

JPRS 76507

26 September 1980

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 7, July 1980



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

26 September 1980

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 7, July 1980

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal **SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Domestic Causes of the Changes in Foreign Policy (A. A. Kokoshin).....	1
The U.S. Armed Forces After the Vietnam Syndrome (E. G. Grigor'yev).....	15
New Capitalist Rationalization Devices (V. B. Supyan).....	29
Advertising: Manufacture of Social Illusions* (O. A. Feofanov).....	43
The Olympics Belong to the World (R. M. Kiselev).....	44
The Republicans and the Presidential Elections (N. N. Glagolev).....	50
United States Interference in El Salvador (Ye. V. Mityayeva).....	58
Applied Space Research (A. A. Vasil'yev).....	63
The United States and UNIDO 3 (V. A. Sokolov).....	72
Economy: The Election Year (Yu. I. Bobrakov).....	76

* Not translated by JPRS.

The Washington Pay-Off*	
(Robert N. Winter-Berger).....	83
American-Canadian Rivalry in Development of Ocean Resources	
(V. D. Pisarev, M. P. Krasnov).....	84
Book Reviews	
American-European Relations, by V. F. Polyakov.....	96
Plans for Strategic Forces, by V. M. Arsov.....	100
China's Role in U.S.-Soviet Relations, by A. A. Nagornyy...	103
Multinationals and Production Internationalization,	
by L. V. Maksimova.....	105
Computer-Aided Political Research, by A. K. Andreyev.....	106
Technological Research in the Arms Field	
(V. V. Potashov).....	108
United States: Energy Problems.....	123
Chronicle of Soviet-American Relations*.....	136

* Not translated by JPRS.

PUBLICATION DATA

English title	: USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY No 7, July 1980
Russian title	: SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA
Author (s)	:
Editor (s)	: N. D. Turkatenko
Publishing House	: Izdatel'stvo Nauka
Place of Publication	: Moscow
Date of Publication	: July 1980
Signed to press	: 11 June 1980
Copies	: 38,000
COPYRIGHT	: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA - ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1980

DOMESTIC CAUSES OF THE CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 3-13

[Article by A. A. Kokoshin]

[Text] The domestic political factors contributing to the Carter Administration's foreign policy reversal at the turn of the decade can only be determined with consideration for prevailing tendencies and processes in the first half of the 1970's. They were largely a result of the internal political struggle over the questions of detente that had been going on in the United States even under the Republican administrations of R. Nixon and G. Ford.

One of the significant features of the American Government's move toward the policy of detente was the fact that this move was accomplished by the Republican Administration of R. Nixon, whose domestic and foreign policy was supported not only by the "center" of the American bourgeois political spectrum, but also by many conservatives. At that time the right wing of the Republican and Democratic parties was more disorganized than ever before in the postwar period. The prestige of its leaders had declined under the influence of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the growth of the mass antiwar movement, which was joined not only by the lower and middle strata of American society, but also a large segment of the ruling class. One of the deciding factors in the growth of these feelings was the negative effect of the tremendous military expenditures on an increasing number of monopolies that were not among the chief producers of military equipment. Under these conditions, the liberal wing of the top political circles in the United States gained strength and became more active, exerting constant pressure on the Nixon Administration to effect the more radical resolution of exceedingly urgent foreign and domestic political problems.¹

President Nixon's official acknowledgement of the strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union and his admission of the impossibility of changing this balance--at least in the 1970's--had a tremendous effect on the foreign policy thinking of U.S. ruling circles and on the

balance of power in Washington. The many changes in the relative economic strength of the United States and its chief capitalist competitors--the Western European countries and Japan--also promoted a more realistic reassessment of many foreign policy postulates and the limitation of the arms race. Prominent American businessmen and statesmen stressed numerous times in the early 1970's that the stronger position of these increasingly formidable rivals of American monopolies was largely due to the fact that most of the Western European states and, in particular, Japan were spending a much smaller portion of their gross national product on military needs than the United States.

Various segments of the American ruling elite, however, invested the concept of detente with their own, sometimes extremely oversimplified and onesided, meaning from the very beginning, even though they supported the compulsory move toward the policy of detente in general.

While the more sober-minded representatives of the ruling class and the political and academic elite serving its interests viewed the policy of detente as the beginning of an unavoidable transition to constant peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures, many American monopolists and politicians regarded detente only as a brief respite in the confrontation with the USSR. Many U.S. statesmen and politicians associated detente with the hope of the "degeneration" of the USSR, of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the ideological struggle and with a joint "division of the world" into spheres of influence for the preservation of the social, military and political status quo. These unfounded hopes soon collapsed under the influence of world events. The Soviet Union had no intention of renouncing the Marxist-Leninist principles of its policy, particularly its support of democratic forces and the national liberation movement, or of withdrawing from the ideological struggle. Moreover, just as the Marxists had predicted, the conditions of detente intensified processes of objective change, reinforced the positions of the socialist community and heightened the successes of the national liberation movement and the developing countries.

The following factor also had a definite effect on feelings about detente in U.S. ruling circles and broader strata. Nixon himself, just as the main "architect" of his administration's foreign policy, H. Kissinger,² evidently took a more realistic view of contemporary international relations and the policy of detente than many American politicians. By publicizing their foreign policy by every means possible within the country, however, they contributed to the rise of "excessively optimistic" views regarding the ongoing positive processes in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The opposition to the Nixon Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union grew as new important results were attained in the relaxation of international tension. After the Moscow meeting (May 1972) of General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee and U.S. President R. Nixon, which concluded with the signing of an entire series of important Soviet-American documents, these forces tried to divest the strategic

arms limitation agreement of most of its meaning and to influence the course of its implementation. The debates that broke out in the United States after the Moscow meeting in connection with the defense budget indicated the practical steps these forces intended to take, and did take; these were not steps directly against the treaties and agreements, but steps to compensate for the new limitations by means of an escalation of the arms race in other areas. These dangerous tendencies were discernible to Soviet experts.³

The most distinct expressions of opposition to the policy of detente at that time were Senator Jackson's amendment in regard to further strategic arms limitation talks in 1972 and the Jackson-Vanek and Stevenson amendments pertaining to trade with the USSR in 1974.

A political counteroffensive was also undertaken by the U.S. military-industrial complex, which saw a mounting threat to its own existence in the results of the detente policy and, in particular, in its prospects. This counteroffensive by the military-industrial complex and other rightist and reactionary forces, including Zionist circles, was launched at a time when the administration, which had done much to promote the policy of detente, was experiencing serious domestic political difficulties in connection with the Watergate affair. The Nixon Administration fell victim to crisis phenomena that had been maturing for decades within the institution of the presidency, to its own abuses of power within the nation and to the massive intrigues of its opponents. The diminishing authority of the President, the almost total preoccupation of R. Nixon and his closest advisers with the struggle for their own survival, the subsequent forced resignation of the chief of state and the transfer of power to G. Ford, who had little experience in international affairs, naturally affected progress in the policy of detente.

One of the important results of the decline in Nixon's influence during the course of the Watergate scandal was the erosion of the centrist coalition on which he had relied for support for his foreign policy. Many of the conservative members of the coalition began to move to the right, particularly in matters pertaining to military detente and U.S. military preparations. Although the liberal wing of the American political elite preserved its relatively constructive approach to arms race limitation talks with the Soviet Union at this time, it made fiercer attacks on the Soviet structure and socialist democracy, which anticipated the "human rights" campaign launched a few years later by J. Carter. The most zealous efforts in this direction were made by the particular segment of the liberal wing that has ties to the pro-Israeli lobby and Zionist organizations.

In 1974, however, rightist forces were unable to prevent a meeting near Vladivostok between General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee and President G. Ford, during the course of which important agreements were concluded on the main aspects of the SALT II talks. At

this meeting, Brezhnev and Ford concluded that favorable prospects existed for the compilation of a new draft agreement in 1975.⁴ Rightist forces were also unable to prevent U.S. participation, with President G. Ford representing the nation, in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the signing of the final document of this conference. As a result of a fierce struggle within the Ford Administration, the "hawk" J. Schlesinger resigned from his position as secretary of defense. But his departure did not influence the administration's plans regarding a return to the policy of increased military preparations. After a slight reduction in U.S. military spending (primarily in connection with the end of the war in Vietnam), the defense budget constantly increased in real terms from fiscal year 1976 on.

Decisions regarding defense budget growth were made by the Ford Administration just before the election campaign of 1976, when his main rival in the Republican Party was R. Reagan, former governor of California, who had rallied the party's right and conservative wing. The effect of Reagan's campaign slogans on the policy of G. Ford, whose position on detente was already inconsistent, was quite noticeable. The administration, conducting its foreign and domestic policy with an eye on the growing Reagan group, as well as other rightist and conservative forces, decided not to conclude the second stage of the talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons and, in general, did not make any progress in other important bilateral and multilateral talks that were supposed to supplement political detente with military detente. The Ford Administration did not make any serious effort to lift the discriminatory restrictions on trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union at that time either. Ford's campaign speeches were also indicative of what was to come: Rightist forces in the United States were particularly pleased with the speech in which the President publicly counseled against the use of the term "detente," replacing it with the cliché, reminiscent of the cold war era, "winning peace through strength."⁵

In this way, just before the present administration took power, the position of rightist forces opposed to detente gained increasing influence over the approach of U.S. ruling circles to the policy of detente as a result of a struggle spanning several years.

The campaign speeches of J. Carter, Democratic Party candidate for the presidency in the 1976 campaign, contained many promises, designed to sound constructive, regarding U.S. foreign policy. Carter made several promises to cut the defense budget and curb the arms race. He also paid considerable attention to certain subjects that are almost compulsory topics for any U.S. politician, such as the need to "strengthen U.S. international positions," to update and improve the quality of the American Armed Forces and so forth, and much of the candidate's rhetoric indicated what was to follow. The propagandists of his campaign seized upon a phrase coined by rightist forces and made energetic use of it: the statement that detente, in its present form, is supposedly a "one-way street," that it allegedly

benefits only the Soviet Union and that this situation must be corrected. The excessively moral tone of his foreign policy statements was also striking --the preaching tone that was inconsistent with the actual state of the problems he discussed and with the need for a constructive and businesslike approach to their resolution.

An analysis of the composition of the top echelon of the new Carter Administration revealed that it consisted of representatives of the sober-minded segment of the American political elite and of individuals who had taken an anti-Soviet and anticommunist stand throughout their political career; moreover, they took this stand so vehemently that there was absolutely no hope that they could take any kind of reasonable approach to the central issues in international relations. An assessment of the views of the new national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski, proved (even with consideration for his attempt, in the works he wrote in first half of the 1970's under the conditions of detente, to camouflage the discredited "hawk" views of the 1950's and 1960's)⁶ that a departure from the line of detente could be expected in U.S. foreign policy if his views should be completely implemented.

Carter's socioeconomic program also seemed quite contradictory. When Carter was making every effort to win the vote of the average American, he promised to reduce the rate of inflation, considerably reduce unemployment, gradually set up a national health system, reduce taxes, accelerate housing construction for low-income families, prevent urban decline, etc. At the same time, one of his main priorities was the eradication of the U.S. federal budget deficit by 1980, which would have required either considerable cuts in federal spending or a rise in taxes, both of which would be inconsistent with the objectives listed above. Cuts in military spending could have aided in reducing the budget deficit, but not cuts on the limited scale proposed by Carter in his campaign speeches.

It is true that the calculations of his advisers regarding the eradication of the federal budget deficit focused on a sweeping reform of the federal tax system (called the "scourge of mankind" by Carter in a fit of campaign demagogy), which was supposed to exclude the possibility of the underpayment of billions of dollars in taxes by the largest corporations and the richest segment of the American population. Many experts in the United States, however, were skeptical about the possibility of conducting this kind of reform from the very beginning--and they turned out to be right.⁷

We cannot exclude the possibility that Carter and his closest advisers were setting these contradictory objectives for 1977-1980 not only because they were following the American political tradition of deliberately deceiving the voters with impossible promises, but also because they were overestimating the capabilities of the new administration. The reasons for this attitude were the personality of the President, his brilliant--by American standards--career as a politician in the heartland, who had won a victory so quickly over his much more famous and experienced rivals, and the

"Carter team's" largely subjective and almost euphoric interpretation of conditions in the United States and in the world.

It seemed that the new administration had reason to feel this way. In terms of a number of political indicators, J. Carter was in a better position than his predecessors G. Ford, R. Nixon and L. Johnson. He did not have to deal with the problem of getting out of the lost war in Vietnam. The U.S. economy was emerging, although with great deal of strain and hesitation, from the most severe crisis since the time of the "great depression." Watergate--a blow, unprecedented in modern U.S. history, to the prestige of the highest executive office--was a thing of the past. Under the influence of the bourgeois mass media, many average Americans were placing their trust in this new President, who had "challenged" all of the villainous politicians who had compromised themselves in one way or another.

In the first months of his term in office, J. Carter had a great deal of public support, but this support began to diminish quickly in just a few months. Economic instability did not disappear: Despite the fact that the crisis of 1974-1975 was over, it was impossible to bring about any noticeable reduction in unemployment or to solve, even temporarily, the problem of inflation. The energy crisis was becoming more serious and was penetrating national economics and politics on a broader scale. Under these conditions, the monopolistic elite took a tougher stand on matters of economic policy and trade relations and was able to bring about a perceptible reduction in the real wages of workers and a dramatic rise in the profits of monopolies in the second half of the 1970's.

The monopolies began to use repressive methods against trade unions on a broader scale than before. Several liberal bills pertaining to social policy in general and labor relations in particular were killed in the Congress under their influence. By the end of the 1970's, this reactionary policy began to arouse increasingly vigorous opposition by trade unions and caused several large labor organizations to move to the left and criticize the policy of the monopolies and the government more openly. A number of influential trade unions joined the fight for cuts in military spending and for the conversion of defense production.

After a brief period of hesitation, vacillation and contradictory behavior, the Carter Administration moved in the direction of conservative methods of economic control, which were more consistent with the traditional approach of Republican rather than Democratic administrations. In an attempt to combat inflation by means of an increasingly overt antilabor policy, the administration began to make cuts in federal social programs, reducing the corresponding budget appropriations and waging a fight against the strike movement that was almost indistinguishable from the one waged by the conservative (in domestic policy terms) administrations of Nixon and Ford. After cutting the federal expenditures on social needs under the guise of instituting "financial discipline" and reducing the federal

budget deficit, Carter went against his campaign promises by agreeing to the growth of the military budget, both in absolute and in relative terms, and this became particularly apparent in the budgets for fiscal years 1979 and 1980.

But even after Carter agreed to higher military appropriations, he could not satisfy the increasing demands of the military-industrial complex and other rightist forces pressuring him for an even more substantial rise in defense spending and the frontal deployment of all of the new weapon systems on which work had already begun. Carter was criticized harshly for his refusal to produce the strategic B-1 bomber, which had been labeled ineffective from the military and economic standpoint by administration experts, for his vacillation on the question of neutron warhead production, for the delays in the development of the new Trident and MX strategic systems, etc. It should be noted that the administration's actions stemmed not so much from its relatively "more sensible" approach (in comparison to rightist and ultra-rightist views) as from the pressure exerted by antiwar forces in the society, which launched, in particular, the massive "Stop the B-1" movement and the movement against the neutron bomb--a movement which engulfed both American and Western Europe, where the neutron warheads were supposed to be deployed. Later events showed, however, that the antiwar movement of the second half of the 1970's in the United States was unable to prevent the general drift of Carter's policy in the direction of militarism and the escalation of international tension.

The administration assigned the energy problem a central place among its priorities, primarily stressing the need to reduce imports of oil.⁸ The successes of the administration--measured in terms of concrete problems and set objectives--were quite meager. Here, just as in many other areas, the administration displayed inconsistency and was unable to win congressional support for its initiatives in the majority of cases. Not one of the energy programs proposed by Carter and repeatedly adjusted during the course of heated domestic political battles won complete congressional approval.⁹ There was a noticeable loss of faith in J. Carter in a considerably segment of the monopolistic elite, and this faith was diminished even more by the fact that the President's conservative budget policy did not restrict the rate of inflation and began to threaten a new recession in industry, which could, according to many bourgeois economists, be more dangerous than the crisis of 1974-1975 both for the United States and for the entire world capitalist economy. In his economic and social policy, therefore, Carter took a considerable risk, including the risk of losing his chances of re-election. After failing to win the necessary trust of most of the nation's monopolistic elite, the President also alienated a large segment of the Democratic mass base (ethnic and racial minorities, the left wing of labor unions, the unemployed, etc.). As a result of all this, in October 1979, just before the election campaign, Carter was in an extremely critical position, enjoying less public support than his chief potential rival in the Democratic Party, Senator Edward Kennedy. His chances were also poor in comparison to the support given to several Republican Party contenders for the presidency.

There is a great deal of evidence that Carter and his closest advisers concluded at that time that, regardless of the steps they might take, they would not be able to bring about any noticeable improvement in national economic affairs--improvements which could be used as a trump card in the political struggle--by the time of the key events of the 1980 campaign.¹⁰ For this reason, an election victory, according to White House calculations, could only be won through foreign policy actions.

Evidently, the possibilities for effective action in a positive and constructive spirit under the conditions of the campaign were very limited, according to the calculations of the "Carter team," thus the possibilities for "dramatic" actions of a forceful nature. Besides this, the administration itself had not displayed the necessary firmness in response to increasing pressure from the right on some important foreign policy matters. The administration's lack of the necessary purposefulness in regard to the positive components of foreign policy strategy led, in particular, to considerable delays by the American side in the talks on SALT II, to the absence of the necessary firmness in talks on other aspects of military detente and to concessions to rightist forces on the questions of a higher budget for the Department of Defense and the implementation of new military programs. After signing the SALT II Treaty and making an energetic initial effort to push the treaty through Congress, the administration gave in to vulgar demagoguery over the so-called "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba during the second stage of the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These maneuvers became one of the factors diminishing the chances of the successful ratification of the SALT II Treaty.¹¹ Many of Carter's closest advisers who assessed these chances at the end of 1979 arrived at the conclusion that attempts to win Senate approval of the treaty would cost much more than originally planned, and this cost would have to come out of the President's already quite meager political capital.

An analysis of the attitudes and opinions of many prominent American statesmen, politicians, financiers and industrialists (the feelings of the latter can easily be discerned from the tone of such leading organs of American monopolistic capital as the WALL STREET JOURNAL, BUSINESS WEEK, FORTUNE, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE and FORBES) indicates that the Carter Administration acted in line with prevailing attitudes in the ruling class, which had taken shape in the second half of the 1970's, when it decided to make the change to a forceful and rigid foreign policy line. In the eyes of a large segment of the American ruling class, one of the chief purposes of this line, in addition to certain foreign policy considerations, was the diversion of public attention away from the constantly deteriorating domestic socioeconomic situation.

Under the influence of most bourgeois propaganda organs, a significant part of the American public was also prepared for the shift to the right after these organs implied that the main cause of all America's misfortunes was the Soviet Union, which was allegedly standing behind the OPEC countries and taking action throughout the world to undermine the

international economic positions of the United States, which would, in turn, affect the well-being of the average American.¹² In the second half of the 1970's, rightist forces were able to convince a considerable segment of the American population of the myth about the "Soviet military threat," in spite of the continuous activity of various organizations supporting detente in the United States and soberly assessing the state of the strategic balance in the world and the intentions of the Soviet Union.¹³

The goal of convincing the American public of the need to achieve military superiority to the USSR has recently been quite evident in the propaganda of several influential organizations of the political elite. The purpose of this is another attempt, just as in the first postwar years, to use the policy of nuclear blackmail. Supposedly, only this can prevent the further deterioration of U.S. international economic positions while preserving the material components of the American way of life.¹⁴

The President's increasing need to shift the emphasis in campaign debates from domestic problems to international issues was partially answered by the crisis in American-Iranian relations, caused by the provocative U.S. act of giving refuge to the deposed shah. When the American Embassy in Iran was seized, Carter used this as an excuse to create an atmosphere of foreign policy crisis, to stimulate chauvinistic feelings and to demonstrate the "force" and "determination" that the average American finds so impressive. By the end of the 1970's, many people in the United States began to forget that this kind of behavior by American presidents had pushed the world to the verge of a third world war during the Berlin (1961) and Caribbean (1962) crises and had brought America to defeat in the Vietnam War.

The tactic Carter chose proved effective over the short range. As the Iranian crisis developed, his chances of re-election were better than the chances of the Republican contenders and E. Kennedy. His competition with the latter in the campaign (possibly right up to the time of the Democratic convention, where the official party candidate will be nominated) is now the main object of the "Carter team's" concern and political maneuvering. But this "team" must realize that the rise in the President's popularity could be quite shortlived and could disappear by the time of the decisive events of the 1980 campaign. This was one of the important reasons why Carter took advantage of the events in Afghanistan to conduct an even tougher policy toward the USSR and to take steps, which were widely publicized by the White House and by many bourgeois mass news organs and which undermined detente in U.S.-Soviet relations¹⁵ and harmed the cause of world peace.

While Carter was pursuing his own selfish domestic political goals, he was also acting in accordance with the long-range goals of influential forces that had persistently fought throughout the 1970's for a revision of detente policy, for a new buildup of military strength and for the restoration of lost U.S. military, political and economic positions by extending Washington's military presence to those parts of the world where

military contingents of the Western European colonial powers had once been stationed. "The anti-Soviet avalanche was necessary not only so that someone on the crest of this wave could triumph in the presidential election in the fall," stressed General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev. "The main thing is that the United States decided to establish a network of its military bases in the Indian Ocean, in the countries of the Near and Middle East and in the African countries. The United States would like to subject these countries to its hegemony and to make use of their natural wealth unimpeded. It would also like to simultaneously use their territory in its own strategic intrigues against the socialist world and national liberation forces."¹⁶

The Carter Administration's foreign policy actions in the cold war spirit and the overdramatization of the international situation--with consideration for the abovementioned general tendency toward a rightward shift in the American political spectrum--are naturally fueling chauvinistic and anti-Soviet feelings in the United States. Several politicians, primarily the chief Republican Party contender for the presidency, R. Reagan, have taken an even more rigid stand, accusing Carter of taking "inadequate" measures.

At the same time, some of the administration's anti-Soviet actions have been criticized by the majority of Republican Party leaders as behavior contrary to the interests of a specific segment of the business community (this primarily applies to the embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union).

More sweeping condemnations of the Carter Administration's turn to the right were voiced by Senator E. Kennedy and by another Democratic Party contender, California Governor E. Brown, who later withdrew from the race. However, neither refrained from attacking the policy of the USSR in the Middle East. Their statements, along with the sharp criticism of the administration by several sociopolitical organizations, including some labor unions, testifies that the struggle over detente is not over in the United States, although the position of realistic-minded representatives of the ruling class and various democratic forces has deteriorated noticeably. According to some American press organs, there are also definite differences between the views of top-level administration officials in regard to the Afghan crisis.

Assessing the domestic political situation at the beginning of 1980, Secretary General G. Hall of the Communist Party of the United States of America said the following: "The American people have not forgotten the frightening years of the McCarthy era. They have not forgotten Watergate either. As a result, the people do not believe the government or the monopolies and are not giving in to hysteria. This is an extremely reliable safeguard against a return to the cold war. Although there is no complete agreement on the events in Afghanistan, the majority of Americans

are categorically against a slide into cold war, which could lead to a 'hot' nuclear war. Besides this, even within ruling circles there are disagreements over where the country should be led.... Loud voices have been raised within the ruling class in favor of peace, detente, increased trade and peaceful coexistence, as this policy is in the interest of part of this class, in the interest of those of its representatives who derive higher profits from trade and the preservation of peace than from war and embargoes."

FOOTNOTES

1. See "The Memoirs of Richard Nixon," N.Y., 1978, pp 414-418, 541-543; H. Kissinger, "The White House Years," Boston, 1979, pp 195-225, 228-302, 1010-1016.
2. It is apparent that H. Kissinger experienced a noticeable shift to the right in his views on many international political issues by the end of the 1970's; this was clearly reflected in his move from a centrist position to right of center to an openly rightist position in the Republican Party political spectrum. There is no question that this colored his retrospective look at international relations (H. Kissinger, Op. cit., pp 522-557, 788, 841, 1202-1307).
3. See, for example, G. A. Arbatov, "An Event of International Significance," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1972, p 11.
4. "Dokumenty i materialy sovetsko-amerikanskoy vstrechi vo Vladivostoke" [Documents and Materials of the Soviet-American Meeting in Vladivostok], Moscow, 1974, p 20.
5. "Facts on File Yearbook," N.Y., 1976, p 165.
6. "Amerikanskaya istoriografiya vneshney politiki SShA 1945-1970" [American Historical Works on U.S. Foreign Policy in 1945-1970], Moscow, 1972, pp 29-30, 162-163.
7. According to the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, uncollected federal budget revenues, mostly in the form of the underpayment of taxes by corporations and private owners of large holdings in fiscal year 1979, totaled 36 billion dollars, or 20 percent of the federal budget. If the present system is preserved, they could reach 188 billion by fiscal year 1983 ("Five-Year Budget Projections. Fiscal Years 1979-1983. Supplement on Tax Expenditures. Congress of the United States. Congressional Budget Office," Wash., 1979, p IX). According to MIT Professor L. Turov, taxes on corporate profits in the 1970's represented only 16 percent of federal tax revenues, as opposed to 22 percent in the 1960's (THE NATION, 17 March 1979, p 271).

8. The lack of any kind of noticeable progress in the resolution of one of the main aspects of the energy problem--U.S. dependence on imports of oil--was reflected in the fact that, whereas in 1976 this nation imported 7.3 million barrels of oil a day, amounting to 31.8 billion dollars a year in cost terms, in 1979 oil imports already amounted to 8.5 million barrels a day at a cost of 50 billion dollars a year. The correlation of the cost of oil imports to total American exports (goods and services) rose from 16.6 percent to 24.6 percent, which graphically illustrates the exacerbation of the problem of the U.S. balance of trade due to increasing imports of oil (OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 12 November 1979, p 175).
9. Renowned American historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who was one of the closest advisers of the "Kennedy clan," said in an address to a congress of the influential liberal organization "Americans for Democratic Action" that, under present conditions, "President Carter is facing domestic problems that are just as fundamental and urgent as those faced by President F. Roosevelt in the 1930's. Above all, inflation and the energy crisis are problems of this magnitude." But whereas Carter is in a similar position, the historian continued, he is not acting like Roosevelt, he is not acting according to Democratic Party traditions, but more like Republican President Grover Cleveland, one of the most conservative presidents in American history (A. Schlesinger, "Who Needs Grover Cleveland?" THE NEW REPUBLIC, 7-14 July 1979, pp 14-15).
10. An interesting analysis of the political aspects of the state of the U.S. economy and Carter's economic policy was published in BUSINESS WEEK: "The first delegates to the 1980 Democratic convention will be elected in just 3 months, but Jimmy Carter is approaching this fateful day in his political career in an extremely pitiful state. The measures taken by the board of directors of the Federal Reserve System to limit credit are making Secretary of the Treasury William Miller's recent assurances that the recession is already half over sound laughable. A policy of the actual limitation of money in circulation...signifies, on the political level, that the recession has not even begun. Unemployment will most likely take a dramatic jump by the time of the primary election. And the rise in unemployment cannot be compensated for fully by lower inflation indicators at a time when the price of oil and the prime rate continue to rise" (BUSINESS WEEK, 22 October 1979, p 130).
11. Inconsistency was also displayed by some influential senators (including Chairman F. Church of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), who had vigorously fought for the successful passage of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate prior to this. Their behavior was largely due to the mounting threat from the right in their own electoral districts just before the 1980 elections. Organizations of the "new right," such as "Americans for the Survival of a Free

Congress" and the "National Conservative Committee for Political Action," had announced that they would unseat several influential liberal senators, including the abovementioned F. Church, G. McGovern, A. Cranston, J. Culver and B. Bayh (TIME, 20 August 1979, pp 20, 22).

12. The publications of prominent reactionary and Zionist N. Podhoretz, editor of COMMENTARY magazine, serve as some of the most vivid examples of propagandistic statements by the opponents of detente. In an article printed in the NEW YORK TIMES, which generally adheres to a more sober line, N. Podhoretz wrote in a regretful tone that the idea of the seizure of Arab oil deposits by U.S. armed forces in response to the sharp rise in OPEC prices was "rejected" by the Nixon Administration, and that this had occurred because, in the author's words, under the conditions of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, as recorded in the SALT I agreements, American military strength was "completely fettered." For this reason, he appealed for an all-out fight against SALT II, which would supposedly perpetuate the U.S. strategic "lag": If the new Soviet-American agreement should go into effect, U.S. opportunities for the forceful "resolution" of the energy problem would be even more limited (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 July 1979, p A-17).
13. According to public opinion polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the number of persons in favor of increased military spending was 38 percent higher by the end of the 1970's than in 1974. In 1978, 72 percent of all respondents felt that the United States was lagging behind the Soviet Union more and more in the military sphere ("American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1979," edited by J. Rielly, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979, p 25).
14. One of the leaders of the notorious "Committee on the Present Danger," E. Rostow, wrote in this connection: "Our policy of intimidation will unavoidably go beyond the protection of the United States against possible nuclear attack. We must also provide for nuclear safeguards of our interests throughout the world and acquire the ability to defend these interests by means of diplomacy or the use of conventional weapons.... In the first postwar years we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and in the next decade or so--approximately up to the middle or the end of the 1960's--we had definite nuclear superiority. We responded to threats to our interests with diplomatic means or, when diplomacy failed, with the use or resolute threat of the use of conventional weapons. But nuclear weapons were always the decisive factor, giving strength to our actions.... At the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's our nuclear superiority disappeared and...could not therefore determine the course of events in Southeast Asia.... The Committee on the Present Danger, which I represent, is against the SALT II Treaty because it...will keep us from restoring the nuclear intimidation potential on which our national security will ultimately depend" (E. Rostow, "SALT II--A Soft Bargain, a Hard Sell," POLICY REVIEW, Fall 1978, pp 47-48, 55).

15. One of the Republican Party contenders for the presidency, Senator R. Dole, expressed a quite definite opinion in regard to these events in a LOS ANGELES TIMES interview in January 1980: "All of this, it seems to me, is a maneuver undertaken to divert attention from Iran. The administration's hopes are running low. Nothing more can be squeezed out of the Iranian crisis unless the hostages are released. And the administration is beginning to wonder how to get out of this crisis. The best tactic is to focus the attention of the Americans on some other explosive situation--the events in Afghanistan, for example. This makes it possible to talk loudly about embargos, olympics and other such things, kindling the public's patriotic feelings and willingness for self-sacrifice. I asked National Security Adviser Brzezinski if all the noise about Afghanistan was designed to divert public attention away from Iran. He did not say yes or no, but I think I understood him. In my opinion, a diversionary maneuver will now be undertaken in an attempt to restore the shaky prestige of government."
16. PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
17. DAILY WORLD, 31 January 1980.

8588

CSO: 1803

THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AFTER THE VIETNAM SYNDROME

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 14-24

[Article by E. G. Grigor'yev]

[Text] Reliance on military strength as one of the main U.S. foreign policy instruments has been a salient feature of American imperialism and, judging by recent events, still is. According to the data of the Brookings Institution, the U.S. Armed Forces were used 215 times in the 30 years after the war to brandish a "military fist"--7.2 times a year on the average--and the "use of strategic nuclear weapons was threatened, directly or indirectly," 19 times. In three decades, the American Government sent naval ships to foreign shores 177 times for armed intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, transport planes were used 106 times for this purpose, land-based aviation was used 103 times, and U.S. Army units landed on foreign territory 45 times.¹ In these years, the United States spent almost 2 trillion dollars for military purposes.

Millions of American soldiers and officers took part in aggressive wars and shows of strength. The Americans who went through just the war in Indochina numbered 2,796,000.²

The military machine of American imperialism turned out to be incapable, however, of overcoming the Vietnamese people's resistance. The reasons for the defeat in Indochina included major difficulties encountered by the U.S. military command in maintaining the morale and fighting spirit of the troops, particularly during the last stage of the war. The huge difference between reality and the ideas and beliefs artificially instilled in the minds of soldiers and sailors, and their gradual recognition of the unjust goals and nature of the war and of their role in it caused individual servicemen and even subunits to refuse to fight and gave rise to acts of revenge against the most despised officers, the frank expression of dissatisfaction and protest against the policy of ruling circles, and the growth of anti-imperialist feelings. Racial conflicts and confrontations increased in intensity and frequency, mass desertion took on clearly defined political features, and there was an unprecedented outburst of

crime and drug addiction. The methods that had always been used by ruling circles and the military command to keep military personnel in line and use them for the attainment of aggressive goals were obviously inadequate under the specific conditions of the war in Vietnam. The war, as the American press admitted, drove the U.S. Armed Forces to the verge of a moral catastrophe.

A broad group of measures was planned and is being carried out energetically within the U.S. Armed Forces to neutralize the sociopolitical consequences of the failure of the aggression against the Indochinese people. The measures include changes in the recruitment procedure, stricter political security checks, the more intensive ideological and psychological training of personnel in the spirit required by the U.S. command, and changes in the American Army and Navy lifestyle and regulations.

The repeal of the selective service system and the institution of exclusively volunteer American armed forces in mid-1973³ brought about changes in the means and methods used to shape the moral and psychological consciousness of American servicemen.

Above all, the need to recruit volunteers for the armed forces considerably expanded the scales of militaristic propaganda, especially among youth, conducted under the banner of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, accompanied by a commotion over the mythical "Soviet military threat." The network of recruiting stations was noticeably enlarged throughout the nation. Each of these became a military propaganda center. The methods used by thousands of recruiters included the sending of letters with militaristic advertising material to young people and their parents, telephone calls, and meetings and conversations with high school graduates. These recruiters are making extensive use of modern technical propaganda media, including radio, film equipment and videotape recorders, to instill militaristic ideas.⁴

The scales of this recruiting activity can be judged from the following figure: According to statistics, the recruiter meets and talks with 24 young people for each 1 he recruits, and therefore has an opportunity to influence a considerable segment of the younger generation.⁵ He not only showers praise on the benefits, privileges and conditions of service in the armed forces and calls it "prestigious," but also injects a definite dose of addictive militarism. The professional training given to recruiters in special academic centers aids them in keeping track of new trends in the feelings and general educational background of today's young Americans and in using more subtle methods of mental deception.

Allocations for armed service advertising have increased dramatically. This publicity is supposed to restore the prestige of the American soldier and of the entire U.S. Army--the prestige which declined after Vietnam. The Pentagon is spending almost 100 million dollars a year on this, or approximately 22 dollars per recruit.⁶ In 1 year the U.S. Defense Department produces 1,141 movies, 3,560 television films and 3,412 radio programs.

Millions of dollars are being spent to organize parades and demonstrations of military equipment.⁷

The reluctance of a considerable segment of youth to serve in the armed forces is the reason for the chronic underfulfillment of recruitment plans, particularly in the land forces. In 1979 the other branches of the armed services also experienced this problem for the first time in many years.⁸

This has been partially compensated for by the greater number of reenlistments. According to Pentagon calculations, 100 professional servicemen are capable of replacing 250 young soldiers, particularly in technical jobs. The most economical combination is thought to be 40 percent professional and 60 percent working on the first tour of duty.⁹ Around 67 percent of those who serve more than 1 term will reenlist.¹⁰ In fiscal year 1979, 138,000 individuals in just the land forces planned to extend their tour.¹¹

The length of contracted terms of service (usually at least 4 years) objectively aids in the further professionalization of the armed forces, weakens the ties between servicemen and working strata, isolates servicemen from society and thereby reinforces the barriers keeping progressive ideas out of the armed forces. A term of service lasting many years will not only turn the soldier into an excellent military specialist, which is in itself of great importance to today's army, but also extends the period during which all-round moral and psychological pressure is exerted on the serviceman for the purpose of instilling him with the necessary qualities. The interest of many people in a military career, including the financial motive, is being exploited in every way possible.

When the U.S. military leadership forecasts future recruitment indicators, it gauges not only the degree to which militaristic propaganda influences the views and beliefs of the younger American generation, but also the specific sociopolitical situation in the nation and the possibility of changes in this situation. Under the conditions of constant economic difficulties in capitalist America and chronic unemployment, particularly among youth, the advertised promises of a tolerable guaranteed wage, free training in a specialty useful in civilian life, and education benefits are quite appealing to some young Americans and, to many, seem to be their only escape from difficult circumstances.

The change to a volunteer army increased the number of members of the poorest strata of American society in the U.S. Armed Forces. In land forces, which were most affected by the repeal of the draft, the percentage accounted for among total recruits by members of families with incomes below the official poverty level rose from 16 percent to 30 percent in the first year, and the percentage of those from families with above-average incomes dropped from 17 percent to 9.6 percent in the same period.¹² And this has been a continuing tendency. According to the ARMY TIMES, "the army has become the last chance of a job for many. Although it is called a volunteer army, the bitter truth is that hunger is forcing a huge number of soldiers to sign up."¹³

In the volunteer army there are more declassé elements and even former criminals, who are least susceptible to the political pressure exerted by the military command. It is known, for example, that between October 1976 and August 1977, 22,700 volunteers concealed information about prior arrests or convictions. Only 4,000 of them were rejected, while the rest were accepted for service.¹⁴

Changes in the social composition of volunteers have lowered the intellectual and education level of new recruits. Whereas 40,000 college graduates were drafted into the army in 1964, only 5,000 joined in 1978.¹⁵ As the American press noted, "the children of wealthy parents enroll in the best universities, they attend excellent academic institutions in preparation for prestigious work. After the repeal of the draft these citizens were completely relieved of military service responsibilities. The less fortunate are carrying their burden."¹⁶

On the whole, the change to a volunteer U.S. Army is increasing the number of disoriented recruits, victims of the bourgeois way of life and militaristic propaganda. According to the military press, the U.S. Army and Navy are "attracting too many social outcasts, people who resent authority, have never persevered in any endeavor and have simply refused to display any kind of self-discipline."¹⁷

This is corroborated by the data of periodic surveys of young soldiers. They indicate that only 23 percent of the respondents joined the armed forces in the hope of "serving their country." The rest were attracted by the possibility of "acquiring a career useful in civilian life" (38 percent) or of continuing their college education (44 percent) and traveling around the world (33 percent).¹⁸ In the words of one American officer, "the young recruits almost never mention patriotism."¹⁹ Around 95 percent feel that financial incentives are of primary importance in military service.

The attitudes, views and beliefs of the absolute majority of servicemen, however, undergo significant changes during the process of military service.

The development of the soldiers' morale and fighting ability begins long before they join the armed forces as a result of the entire way of life in bourgeois American society, but it is more concentrated and purposeful during their period of service. As soon as a soldier or sailor arrives in the training center where recruits are sent, the young individual is forced to adapt to a strange social environment. Here he is divested of most of his individuality, his customary living patterns are ruthlessly disrupted, objective elements of class awareness and perception are stifled, and he is inculcated with the ideas prevailing in the armed forces and a different way of thinking.

First of all, all of the illusions about military service that have been fostered by advertising are wrecked. The novice American soldier first realizes the huge discrepancy between advertised promises and actual conditions and mores in the U.S. Armed Forces "when the drill sergeant begins

to break his psychological back."²⁰ At the training center, the young soldier or sailor encounters insults, taunts and humiliation at every turn. Cases of recruits being worked to death by drill sergeants are far from isolated. The recently publicized almost simultaneous deaths of two recruits soon after their arrival at a training base compelled U.S. Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander to admit that these deaths were the result of "complete and irresponsible contempt for human life" in the army environment.²¹ The command's attempts to blame the soldiers' deaths on the brutality of individual drill sergeants were futile. During congressional hearings on the matter, some demanded that not only these sergeants be held responsible, but also top-level military leaders, and Congressman Sam Stratton, drawing a parallel with the trial of Lieutenant Calley, said: "Why does the army always blame everything on the lower ranks and allow the higher ones to get off scot-free?"²²

The disobedient or less pliable soldiers are "disciplined" with socks on the jaw. In July 1978, for example, there were 22 victims of drill sergeant brutality in just one company at the army's Fort Dix training center in New Jersey. They were beaten with fists, belts, sticks and other objects.²³ Similar cases have occurred at many other training centers. Servility is cultivated with the aid of intimidation. The threat of losing the future advantages for which the recruit joined the armed forces heightens psychological tension and the sense of fatal dependence on those on higher rungs of the service ladder. The willingness to unconsciously act on any order is cultivated and reinforced in the young recruit by any means available. Rigid schedules and extreme physical and psychological strain are calculated to, as Drill Instructor Michael Wedgers declared, "put the soldier to sleep a second after he lies down in his bunk at night."

A study of the behavior of new arrivals at training centers showed that many of them were subjected to as much stress as people who have experienced personal tragedies. The biochemical changes in their organism are even more pronounced than the physical changes brought about by combat.²⁴

The psychological shock and deterioration are gradually replaced by the humility required for the development of the necessary skills and characteristics; the person loses his individuality. As U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT eloquently put it, "the word 'I' disappears from the recruit's vocabulary when his hair hits the barber's floor the morning he arrives at the training camp."²⁵ The cultivation of "instinctive obedience" plays an important role. This implies the complete eradication of conscious behavioral motives and is achieved by instilling the fear of punishment.

Disciplinary penalties, used extensively by the command to keep recruits and soldiers in the ranks in line, play a significant role. The system of disciplinary penalties stipulated in the code of military law includes arrest and confinement for up to 30 days, the imposition of extra duties for up to 45 days, confinement to quarters, etc. The suspension of up to 50 percent of the soldier's wages for up to 2 months and the stoppage of

up to two-thirds of wages for 2 months are also widely practiced by the command. Regulations permit the simultaneous imposition of two or even three penalties for a single infraction. Moreover, one of these penalties is usually connected with financial losses and is especially painful to endure.

Unit commanders have the right to not only punish guilty soldiers and sailors on behalf of the disciplinary court, but also to record their convictions.

The transfer to a volunteer army considerably simplified the procedure of dismissing unfit or undesirable--for any reason--soldiers and sergeants. The unit command has the right to dismiss, "with the retention of benefits and privileges," soldiers who have undergone their basic training for the "inability to adapt," unsatisfactory progress in training or "nonconformity." There is the practice of the "immediate discharge"--the commander's right to get rid of servicemen who have what he considers to be a poor attitude, who do not display enough interest in military service or who are unable to adapt to army life. Other grounds for dismissal are "unworthy behavior," "unfitness" and "contract violations."²⁶

Although the U.S. Armed Forces lose 6,000-9,500 dollars when a soldier or sailor is discharged, the command readily resorts to this action in order to, on the one hand, intimidate personnel and, on the other, develop the necessary qualities in servicemen. In fiscal year 1977, 93,651 individuals were dismissed from just land forces, including 34,342 who were processed as "immediate discharges" and "recruit discharges." On the average, one out of every three young soldiers is dismissed.²⁷

An effective means of influencing those who want a career in the military is the command's right to disallow reenlistment. In 1977, for example, 37 percent of the reenlistment applications of those who wished to remain in the army after their first term of service were denied.²⁸ Sergeants and top sergeants with many years of army service can be dismissed by the decision of boards of experts "in the interests of the service." The traditional discharge of any serviceman by the verdict of a military court is also still practiced.

Intensive political indoctrination is still the chief method of forming the political views and convictions of American servicemen and convincing them to fight for the interests of monopolistic circles--interests which are objectively alien to them. This indoctrination is conducted through a widely diversified system by various means and methods at specially scheduled times, during the process of military training and during leisure hours.

The basic content of the ideological training given to U.S. military personnel has not undergone any fundamental changes in recent years, although there has been some shift in emphasis. The fanciful thesis about a

constantly mounting Soviet "military threat" and, in line with this, the discrediting of the Soviet Government's foreign policy activity and the misrepresentation of the goals and objectives of the Soviet Armed Forces are still prominent in anticommunist propaganda, which represents the focal point of ideological indoctrination. The political system of the Soviet socialist state with its truly democratic character is still the object of constant falsification.

The American way of life, American democracy and all of its institutions are still being extolled, and the "special mission" of the United States and its armed forces to defend "democracy," "freedom" and "justice" throughout the world is insistently propagandized. The "normality" of intervention in the affairs of other countries and peoples is still being substantiated.

These important areas of ideological indoctrination are calculated to make armed forces personnel devoted to the American way of life and convince them that "the United States has only one enemy--the Russians."²⁹ They contribute to a stereotypical view of developments in the world from the standpoint of "stronger or weaker Russian influence."³⁰ As the instructions of U.S. ground force commanders (regulating personnel training procedures) stress, the command should strive to make servicemen aware of the "external danger of communism and other forces posing a threat to the United States and the entire free world."³¹

The transfer to a volunteer army somewhat weakened "positive propaganda," which was based on bourgeois ideas of patriotism and duty. As prominent American military sociologist Charles Moskos notes, "after the repeal of the compulsory draft, the armed forces will cease to be an institution based on 'duty, honor and loyalty to the nation': Now this profession will be based on economic motives."³²

Attempts to neutralize the consequences of the U.S. aggression in Indochina have recently occupied a prominent place in the ideological training of American servicemen. The efforts of the propaganda network have been focused on removing thoughts about shameful defeat from the minds of servicemen and replacing the image of the American soldier as chastiser and executioner of the Vietnamese people, which still lives in the American public memory, with the false image of the martyr-hero, the fighter for the American people's national interest. A nationwide campaign has been launched to whitewash the crimes of the American military establishment in Vietnam and to eulogize the veterans of this war.

As early as 1976 the National Alliance of Businessmen proposed a program to "give credit to the young Americans who remained loyal to their military and patriotic duty." Participants in the Vietnam adventure are hypocritically compared to the veterans of World War II and are held up as an example to all military personnel.

A memorial plaque with the following inscription was unveiled at Arlington National Cemetery, where the remains of almost 57,000 American soldiers and

officers who died in Indochina are honored. "The people of the United States pledge their respect to the American servicemen who honorably served in Southeast Asia at the time of the Vietnam conflict." By a decision of President Carter, a Vietnam Veterans' week was declared in 1979. The decision stipulated that, during this week, "the contribution of Vietnam-era veterans to national defense should be stressed"; they "served bravely and honorably" but were given no recognition because this "war was unpopular." An attempt is being made to blame the unpopularity of the war on the American newsmen who covered the events in Indochina. In a special study published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the National War College, the persons responsible for the defeat suffered by American imperialism in the Vietnam adventure are declared to be "most reporters...who were biased by their strong hatred for war and their deep mistrust of the military" and "harshly distorted the events of some of the most crucial periods of the war."³¹

At the same time, the Army press is doing everything within its power to discredit studies and materials attesting to the criminal role of the American military establishment, is concealing its evil actions and is distorting the political goals of the aggression and the liberating nature of the Vietnamese people's struggle.

The memoirs of former participants in the war, which "tell it like it is" and which supposedly reach a "level of realism," are persistently recommended to the military reader. In particular, many military publications have printed rave reviews of a book by Frederick Downs, former platoon commander in Vietnam--"The Killing Zone."³² This "diary" describes the difficulties and dangers encountered at every step by American soldiers in Vietnam. In reference to the author of this book, the ARMY TIMES wrote the following: "It takes courage to go against the prevailing opinion that all stories about Vietnam should conform to the same pattern of a homicidal madman and drug addict who commits two brutal crimes before breakfast and half a dozen more by sunset." Acclaimed novels, such as "Heroes," "Vietnam Knights," "The Boys in Company C" and others, also idealize the behavior of American servicemen.³³

Official propaganda is striving to inculcate servicemen not only with respect for Vietnam veterans, but also with sympathy and empathy for them. In particular, photographs of Downs, the author of the "memoirs" mentioned above, showing the book he now wears as a substitute for the hand he lost when it was blown up by a land-mine in Vietnam, have been imprinted on the servicemen's memory. Another photograph published in the Army press depicts a certain Joseph F. Andrew, standing next to his wheelchair, in which his two good-looking children are sitting. According to the caption, just a little over 10 years ago Andrew hoped for a place on the national Olympic running team. A few months later "a booby-trap set by Vietnamese partisans immediately dashed his hopes. He lost his left leg and right eye, and his body was riddled with shrapnel."³⁴

Certain changes have also taken place in recent years in the moral and psychological indoctrination of personnel during the process of army and navy combat training.

Ever since World War II, virtually all American armed service exercises have been conducted on an overly anticommunist basis. They have usually been exercises in "repulsing communist troops invading a neighboring country," or "helping the legal government of a nation invaded by communists" or "striking at troops invading from the east," and so forth. The same atmosphere is created even in our day. But whereas American soldiers and officers trained after the aggression in Korea were indoctrinated in special training centers modeled on "POW camps" in North Korea, where the "captive" American servicemen were "tormented" by American soldiers dressed in the uniforms of soldiers and officers of the DPRK, and whereas training during the years of the war in Vietnam took place in specially equipped "Vietnamese villages," where the skills of fighting against patriots and the psychological willingness to treat civilians brutally were cultivated, combat training is now of an overtly anti-Soviet nature.

Since 1974, field exercises have pitted new recruits against American soldiers and officers specially trained in Soviet army combat tactics and dressed in Soviet Army uniforms. According to a report in *SOLDIERS* magazine, for example, a "Soviet defense point" was set up at Fort Benning, Georgia, surrounded by barbed wire and peppered by trenches, dugouts and shelters for tanks and armored personnel carriers. In Fort Hood, Texas, American soldiers are forced to live according to Soviet Army regulations and schedules. They, as the same magazine reports, "are roused from their beds by Soviet Army music and are given horscht for breakfast. Their daily physical exercises and...briefings are modeled on the Soviet type."³⁷

The use of dummy Soviet military equipment and weapons in tactical exercises and firing practice has become customary. In Fort Bragg, in particular, dummy Soviet tanks are used in antitank weapon firing practice. Special subunits have been set up on the model of Soviet missile defense and other combat troops. "Aggressor" training squadrons have been formed in the U.S. Air Force; the pilots in these squadrons are trained in Soviet Air Force battle tactics and undergo their combat training in planes with Soviet emblems.³⁸

During the war in Vietnam and immediately afterward, the U.S. military leadership was particularly disturbed by the birth and development of a more or less organized antimilitarist, democratic movement in the Armed Forces. The establishment and widespread influence of such organizations as the League of American Servicemen, the Movement for Democratic Armed Forces and others, and the publication and distribution of antiwar newspapers for soldiers had a definite effect on the political attitudes of American servicemen. Although all of these organizations functioned within the bounds of bourgeois legality, they were not under the control of the military command, and this naturally gave rise to mounting anxiety.

The end of the war in Indochina and the withdrawal of American troops from this part of the world did not result in the quick and automatic dissipation of these feelings. Ruling circles and the military command took an entire series of ideological and organizational steps to divert the attention of servicemen away from political problems to material matters, and then to push for the passage of legislation prohibiting any kind of independent political activity in the armed forces.

The debates over "unionization" in the armed forces played a significant role. The two leading unions in the AFL-CIO--the American Federation of Government Employees and the United National Dockworkers--wanted to extend membership rights to servicemen. When this matter was being discussed, it was repeatedly stressed that the unions did not intend to become involved, as one of their leaders declared, "in so-called ideological matters" and would limit their goals exclusively to economic matters. It was expected that, since many recruits regard service in the armed forces as an ordinary job, they would support the idea of "unionization."

The more than 2 years of debates over "unionization" and the persistent emphasis on economic problems gradually toned down the servicemen's political attitudes that were undesirable to the military command and reduced these attitudes to dissatisfaction with certain aspects of military service. The mass expulsion of all servicemen who displayed any kind of political activity contributed a great deal. In 1975 alone, around 80,000 people, or one-eighth of all discharged servicemen, were given a dishonorable discharge largely for precisely these reasons.³⁹ Base commanders were given the right to prohibit political speeches and the distribution of leaflets on military territory.

The question of the "unionization" of the armed forces was completely closed by the passage of a law prohibiting servicemen from joining unions or encouraging others to join, and prohibiting commanders and other administrative personnel from engaging in any kind of negotiations with servicemen.

But the banning of political activity by servicemen did not eradicate social class differences in the U.S. Armed Forces. Moreover, the transfer to a volunteer army and the increased professionalization of army and navy life objectively created the necessary conditions for the growth of these differences. The dissatisfaction of many soldiers and sailors with their inferior status and their callous treatment by officers, particularly senior officers, are a constant source of indignation.

The question of racial relations is still a major problem for the American command. In an attempt to subside the wave of racial conflicts that flared up during the Vietnam war, the Pentagon first increased the percentage of black Americans in the armed forces. Army propaganda energetically publicized this as a so-called new policy of "racial equality and brotherhood." The number of blacks and members of other ethnic minorities in the Army rose dramatically, as it was precisely for these strata of American society

that the army appeared to be a refuge from mass unemployment. By mid-1978 there were 370,000 blacks in the armed forces--that is, more than 18 percent of all military personnel, including 30.3 percent of the soldiers and 6.4 percent of the officers.⁴⁰

American military circles perceive a definite potential threat to the army's "reliability quotient" in this "blackening" of the armed forces. In the first place, there are more and more people joining the army who are least trusted by American ruling circles to defend their interests. In connection with this, a Defense Department report proposed that the excessive concentration of blacks in combat positions be avoided. "The image of the black man dying in a white man's war," the document stressed, "could give rise to extremely serious problems." In the second place, military strategists are afraid that this process could lower the professional and technical level of military personnel, since, according to American specialists, it is precisely this contingent that is distinguished by a lower educational level.

Discrimination against black Americans in the armed forces is constantly exacerbating racial conflicts. The post-Vietnam years have provided many examples of increasing racial hatred in the army and, in particular, in the navy, where Ku Klux Klan members have been noticeably more active. Young fascists have provoked many racial conflicts on ships and army bases. Admiral Thomas Hayward, chief of naval operations, had to publish a special directive to ban the distribution of racist publications and the functioning of racist organizations in the navy. According to the U.S. military press, however, "racism in the army is a reality, regardless of whether it is covert or overt."⁴¹

The end of the war in Vietnam and the transfer to a volunteer army did not put an end to such characteristic American army phenomena as desertion (deliberate absence without leave for more than 30 days). The number of deserters in the volunteer army is now twice as high as during the pre-Vietnam period. During the first 4 years of the volunteer army's existence, 608,000 people deserted the armed forces or took long unauthorized leaves. During the same period, the FBI apprehended 80,000 deserters.⁴²

In recent years, however, deserters were no longer reported to the FBI, but were simply discharged for breaking their contract by a decision of the unit commander. These absences are compensated for by additional recruitment.

Drug addiction and drunkenness are still an acute social problem in the U.S. Armed Forces. Official Pentagon statistics attest to the huge scales of the phenomena. It has been reported, for example, that 50 percent of the young people entering the armed forces have already experimented with drugs.⁴³ Naturally, far from all of them are drug addicts, but the spread of this phenomenon is arousing anxiety in the United States. Those who cannot break the habit are driven out of the army and navy, particularly if they are young soldiers or sailors, while necessary and experienced specialists are sent for compulsory treatment. Regulations against drug

abuse have been made much stricter in the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, where this problem is particularly acute.

Similar steps have been taken to combat alcoholism, which, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, "was tolerated and even encouraged for so long in the army." Six alcohol abuse treatment centers have been opened just for American troops stationed in the FRG.

The transfer to a volunteer army in the United States changed the attitude of the command toward many problems in the army and navy.

A broad group of steps taken by the U.S. military and political leadership in recent years went a long way toward stopping the process by which soldiers were becoming politically aware, stabilized the situation in the armed forces and restored their reliability as a means of implementing the aggressive line of imperialist circles. Almost one-fourth of all servicemen are now serving outside the United States, and last year the number of American troops stationed in the FRG, England, Turkey, Japan and the Pacific Islands rose.⁴⁴ The creation of the Pentagon's new "fire brigade" is being completed. This is the "fast reaction corps," which is supposed to protect the interests of American monopolies in the planet's "hot spots." The question of restoring the mandatory registration of draft-age persons is being considered as a way of ensuring the further augmentation of the armed forces.

The recent intensification of the militaristic course of U.S. ruling circles and their frank threats of armed intervention in developments in various parts of the world are also based on the military command's faith in the willingness of the absolute majority of military personnel to act on any order.

FOOTNOTES

1. ARMY TIMES, 18 December 1978.
2. Ibid., 13 March 1978.
3. For more detail, see the article by Yu. V. Katasonov in Issue No 11 for 1972, pp 30-40--Editor's note.
4. ALL HANDS, June 1979, pp 20-31; AIRMAN, June 1979, pp 37-41.
5. THE NATION, 16 October 1977, pp 25, 27.
6. ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, December 1979, p 6.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 27 August 1979, p 45.
8. Ibid., 10 September 1979, p 28.

9. ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Summer 1978, p 720.
10. ARMY TIMES, 30 July 1979.
11. Ibid., 18 December 1978.
12. Ibid., 23 January 1978.
13. Ibid., 3 July 1978.
14. Ibid., 14 November 1977.
15. ARMY, April 1979, p 9.
16. ARMY TIMES, 3 July 1978.
17. Ibid., 13 August 1979.
18. ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Summer 1978, p 650.
19. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 November 1978.
20. ARMY TIMES, 2 July 1979.
21. Ibid., 23 July 1979.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 16 October 1978.
24. J. Finn, "Conscience and Command. Justice and Discipline in the Military," N.Y., 1971, pp 138-157.
25. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10 September 1979, p 28.
26. ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, Spring 1978, p 397; ARMY TIMES, 28 August 1978.
27. ARMY TIMES, 23 January 1978; ARMY, April 1979, p 10.
28. ARMY TIMES, 28 August 1978.
29. DAILY MAIL, 17 October 1978.
30. STARS AND STRIPES, 4 January 1979.
31. "Army Regulations 360-81, Command Information Program General Provisions," HQ, Department of the Army, 17 April 1970.
32. NAVY TIMES, 31 July 1978.

33. STARS AND STRIPES, 12 November 1978; ARMY TIMES, 7 May, 13 August 1979.
34. F. Downs, "The Killing Zone," N.Y., 1978.
35. ARMY TIMES, 3 October 1977; 6 November 1978.
36. Ibid., 6 August 1979.
37. SOLDIERS, February 1978, p 10.
38. ARMY TIMES, 16 April 1979; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, September 1977, p 52.
39. THE NATION, 21 February 1976, p 208.
40. ARMY TIMES, 26 June 1978; 20 August 1979.
41. Ibid., 8 January 1979.
42. Ibid., 16 April, 20 August 1979; ARMY, April 1979, p 10.
43. NEWSWEEK, 26 March 1979, p 25.
44. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 31 December 1979, p 47.

8588

CSO: 1803

NEW CAPITALIST RATIONALIZATION DEVICES

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 25-36

[Article by V. B. Supyan]

[Text] Bourgeois political economy and the capitalist governments have always paid considerable attention to problems in the organization of labor and the exploitation of manpower. They are playing a particularly important role during the current stage of the general crisis of capitalism, now that the exacerbation of its social, economic and political contradictions is making old forms and methods of manpower exploitation less effective.

Some aspects of this topic were examined from the managerial standpoint in Yu. A. Savinov's article in Issue No 8 of our journal for 1979. The article below discusses the evolution of capitalist methods of exploitation, the prerequisites and grounds for the new methods of the 1970's and the practical results of their implementation.

The socioeconomic status of hired labor in the bourgeois society depends on an entire group of factors. The most important include the ways in which manpower is used by capital and the forms and methods of capitalist exploitation. The fact that the process of labor in the capitalist society is simultaneously a process by which surplus value is created (that is, the exploitation of workers and employees by capitalists) is the cause of acute socioeconomic conflicts, which became particularly intense in the United States in the 1970's. Along with the general deterioration of reproduction conditions during this period, they stimulated the bourgeoisie to search for new methods of capitalist rationalization of labor for the purpose of intensifying manpower exploitation without exacerbating social antagonisms. In particular, this applies to the methods of "enriching" the labor process that have become widespread in recent years, and to various experiments in the organization of working time.

Prerequisites for the Development of New Methods

The development of new methods of organizing and stimulating labor in the capitalist society is a constant process, connected with the objective need to improve productive forces and with capital's desire to maximize profits. Capital uses methods which will enhance labor intensity and ultimately increase the effectiveness of capitalist production. From the standpoint of political economy, the evolution of labor organization methods under capitalism is simultaneously the evolution of methods of exploiting the working class, methods by which capital can use manpower to produce surplus value. Therefore, changes in labor organization methods essentially represent changes in the methods of deriving surplus value.

As K. Marx noted, methods of exploitation depend, on the one hand, on the degree of development in productive forces, the level of public division of labor and the growth of class contradictions; on the other, they are influenced by bourgeois activity aimed at the maximization of profits, preferably without exacerbating social antagonisms. The entire history of the development of modern exploitation methods¹--from F. Taylor's "scientific" system to the latest theories regarding the "quality" of labor and its "enrichment"--corroborates the accuracy of this approach. For example, the objective motive underlying the introduction of Taylor's system of labor organization was the more intensive division of labor resulting from the continuous development of machine specialization. This system simultaneously reflected the desire of employers to compel workers to "cooperate" by creating a system of "strong" financial incentives to heighten labor productivity.

But the view of the worker as an "asocial" being with a limited group of only the vital necessities, which was an inherent part of Taylor's theory, became an anachronism as profound changes took place in the economic and social structure of capitalism, working class awareness and the labor movement grew, and the revolutionizing influence of the socialist countries became stronger. In the postwar period, methods of "human relations" appeared, signaling a significant departure from the theory and practice of Taylorism. In essence, this theory consisted in the admission that the participation of workers in production was not in any sense only a technical process with a single goal--the earning of wages--but also a complex sociopsychological process which included the workers' relations with one another and with administrative personnel, as well as a complex of goals and needs of a non-material nature (the respect of co-workers, the prospect of professional growth, the desire for an education and so forth). Administrators began to attach primary significance to the moral and psychological atmosphere in labor collectives, instill workers with pride in their profession and "their" firm, and concern themselves with the most painless methods of worker adaptation to new technology.

The final goal of this approach was the maximization of labor productivity through the use of not only the worker's skills, but also his state of

mind, attitudes and so forth. It is indicative that the ideas of Mayo and other authors of the "human relations" theory began to be vigorously implemented in the second half of the 1940's and in the 1950's, when the strike movement in the United States took on comparatively sizeable dimensions. But the use of these methods was accompanied by attacks on labor unions and the passage of several antidemocratic laws which limited the workers' right to strike, envisaged repressive measures against communists and so forth (the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the McCarran-Wood Act of 1950 and the Humphrey-Butler Act of 1954). By means of this dual policy, capital tried to convince the workers that all positive changes in the production sphere were made by employers, that they were striving to cooperate with the workers, and that all misfortunes and clashes were the fault of the labor unions, which had supposedly fallen under the influence of communists. One of the authors of the "human relations" theory, P. Drucker, frankly wrote that this policy was a means of undermining and discrediting labor unions.²

The specific features of the subsequent development of methods of labor organization and stimulation in the 1970's completely corroborate the influence of objective and subjective factors on this process--the further development of productive forces as a result of the technological revolution, the greater importance of administration in social production, the intensification of socioeconomic antagonisms and so forth. In the last decade, for example, the United States has witnessed, on the one hand, the deterioration of the conditions of social reproduction in general and manpower in particular, more extensive unemployment and rising prices, and the growth of class contradictions and, on the other, more vigorous activity by capital to escape economic difficulty, strengthen shaky U.S. positions in world markets, and enhance labor productivity and production efficiency in general.

Another factor necessitating new forms and methods of labor organization and rationalization was the increasing alienation of hired labor in the 1970's. Alienation is organically inherent in the capitalist system. Even in the early stages of its development, workers occupied an inferior position in relation to embodied labor and the means of production. "The domination of live labor by past labor," K. Marx wrote, "is not only a social fact, reflected in the relationship between the capitalist and the worker, but also, so to speak, a technological fact."³ The hired worker, who has to sell his labor to capital, loses his independence in the process of social production--he is alienated not only from the results of his labor but also from his very ability to work. "The external nature of labor," K. Marx commented, "is apparent to the worker from the fact that this labor does not belong to him, but to another.... The worker's activity is not his own. It belongs to another and represents the worker's loss of himself."⁴

At present, the compulsory nature of labor is particularly apparent, as the worker is being alienated more and more from the means of labor and its results, as well as from the entire group of working conditions and bourgeois social values. This is due to a number of factors.

In particular, the concentration of production and capital is continuing, expanding the basis of capitalist exploitation and increasing the absolute and relative numbers of hired workers. Besides this, forms and methods of capitalist labor rationalization are being perfected, and this is making the production functions of more and more hired workers purely performance-oriented, and is making their labor routine and mechanical. As a result, the subordination of workers to capital is taking on increasing dimensions. The growth of alienation is also being fostered by a new contradiction between the better quality of manpower (educational level and skills) and the monotonous and meaningless labor of many categories of workers and employees, the entire system of capitalist labor organization.

One indicator of the general tendency toward alienation (an extremely collective one) is the level of job satisfaction in different categories of the hired labor force. Increased job dissatisfaction in the United States in recent decades is attested to by many surveys. According to a study conducted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in the early 1970's, for example, only 41 percent of all workers engaged in mental labor said that they would still be doing the same job if they had a choice; the indicator for workers engaged in physical labor was only 24 percent.⁵ Moreover, according to American sociologists, even these data are too high. The most negative attitude toward the nature and content of labor is found in such categories of workers as black youth (37 percent were dissatisfied with their work), workers on conveyor lines, members of other ethnic minorities and workers engaged primarily in physical labor ("blue-collar" workers). The tendency toward increased dissatisfaction with working conditions, the content of labor and the methods of heightening efficiency is also spreading to previously privileged manpower groups--specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education, office workers and so forth.

Other indicators can serve as even more specific reflections of the same tendency--the deteriorating quality of products, the decline of labor productivity growth rates, increased personnel turnover, the higher number of unauthorized absences in the production sphere, the activation of the strike movement and other active forms of protest and struggle by the workers for their rights, the American public's high degree of social passivity and its sharply increased mistrust of the political and economic institutions of bourgeois society.

The mounting alienation of hired labor in the last 15-20 years has made this problem one of the most pressing socioeconomic and domestic political problems in the United States. Bourgeois politicians, scientists and employers see this as more than a threat to the very method of economic management. The increasing self-awareness of the workers, their protests against the despotism of authority in the production sphere and their desire to take part in fundamental decision-making are arousing deep concern within the bourgeoisie over the possible sociopolitical consequences of the continued alienation of labor and have had a considerable effect on the development of specific methods of worker exploitation that will produce an economic impact and increase profits without exacerbating social antagonisms.

This new tactic was chosen by employers because they are sometimes forced by the existing balance of class power to make a few real concessions to the labor movement, including concessions in matters of labor organization. This is a traditional element of the bourgeoisie's social maneuvering. "If the bourgeoisie always used the same tactic or even several similar tactics," V. I. Lenin stressed, "the working class would quickly learn to respond with its own identical or similar tactics. In fact, the bourgeoisie in all nations inevitably develops two systems of control, two methods of struggle for its interests, two ways of defending its dominant position, and these two methods either alternate or are used together in various combinations. The first is the method of brutality, the method of refusing to make any concessions to the labor movement, the method of supporting all old and obsolete institutions, the method of the uncompromising denial of reform.... The second is the method of 'liberalism,' steps in the direction of...reform and compromise, etc."⁶ Lenin's analysis is still applicable today.

Experiments in the Organization of Labor and Work Schedules: Theory and Practice

The new theories of labor organization and stimulation that have become popular in the United States in the 1970's represent, on the one hand, a development of previous methods of worker exploitation and reflect, on the other, the abovementioned recent changes in national production and in the status of workers. The theories of several American economists, sociologists and psychologists, despite certain differences in their approach to the practice of labor organization, have certain general and fundamental premises in common. These theories, which stress the "improvement of the quality of labor," the "enrichment of the content of labor" and the "humanization of labor," declare, above all, the need for social and production participation by the worker (naturally, in a direction benefiting the employer) and proclaim the exceeding importance of the content of labor in fully revealing all of the capabilities and potential of the worker and, consequently, using his labor effectively. It is this aspect of the new methods of capitalist rationalization--emphasis on the content of labor and on a broader circle of responsibilities for the worker, ensuring him greater autonomy and participation in production decision-making, giving him an opportunity to display initiative in his work, establishing some conditions for professional growth and revealing elements of creativity in certain areas--that distinguishes the theory of "job enrichment" from previous theories of "human relations."

The founders of the theory of "job enrichment," for example, American professors F. Herzberg and D. McGregor, feel that employers should not limit themselves to such incentives as salary increases, improved working conditions and so forth. In their opinion, job satisfaction and the economic impact of work can best be stimulated by meaningful content, social recognition, opportunities for creativity and heightened responsibility for each individual worker. Herzberg, who worked out a theory of factors influencing job satisfaction, feels that negative attitudes toward work are

influenced primarily by such factors as working conditions, salary levels, relations with co-workers and superiors, and social status, while job satisfaction is influenced by factors of another kind, namely the nature and content of labor, opportunities for professional growth and advancement, the degree of responsibility and autonomy on the job, and social recognition.⁷ Furthermore, Herzberg believes that heightened job satisfaction reduces spiritual alienation and, as a result, has a positive effect on economic production indicators and on the social atmosphere in the enterprise.

The Japanese experience, stressing personal relations between administrators and workers and the development of informal relations at enterprises, is having a more sweeping effect on the practice of labor stimulation in the United States.⁸ At the same time, many American scientists are recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach to the "motivation" of white-collar and blue-collar workers--that is, the use of economic and non-economic incentives. Furthermore, in the area of economic incentives, more attention is being paid to various forms of collective motivation.

New theories regarding the reorganization of the labor process became quite popular after World War II and, particularly, in the 1970's. The United States and several Western European countries have already accumulated considerable experience in the reorganization of this process in line with "labor enrichment" theories. The experiments being conducted in companies and the labor organization methods employed in connection with these differ widely.⁹ The most widespread methods are the following:

The "horizontal" expansion of labor operations--that is, the introduction of greater variety into the work within the framework of a functionally homogeneous structure;

The "vertical" expansion of duties--that is, the guarantee of greater autonomy and responsibility on the job, the assignment of several additional functions to the worker, pertaining to personal planning and quality control;

The rotation of production workers--that is, the alternation of professions for the purpose of reducing monotony;

The creation of autonomous work groups to carry out specific production tasks, with the delegation of a broad variety of rights to these groups in connection with planning, the distribution of duties within the group, product quality control and the distribution of financial bonuses for high production indicators;

"Labor process efficiency design," involving the clarification of the content of work, the specific methods of its performance, and relations between administrative personnel and workers to the satisfaction of both;

The creation of a "sociotechnical production system," first used widely at automobile plants in Sweden, and then in a number of other capitalist

countries, including the United States. This system involves the reorganization of various production elements and areas, both in their technological aspects (for example, the move to the non-conveyor assembly of automobiles) and in the socio-organizational sphere--that is, in working conditions, the forms and methods of labor organization, and relations between workers and administrators;

The use of a system of labor incentives based on financial rewards for workers commensurate with their contribution to rising labor productivity, presupposing the creation of joint commissions representing workers and the administration (the "Scanlon Plan");

The use of new forms of work scheduling, primarily the flexible schedule.

These methods are used in combination with one another or alone. The emphasis is on the combination of moral and psychological incentives with "Taylorist" efficiency methods--that is, attempts are made to create a "synthetic" model of labor organization providing maximum opportunity for the exploitation of workers. The number of new programs involving the "enrichment" of jobs and the use of other methods of labor stimulation and organization in the United States rose from 87,000 to 123,000 just between 1969 and 1972, and they covered 9 million workers.¹⁰ The bourgeois government is paying more attention to these problems. Experiments are also being conducted by federal and local government agencies.

The companies that have accumulated considerable experience in the experimentation with new forms and methods of labor organization include such large firms as Alcoa, American Airlines, AT&T, Bankers Trust, Chrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, IBM, Kaiser Aluminum, Monsanto Chemical, Motorola, Polaroid, Procter and Gamble, U.S. Steel, Western Electric, Volvo and Saabscania. Judging by this list, the experiments involve an extremely broad spectrum of economic branches and types of commercial activity.

In the majority of cases, as studies have shown, the main results of the new methods of labor organization were reduced personnel turnover, reduced absences, higher product quality and labor productivity indicators and slightly increased job satisfaction. Therefore, the goals of the organizational innovations were partially attained.

But the introduction of various methods of labor "enrichment" has not always been successful: In some cases the economic results of enterprise operations have not improved, and the sociopsychological climate has remained the same. In 78 experiments conducted in 1977, for example, overhead costs rose in 14 percent of the cases, labor productivity declined in 10 percent, product quality deteriorated in 11 percent, absences increased in 22 percent, and "production morale" (bourgeois terminology) dropped in 33 percent--that is, there was more dissatisfaction with conditions in the production sphere, more workers went on strike, and so forth.¹¹ According to several American experts, negative results were seen in those cases when

The experiments were conducted without the necessary preparations, without consideration for the specific conditions of production and characteristics of the labor force, and with irresponsibility on the part of the administration.

Let us take a look at a few specific examples of new methods of labor organization that have produced definite positive results.

Measures aimed at "enriching" labor are being carried out on the broadest scale in industry, where worker dissatisfaction with the nature and content of jobs is particularly pronounced. Primary attention is being given to conditions on assembly lines, where the external attributes of capitalist exploitation are most visible and tangible. Since the worker's movements are governed by the speed of the conveyor belt, all of his activity is subordinated to the conveyor. Besides this, he is subject to the greatest limitations in the sphere of professional growth. From the psychological standpoint, work on the conveyor line is particularly unfulfilling. This is why the objective of "enriching" work on the assembly line is acquiring particular importance.

Attempts of this kind were made by the Donnelly Mirror Company (mirrors for motor vehicles). The workers here were divided into groups, each of which bore collective responsibility for a specific part of the production process. The conveyor was controlled by the workers. Besides this, the hourly wage was eliminated and replaced with a salary system. As a result, product quality improved dramatically, there was a 25-percent reduction in production waste, wages increased 12 percent on the average, and absences decreased from 5 percent to 1 percent.¹²

The experience of the Corning Glass Company was widely publicized. The program at one of its plants included the substitution of individual headlight assembly for conveyor assembly. Within 6 months after the introduction of the new assembly methods, labor productivity rose 84 percent, substandard products decreased from 23 percent to 1 percent, and absences dropped from 8 percent to 1 percent.¹³

Experiments have also been conducted in the U.S. automotive industry, where the number of assembly line workers is particularly high and the problem of monotony is particularly acute. General Motors, in particular, is investigating the question of job "enrichment." Its approach includes more active worker involvement in the production process and the organization of work taking fully responsible for the entire process of automobile assembly. A "Program to Increase Job Interest" was instituted at Chrysler plants. It began with general meetings for the discussion of basic requirements: respect for the work; the introduction of the element of responsibility; the creation of an atmosphere in which each worker comprehends the significance of his job in the "total scheme of things"; the creation of an atmosphere conducive to reform. According to estimates, these programs reduced turnover from 47 percent in 1969 to 17 percent in 1973 and reduced absences from 7.8 percent to 3.6 percent.¹⁴

Experiments among workers engaged primarily in mental labor also took on extremely broad dimensions. American Telephone and Telegraph has the most experience in this area. Employee dissatisfaction with the nature and content of the work had given rise to high personnel turnover, low labor productivity, and discontent. Plans were made to change the organization of office work and to eliminate the "paper conveyor." The changes affected the jobs of 10,000 people. In particular, employees were granted a higher degree of independence in the compilation of business documents, and the day-to-day supervision of administrators was relaxed. This resulted in the sharp reduction of personnel turnover and absences, and positive changes were noted in work attitudes.¹⁵

Another example of a broad-scale experiment in job "enrichment" is the Bell System program, participated in by 100,000 workers. As a result of one of these experiments, involving reorganization of the jobs of 1,200 office workers, engineers and operators of computers and other office machines, personnel turnover decreased 9.3 percent and overtime was cut in half.¹⁶

The experiments testify that, in many cases, employers attain their economic goals--the improvement of product quality, a rise in labor productivity and the reduction of absences and personnel turnover. At the same time, it is evident that these programs are aimed at maximum profit and the more intensive exploitation of workers. Psychological and organizational innovations do not change the socioeconomic conditions of manpower use. Contrary to the assertions of bourgeois sociologists, a slight increase in job interest and greater production autonomy for the worker do not in any way signify radical changes in the status of blue- and white-collar workers in the production sphere. In addition to using job "enrichment" to attain economic benefits, capital views this as a means of increasing its ideological influence on the workers and of convincing them that the interests of employers and employees coincide. As American researcher R. Pfeffer correctly stresses, "democratization of the job changes only the forms of capitalist dictatorship while leaving its essence unchanged."¹⁷

Experiments in the area of work scheduling are acquiring increasing importance among the new forms and methods of labor organization. This is connected with the invariable trend toward a shorter work-day as a consequence of the postwar struggle of the working class. Whereas the average length of the work-week in 1947 was 40.3 hours for production workers in the United States, it was 38.8 hours in 1957, 38 hours in 1967 and 36.1 hours in 1977.¹⁸ Employers' attempts to compensate for these "losses" by means of labor intensification with no reduction in the surplus value norm result in these experiments with work schedules. The goals of this innovation are the same as those of job "enrichment."

Innovations of this kind include, above all, flexible shifts and a variety of 4- and 3-day work-week schedules (with the total length of the week still at 40 work hours).

One of the most widespread innovations in the United States is the flexible shift. In essence, this means that workers and employees are given the right to choose their own work hours (there are some hours during which workers must be present) within the framework of the total amount of work time needed to make up a work-week of 40 hours (the use of quarterly or even annual quantities of working as a basis has also been proposed).

According to reports in the American press, this system is particularly widespread in Western Europe. In Switzerland it already applied to 40 percent of the total labor force by 1976; in the FRG, where the practice has been instituted by more than 16 percent of all private firms and almost two-thirds of all government agencies, it applies to 30 percent of all persons employed. The system is particularly widespread among workers engaged primarily in non-physical labor, mainly office workers. In the FRG, for example, 6 million white-collar workers, or 50 percent of the total, were already working according to this system by 1975.¹⁹

In the United States, where the use of the new system did not begin until the mid-1970's, hundreds of companies are now using the system or conducting experiments in its use. According to estimates, more than 1 million workers and employees have been transferred to various forms of flexible schedules. Around 10,000 employees are working according to these schedules just in federal establishments.²⁰ Increasing attention is being paid to this method, and it is being widely discussed in scientific literature and in ruling circles.

The general characteristics of this kind of scheduling are the following. The maximum length of the work-day is established at an enterprise--usually 11-12 hours, or a few hours longer than the traditional 8-hour work-day (with a 5-day work-week). The worker does not have to work 11 or 12 hours; this is simply the amount of time he has the right to work. A second essential condition is the stipulation of certain hours during which workers must be on the job; as a rule, these hours are divided into two periods with an interval of 1.5-2 hours. The third condition is the establishment of the hours when the worker does not have to be present; these are at the beginning of the day (1.5-2 hours), when the employee can arrive at work at any time--for example, between 0630 hours to 0830 hours; the noon interval (1.5-2 hours), and the end of the day (1.5-2 hours), when the employee can leave work at any time--for example, from 1600 to 1800 hours. In this way, the employee can vary his daily work schedule considerably within the framework of a work-week of unvarying length.

Naturally, this kind of scheduling cannot be used in all cases. Its use would create many problems on assembly lines, for example, or in branches with a continuous production cycle. This scheduling is mainly used in the particular branches and professions in which the work is primarily individual, in which the performance of a job generally requires individual effort (office work, the work of specialists, jobs in the trade network, education, civil service, consumer services and so forth).

Just as in the job "enrichment" experiments, the chief benefits of the new scheduling system are derived by employers. This is one of the new methods of exploiting workers and employees, even though it is definitely convenient in some respects for the workers themselves (they have an opportunity to plan their work time more efficiently, to avoid "rush hour" traffic, and so forth). The system reduces personnel turnover and losses of working time (because workers are less likely to stay home from work, leave in the middle of the day, and so forth). All of this heightens job efficiency and productivity, improves quality and, consequently, increases capitalist profits.

At present this kind of scheduling is being used to some degree in such large American corporations as Control Data, General Motors, American Airlines, Montgomery Ward and Mutual of New York Insurance Transactions. The experience of the Beral Corporation (pens and pencils) is indicative. Here the new work schedule was instituted for research and office workers as well as production workers. As a result, absences decreased 50 percent, the average number of days missed per worker in a year declined dramatically and job satisfaction increased.²¹

Part-time employment has been used more widely in recent years as another method of manpower exploitation by capital. It is not a fundamentally new undertaking in the organization of working time. But the significant increase in the number of persons working part-time in recent years, and the changing attitudes toward this phenomenon among employers and many employees are motivating researchers and the American press to pay more attention to it. In September 1979, 17 million people, or 17.4 percent of all persons employed in the United States, had part-time jobs.²² It is important to note that almost 14 million voluntarily chose this kind of work, while the others could not find full-time jobs and can therefore quite justifiably be called semi-unemployed.²³

The number of persons working part-time is rising at an amazing rate. Between 1966 and 1979 the number of part-time workers in the non-agricultural sector of the economy rose from 7.4 million to 12.5 million, or an increase of almost 69 percent. During the same period, the number of persons employed full-time increased less than 38 percent. Whereas the ratio of part-time workers to the total labor force was 1:10 in 1963, it was 1:6.7 in 1979.²⁴

Employers and the bourgeois state derive considerable socioeconomic advantages from the use of part-time schedules. In particular, the placement of a worker or employee in a job that takes at least 1 hour a week nominally takes him off the unemployment rolls and gives the government a chance to embellish the employment situation. The hiring of part-time workers benefits employers in several ways. The hourly wages of these individuals are generally minimal (in 1977 they were 1.8 times lower on the average than the hourly wages of full-time workers),²⁵ they rarely receive bonuses, they are virtually uncovered by social insurance and they

are ineligible for paid vacations and pensions. In the majority of cases, therefore, American labor unions regard the part-time schedule as a discriminatory measure, harming the interests of workers, and oppose part-time employment.

The discriminatory nature of part-time hiring conditions is largely connected with the fact that part-time jobs are filled by primarily the same manpower categories that are not organized in labor unions and for whom this kind of work is the only acceptable and necessary form of employment. These are primarily women (one-third of all working women), young people under the age of 20 and persons over the age of 50, mainly retirement-age individuals who wish to continue working.²⁶

All of these circumstances are fully utilized by capital, which derives sizeable benefits from the maximization of these groups of workers. In many companies the use of a part-time work-week produces a multitude of technical and economic advantages--reduced personnel turnover, lower absence figures and, in some cases, higher labor productivity.

Bourgeois scientists, who try to describe job "enrichment" and other new forms of organization as a cure-all of equal benefit to employers and workers, have to acknowledge the contradictory nature of these measures. This is attested to by the conflicting opinions of American experts. On the one hand, the new methods are often regarded as a universal means of solving all major problems in the sphere of manpower utilization: They heighten labor productivity and reduce job dissatisfaction. On the other hand, some experts feel that the new methods do not have enough impact. One of the chief critics of these innovations, H. Fine, believes that the measures to "enrich" and "humanize" labor are objectively limited by the nature of modern technology, the level of work skills, the desire of employers to hold overhead costs to a minimum, and the conflicting goals of workers and employers.²⁷ According to the other point of view, which is expressed more often, the new methods will indisputably provide the bourgeoisie with definite technical, economic and social dividends, particularly if they are carried out under the proper conditions and after the necessary preparations.

Despite the fact that the declared purpose of all of the labor rationalization methods listed above is the "humanization" of the labor process, the improvement of its quality and the promotion of job satisfaction, their main purpose is still the augmentation of the effectiveness of capitalist production. Bourgeois researchers and employers have had to admit this. A 1977 survey conducted at 78 companies in the United States, for example, indicated that most of the results of the introduction of new forms of labor organization concerned the improvement of the quality of goods and services, the reduction of personnel turnover, and the improvement of worker and employee attitudes toward their jobs--that is, factors promoting higher company profits.²⁸ As a means of alleviating social antagonisms, however, these measures are of a palliative nature and do not eliminate the

fundamental causes of worker alienation. It is not surprising that many American labor unions oppose job "enrichment," seeing it merely as another, more subtle means of heightening labor productivity and of exerting ideological pressure on workers to divert them from the struggle for their vested interests.

Therefore, the main result of the introduction of new, non-traditional methods of labor organization in the United States is the more intensive and effective use of manpower by capital. At the same time, these methods, which are actually only new forms of worker exploitation, reflect the changing conditions of manpower reproduction and changes in the balance of class power. In order to preserve and intensify exploitation, capital has had to take certain steps which have improved working conditions to some degree and have promoted job satisfaction. In some cases, job "enrichment" measures enhance worker qualifications, and this increases their salaries. In spite of a positive features, however, the new forms cannot change the essence of capitalist exploitation. The actual humanization of labor is being prevented by the entire system of capitalist production relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a more detailed discussion of their evolution, see S. A. Yershov, "SShA: razvitiye form i metodov kapitalisticheskoy ekspluatatsii" [The United States: The Development of Forms and Methods of Capitalist Exploitation], Moscow, 1974; S. I. Yakovleva, "Ekonomicheskoye prinuzhdeniye trudyashchikhaya i sovremennyy kapitalizm" [The Economic Coercion of Workers and Present-Day Capitalism], Moscow, 1977.
2. J. Madge, "The Origins of Scientific Sociology," N.Y., 1962, p 207.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 47, p 552.
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Selected Early Works," Moscow, 1956, p 563.
5. "Work in America. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare," Cambridge, 1973, p 16.
6. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 20, p 67.
7. P. Dickson, "The Future of the Workplace," N.Y., 1975; "Work and the Quality of Life," edited by James O'Toole, Cambridge, 1974; TRAINING AND DEVELOPING JOURNAL, July 1974.
8. For more detail, see the article by A. N. Kuritsyn, "Japanese Management in the United States" in Issue No 12 for 1979--Editor's note.
9. These topics are examined in detail in the following books: P. Mali, "Improving Total Productivity," N.Y., 1978; E. Glazer, "Productivity Gains Through Worklife Improvements," N.Y., 1976.

10. P. Dickson, *Op. cit.*, p 194.
11. "The Quality of Working Life: An Important Issue for Managers of the Federal Work Force," 3 July 1978, p 9.
12. E. Glazer, *Op. cit.*, p 47.
13. R. Katznel et al, "Work Productivity and Job Satisfaction," N.Y., 1975, p 353.
14. "Perspectives on Job Enrichment and Productivity," Atlanta, 1975, p 260.
15. MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, July 1973, p 35.
16. "Work in America," pp 188, 189.
17. R. Pfeffer, "Working for Capitalism," N.Y., 1979, p 276.
18. "Employment and Training Report of the President," Wash., 1978, p 265.
19. "Alternative Work Patterns," N.Y., 1976, p 29; OFFICE, March 1975, p 66.
20. "Alternatives in the World of Work," Wash., 1976, p 2.
21. BUSINESS WEEK, 24 May 1976, p 38.
22. EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, October 1979, p 46. According to official U.S. statistics, persons who work from 1 to 35 hours a week are part-time workers. Those who work 35 hours or more are full-time workers.
23. The subsequent discussion refers only to persons who work part-time of their own accord.
24. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 April 1977; EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, October 1979, p 58; "Employment and Training Report of the President," p 226.
25. Calculated according to: MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, June 1978, p 6.
26. "Alternative Work Patterns," p 17.
27. "The Quality of Working Life," p 19.
28. *Ibid.*, p 8.

8588

CSO: 1603

ADVERTISING: MANUFACTURE OF SOCIAL ILLUSIONS

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 37-48**

[Article by O. A. Peofanov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803

THE OLYMPICS BELONG TO THE WORLD

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 49-53

[Article by R. M. Kiselev]

[Text] Only a few days remain before the long-awaited moment when triumphant fanfares will announce the opening of the 22d Olympic Games in Moscow and the green field of the Central Lenin Stadium will be filled with hundreds of athletes from all continents, representing the multi-millionstrong international olympic movement.

For more than 80 years now, the young athletes of the world have gathered together each 4 years for honest athletic competition to settle a matter whose essence is reflected in the olympic motto "Citius, Altius, Fortius" (faster, higher, stronger). It would be difficult to name any other international event that attracts as many participants and spectators.

The contemporary olympic movement cannot be correctly understood or assessed in isolation from the socioeconomic and political changes in the postwar world. Above all, they include such fundamental changes as the birth and maturation of the world socialist system with its decisive influence on the development of all international life; the eradication of colonial oppression as a result of the successful national liberation struggle of the African, Asian and Latin American people, leading to the formation of a large group of young states on these continents, taking the path of independent national development; the growing size and strength of the general democratic movement of the world public in defense of the social and political rights of workers and in defense of mutual understanding and peace between nations.

These fundamental changes have had a profound effect on the international olympic movement as well, turning it into a socially significant, major phenomenon in contemporary life.

French historian and pedagogue Pierre Coubertin (1863-1937) played an important role in defining the lofty and noble goals of the olympic movement and is rightfully considered to be the founder of the olympic

movement and the modern olympic games. He is the one who said: "The importance of sports increases with each year. The role of sports seems just as important and constant in today's world as in the ancient world. The phenomenon of sports is acquiring more and more new features: It is becoming international and democratic, consistent with the ideals and requirements of the present day. But today, just as in the past, the influence of sports can be good or bad depending on how it is used and for what purpose. Sports can arouse noble or base emotions.... And, finally, it can be used to strengthen the peace or to prepare for war. Noble emotions, a high regard for selflessness and honesty, the spirit of chivalry, courage and peace are now the chief requirements of democracy."

Coubertin's statement essentially sets forth the basic goals now stated in the beginning of the Olympic Charter. What is the import of these goals, officially declared by the International Olympic Committee in its basic law, the observance of which, according to Article 24, is mandatory for each and every national olympic committee wishing to join the international olympic movement and to participate in the olympic games? Above all, they state that the international olympic movement represents a mass public movement permeated with the humanistic olympic ideals. This movement unites millions and millions of athletes on all continents and does not permit, as Article 3 of the Olympic Charter states, "any kind of discrimination for racial, religious or political reasons." The main idea behind the movement is friendship and mutual understanding between nations, the idea of peace.

The international olympic movement's antiwar character reflects the most important condition for its very existence--the condition of peace. The history of the olympic movement testifies that only war has interrupted the course of olympic development: The Sixth Olympic Games in 1916 fell victim to World War I, and the 12th and 13th games (1940 and 1944) were disrupted by World War II. Nonetheless, they have been recorded for all time in the olympic chronicle and have kept their olympic numerals.

The lofty humanitarian goals of the international olympic movement served as a reliable guarantee of its constant growth. The implementation of these goals, however, could not actually begin until after World War II, when the people of Africa, Asia and Latin America embarked on the course of independent national development.

As early as 1923, Coubertin proposed the organization of African games. He realized that the famous emblem of interconnected rings, symbolizing the olympic unity of the five continents, was meaningless without the African ring. Plans were made to hold the first African games in Alexandria in 1927. Coubertin believed so much in his idea that he personally designed the medal to be awarded to the victors. But bitter disillusionment awaited him. The colonial system that ruled Africa could not allow the spread of olympic ideals on this continent. Athletics turned out to be powerless when confronted by the colonial authorities. The games were not held.

Coubertin's dream only became a reality after the success of the African people's national liberation movement. Whereas only three African countries (Egypt, Nigeria and Ghana) took part in the 1952 Olympic games in Helsinki (where, incidentally, the Soviet athletes made their Olympic debut), 29 countries took part in the 1972 games in Munich. The national athletic organizations of the African continent took on the honorable but difficult task of developing physical culture and sports in their homeland. Their efforts were productive. The crowning symbol of African sports unity was the first African Olympiad in Brazzaville in 1965, with athletes from 25 countries competing. The games in Brazzaville proved that the unity of African sports organizations was the key to many problems facing African sports. The athletic unity of Africa was organizationally reinforced by the creation of the Supreme African Athletic Council. The struggle against racial discrimination in sports, which contradicted the basic principles of the Olympic charter, became one of the main areas of the supreme council's work.

At the initiative of the Soviet National Olympic Committee, the question of combating racial discrimination and excluding racists from the Olympic movement was first considered by the executive committee of the IOC in 1959. It was not until 1963, however, that the IOC decided not to allow South Africa to compete in the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo. The final decision to exclude South Africa from the Olympic movement was made at the IOC session in Amsterdam in 1970. In this way, as a result of the combined efforts of progressive forces in the world athletic movement, one of the basic Olympic principles triumphed--the impermissibility of racial discrimination in sports.

The feelings of African athletes about the Olympic games in Moscow were expressed by President Abraham Ordia of the continent's supreme athletic council: "The Olympic Games of 1980 will be the most significant event in the entire history of the Olympic movement. All of the African people regard the 1980 Olympics as their own competition because it will be organized by a nation which repeatedly demonstrated its friendship to the African states and gave them all-round support, a nation which proclaimed its own ideal of universal peace and fraternity between nations 60 years ago. This ideal is completely consistent with the goals and objectives of the Olympic movement."

The international Olympic movement's successful implementation of its goals in general, its transformation into a truly universal democratic movement of the world's young athletes and, finally, the evolution of the Olympic games into a major event in international life, making an impressive contribution to stronger mutual understanding, friendship and peace--all of this must displease the particular circles in the West that have always taken, overtly or covertly, a cold war stand. In the 1950's the cold war strategists included world sports among their weapons in the struggle against their enemies. Political discrimination against the sports organizations of several socialist countries, primarily the GDR, stunned

the organism of world sports for a long time: National and world championship matches were cancelled, congresses of international federations were transferred from one country to another, the traditional award ceremonies were either cancelled or disrupted by flagrant police intervention, and athletes from the socialist countries were ostracized.

The consistent and persistent struggle of Soviet athletic organizations against political discrimination, supported by all progressive forces in world sports, including Western sports organizations and athletes, led to harsh protests by many international athletic associations against the extension of cold war policy to the athletic sphere.

In February 1963 the following declaration was adopted at a convention of the IOC executive committee and international federations in Lausanne: "Sports, in the olympic sense, is purely amateur in nature and truly international sports is therefore devoid of financial and chauvinistic purpose. There can be no discrimination in sports for racial, religious or political reasons. As a result of this, within less than the lifespan of one generation the olympic movement has enveloped all continents with its appeal to people who thirst for peace and honest competition.... The members of the great organization of international sports, numbering in the millions, work together on the program to develop the international friendship and goodwill for which the young people of the world are striving. International sports--one of the few areas in which participants act on an equal basis--cannot survive if it is used as some kind of political tool or weapon. This is why we hope that all governments will recognize the free and independent position of sports, as a boon to all and a threat to none, and will respect our neutrality in all areas."

The gradual improvement of the international climate and the move from the policy of confrontation and cold war to the policy of detente and constructive dialog between countries with differing sociopolitical structures aided in eliminating most political discrimination from world sports and establishing favorable conditions for the further development of the olympic movement and the olympic games. In turn, the international olympic movement and the olympic games became an important factor in the implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence, reinforcing by its very existence the peaceful basis of contemporary life.

It was profoundly symbolic that the 10th Olympic Congress, held in Varna in 1973 after an interval of more than 40 years and attended by members of the IOC and heads of international federations and national olympic committees throughout the world, had as its official motto "Sports Serving Peace."

Viewing international sports as an important factor reinforcing peace and mutual understanding between nations, the all-European conference in Helsinki noted in its Final Act: "In order to expand existing contacts and cooperation in the area of sports, the signatory states will encourage

these contacts and exchanges, including athletic meetings and competitions of all types, held on the basis of universally accepted rules, regulations and practices."

As we know, in the beginning of January 1980 the Carter Administration used the events in Afghanistan as a pretext to announce that several unilateral steps would be taken to dramatically curtail contacts with the Soviet Union. It was announced that Soviet policy would supposedly put American athletes and tourists "in danger" at the olympic games in Moscow. This officially launched a crusade against the 22d Olympic Games and the entire international olympic movement, actively participated in by millions of athletes and sports fans in more than 140 countries.

It is quite obvious that the Carter Administration's attack on the olympics was conceived from the very beginning as part of a broad political campaign against the Soviet Union. In this political adventure, J. Carter planned to sacrifice the olympic games, the international olympic movement and, what is more, the interests of athletes throughout the world, including Americans, to his own egotistical interests, connected primarily with the election campaign in the United States.

Coubertin once warned: "My friends and I did not do all of this work to revive the olympic games just so they could become a museum exhibit or the subject of a movie. We also did not want the games to be used for commercial or campaign purposes." That was long ago, but Lord Killanin, president of the IOC, issued the same kind of warning just recently. When he was interviewed by a UPI correspondent in August 1977, he said: "I am carefully, quite carefully keeping an eye on the preparations for the Moscow olympics. After all, so much depends on the relations between the great powers. Carter's very first move was a departure from detente. And this could color the atmosphere in which the games will be held."

Yes, the Carter Administration did everything within its power to poison the atmosphere of the coming games. A campaign of pressure and arm-twisting, unprecedented in the history of the games, was launched against the U.S. National Olympic Committee and American athletes. The entire world learned the actual value of all of the bombastic statements about human rights by Carter and his administration. At the same time, a law on amateur athletics, signed by the President of the United States and passed at the end of 1978, includes a separate article on the "rights of athletes."

What does it say? The section on "athletes' rights" in the final document of the President's commission on olympic sports, which studied the state of amateur sports in the United States for more than 2 years, makes the following admission: "The athlete is too often denied the right to compete, which is most essential to him.... The commission intends to make special note of situations in which the athlete is denied the right to compete by the very organizations which are officially set up to serve

him.... It is difficult to imagine that the United States might announce a government boycott similar to the boycott of the 1976 olympic games by the African countries, dictated by state policy. Nonetheless, American athletes have often been penalized for taking part in international competitions or have been deprived, by means of threats, of the opportunity of participating."

It was just over a year after the passage of the amateur sports act, which was supposed to guarantee these "athletes' rights," when the action that was so "difficult to imagine" was taken in the United States. The Carter Administration, with the support of the Congress, is depriving athletes of the right to participate in the largest international competition, in the olympic games! It is depriving them by means of harsh threats and intimidation in the interests of its own policy.

The Carter Administration has put the American National Olympic Committee in an extremely difficult position in the international olympic movement. This committee, which has always been proud of its independence of state and government, was forced to violate Article 24 of the Olympic Charter, which states that "the national olympic committee must preserve its autonomy and withstand any kind of pressure--political, religious or economic. The committee can cooperate with private or government organizations for the attainment of these goals, but this cooperation must not contradict the principles of the olympic movement and the rules of the IOC."

Lord Killanin's predecessor in the IOC, Avery Brundage, a prominent figure in the American athletic movement, once wrote the following: "There are governments which use their power to carry out national programs of physical education. But there are also governments which impose the implementation of these programs on others, although they eagerly bathe themselves in the glitter of olympic medals. I want to cite one example. According to what I was told, 47 million people competed in the last Spartan Games in the USSR. I have little reason to doubt this. But in the United States, 50 percent of our young people are unfit for military service, which does not even require any special athletic talent."

When he launched his campaign against the olympics, J. Carter forgot that the olympic games do not belong to the Soviet Union, just as they do not belong to the United States. The olympic games belong to the young athletes of the world. Many American athletes, coaches and officials realize this. "The summer olympics do not belong to Moscow any more than the United Nations belongs to New York," Stephen Taylor, member of the U.S. sailing team, wrote to the NEW YORK TIMES.

Even the United States's Western European allies, with isolated exceptions, refused to support Carter's campaign against the olympics. This campaign has failed.

THE REPUBLICANS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Review SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 54-60

[Article by N. N. Glagolev]

[Text] The first stage of the election campaign in the United States is over. This stage is distinguished by a struggle between contenders for the presidency within each of the two main bourgeois parties. For the Democrats this struggle quite quickly turned into nothing more than a "Carter-Kennedy duel."¹ Individuals who wished to lead the Republican Party to a victory in November, on the other hand, formed a larger group--at first there were around 10 of them. By mid-March, however, most of them had dropped out of the race. Former Governor of Texas and former Democrat J. Connally had to give up his presidential ambitions after suffering a crushing defeat in the primaries in South Carolina and spending almost 11 million dollars in 14 months. Congressman P. Crane and Senator R. Dole also dropped out of the race. After the Massachusetts elections, Senator H. Baker realized he had no chance of winning.

By the end of May, former Governor of California R. Reagan had virtually guaranteed his nomination at the national convention of the Republican Party in Detroit. For a long time, Texas businessman G. Bush, former director of the CIA, preserved his chances of winning by triumphing in several primaries. Until the second half of April, Illinois Congressman J. Anderson was one of the Republican contenders. After the Pennsylvania primaries (22 April), however, he declared himself an independent candidate.

Political correspondents have noted that the victor at the Detroit convention will have the difficult task of bringing a party back into the White House, a party which was doomed to play "second fiddle" for many years in the two-party political mechanism. In almost half a century--since the "Great Depression" of 1929-1933 and the brutal election defeat of then Republican President Herbert Hoover with his policy of "rugged individualism"--the Republicans have controlled the White House for only 16 years.

¹ For more detail, see B. B. Isakov, "The Election Strategy of the President," SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 5, 1980.

Half of this period was taken up by the presidential term of D. Eisenhower, who received the national mandate by virtue of his personal popularity as a war hero, and not at all on the strength of his Republican Party affiliation. Six years were covered by the term of R. Nixon, which ended with his unprecedented resignation as a result of the Watergate scandal. The nomination of Senator R. Goldwater in 1964 by ultra-conservative forces turned into a political catastrophe for the party. That year the Republicans lost hundreds of elective offices; in the nation's highest legislative body they kept only 27 of the 100 seats in the Senate and 140 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives. The party leadership's attempts to recover from this "severe housecleaning" were nullified by the Watergate scandal. In 1977 the Republicans in the Senate and the House numbered 38 and 145 respectively.

An even more indicative sign of the Republican Party's changing status was the gradual narrowing of its mass base, which is attested to, in particular, by the regular polls conducted by the Gallup Institute. According to these data, 38 percent of the voters called themselves Republicans in 1940 (as opposed to 42 percent Democrats and 20 percent Independents). This figure has decreased constantly in all the years since.

In 1977—that is, after the last presidential elections—only 20 percent of the voters were registered Republicans. In reference to the declining trust of the voters in politicians and "Republicans, in particular," Vice-President G. Fister of Market Opinion Research wrote: "The first thing that comes to mind when people hear the Republican Party being discussed is that it is the party of big business, the party of the rich, the organized and the solvent."

After 1976 the future of the party was the subject of lively debates in national political circles and among scholars and journalists who were worried about the integrity of the two-party political mechanism, which would be unthinkable without an opposition party as the illusion of an alternative for dissatisfied voters. After analyzing the results of the last presidential elections, political scientists J. Bibby and R. Hawkeshorn found a number of convincing, in their opinion, signs of life in the "Grand Old Party". In the first place, in 1976 more of the voters who called themselves independents voted for Republicans than for Democrats (in a ratio of 57:48). From this, the authors concluded that the constant growth of this category of voters (from 20 percent in 1940 to 31 percent in 1977) would improve Republican prospects in future elections. In the second place, the Republicans were relatively successful with young voters: Ford received 51 percent of the vote in this segment of the voting public.

Finally, the Republicans won support in population groups that have traditionally associated themselves with the Democratic Party—members of labor unions and ethnic and religious minorities. According to Harris polls, 60 percent of the votes won by the Democratic Party in 1936 were accounted for by this group, Franklin Roosevelt's "grand coalition"; in 1976 this segment of the Democratic social base had decreased to 43 percent. At the

same time, the proportion accounted for by traditionally Republican groups, particularly those voting for G. Ford (suburbanites, college graduates, white-collar workers and administrators), rose from 40 percent to 46 percent of the voting public in these years. "In an era when party labels are less important and when voters are not always guided solely by party affiliation and often make their choice only in the last stages of the campaign, the decrease in the percentage of Republican voters is not as significant as it was in the 1950's," Binkley and Hawkeberry write. "In light of this, the most important thing is to strengthen the organizational base of the party and nominate popular candidates."

The second half of this task still remains to be performed by the Republicans at the national convention in July. Its outcome, however, is virtually a foregone conclusion, as R. Reagan has already secured the votes of more than 1,000 delegates, and a victory at the convention requires only 998.

Former California Governor Ronald Wilson Reagan, a professional actor who devoted 28 years of his life to movies and television and who was once a Democrat and labor spokesman (he was elected to the top position in one of Hollywood's biggest unions--the Screen Actors Guild--six times in the late 1940's and early 1950's), entered the bosom of the Republican Party a confirmed conservative and rabid anticommunist. In fall 1964 Reagan made a nationally televised speech in support of R. Goldwater, the Republican Party candidate for the presidency at that time. The United States, Reagan said, was "the only island of freedom left in the world." The former actor's zeal did not escape the notice of conservative circles in the Republican Party. He was given the necessary support in the California gubernatorial race and occupied this office for 8 years (1967-1975).

As a protégé and spokesman of the party's conservative wing, Reagan entered the presidential race twice--in 1968 and 1976.

Reagan's political views are not distinguished by novelty or originality. In the last 15 years he has invariably declared his unconditional belief in the old orthodox Republican ideology, particularly its chief dogma: the restriction of government's role in the economic and social spheres. When he took the office of governor in California in 1967, Reagan made the following announcement: "They tell us that there are no simple answers to complex problems. I think the truth is that there are no easy answers, but there are simple ones."

In the last election campaign and this year, Reagan has been eager to demonstrate the "simplicity" of his views on urgent problems, knowing that this will appeal to the average American. Inflation? "The government caused inflation and the government must now cure it" (by means of, as Reagan asserts, cutting the income tax by 30 percent in the next 3 years). Besides this, he feels it will be necessary to curtail federal social programs by transferring the funds needed for their implementation to the state governments. The energy problem? "From the time the automobile made its first

appearance right up to 1971," Reagan says, "this problem never came up. It arose only in 1971, when the government intervened in the energy business." The solution, therefore, is a simple one: "Leave the oil companies alone," which will then motivate them to increase oil production within the nation, and "we (the United States--S. G.) will escape foreign dependence." (Experts have not failed to point out that "simplicity" in this case borders on common everyday ignorance: The American Petroleum Institute has reported that the use of all economically sound oil reserves in the nation would only reduce the present import volume by half.)

Foreign policy: "In the last 25 years the Soviet Union has won victories everywhere" because American foreign policy "has verged on conciliation." Here again, the Reagan solution is a simple one: Recalibrate the race for all types of weapons, dramatically increase military spending, develop new weapon systems and activate secret CIA operations in other countries. Detente, Reagan feels, is "essentially an illusion" and the SALT II Treaty "should be sent back to Moscow."

At the end of March, NEWSWEEK magazine wrote: "A group of foreign policy experts, consisting of hawks and super-hawks, is operating in the Reagan camp. Both factions oppose SALT II in its present form. The hawks feel that a sharp increase in U.S. military spending will force Moscow to revise the treaty in ways benefiting Reagan. The super-hawks are categorically against any agreement of this kind. . . . They are convincing Reagan that he should support an immediate 20-percent increase in military spending." In April, the circle of Reagan's foreign policy advisers was considerably widened by the inclusion of 68 experts on foreign and military policy. They include some former members of the Nixon and Ford administrations as well as a few retired admirals and generals and representatives of the academic community. "The overwhelming majority of the newly appointed advisers," the LOS ANGELES TIMES reports, "support a tough line in the cold war spirit." The newspaper states that if the former governor of California should win the nomination at the convention in Detroit, this group will work out the candidate's foreign policy position for the rest of the campaign.

Just as R. Nixon in 1968, Reagan entered the election race with firm support in virtually all states of the nation. In the first of the 35 states where primaries were held this year--New Hampshire--Reagan won an impressive victory. He gathered more votes than all of the other Republican candidates combined. In the primaries in the South, in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Florida, where the conservative influence is strong, Reagan's victory came as no surprise. But his subsequent successes in such traditionally liberal states as New York and Connecticut (followed by victories in Wisconsin, Kansas and Louisiana) made Reagan the most probable recipient of the Republican Party nomination.

Specialists feel that the results of the Wisconsin vote are particularly indicative. In Wisconsin the voters are issued ballots with the names of all Democratic and Republican candidates, regardless of their party

affiliation. "Wisconsin," TIME magazine reports, "has the reputation of a state sending accurate signals to candidates. In 1960 it signaled to John Kennedy that he was headed for the nomination, and in 1968 it signaled to Lyndon Johnson that he was in a difficult position. This year," TIME stresses, "Wisconsin is signaling that the voters are turning away from the Democrats." For the first time in the last 20 years, Republicans won more votes than Democrats in this state (895,000 as opposed to 621,000).

The next primaries intervened in Reagan's triumphant march. The second Republican contender, G. Bush, won a victory in Pennsylvania on 22 April, livening up the Republican race.

George Herbert Bush, the 55-year-old journalist who was born in Massachusetts and whose father was a banker, made a career for himself in the Texas oil business as the founder and head of the Zapata Offshore company. He was twice elected to the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress from the state of Texas. In contrast to Reagan, Bush has a reputation as an experienced statesman. He was the head of the American delegation to the United Nations, the chairman of the Republican Party National Committee during the difficult Watergate period, the chief of the American liaison office in China (1974-1975) and the director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1975-1977).

Traditional Republican views on the role of government, the budget and foreign policy make up the basis of Bush's campaign platform. On the whole, however, his position on various problems is less rigid and less "ideologically tinged" than Reagan's. Bush is not proposing state control over federal social programs. He also supports limitation of the growth of federal expenditures, but it would be possible to reduce taxes, increase military expenditures by 5-8 billion dollars a year and balance the federal budget by 1980 without causing any substantial harm to the majority of social programs. In foreign policy matters Bush displays a certain degree of flexibility. He is opposed to the SALT II Treaty but he admits that the race for nuclear arms is "senseless" and promises to negotiate a "better" treaty if he is elected. He is not renouncing the campaign for "human rights" but is counseling recognition of the fact that "we are not planning to alter the world according to our pattern or sever relations with countries which do not conform completely to our standards." Bush opposed the embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union, believing that this measure would inflict more injury on the United States than on the USSR.

In contrast to Bush and Reagan, J. Anderson entered the campaign with no firm basis of support in the Republican Party and no national renown. Between June 1979, when Anderson announced his candidacy, and the beginning of this year, he has received 456,000 dollars in campaign contributions--slightly more than Reagan spent in one of the first days of his campaign. In January and February, however, contributions to the Anderson fund amounted to 971,000 dollars and the figure exceeded 683,000 in just the first 10 days of March. In Massachusetts Anderson almost passed up Bush,

a native of this state; in Vermont he defeated Bush, winning second place after Reagan. Although he had never gone to the South before the primaries and had no organized support there, Anderson nonetheless received 10 percent of the vote in Florida and in Georgia. Anderson explained his success by the fact that he had offered the voters "something new" and not just the "conservative refrains" of the two preceding candidates.

John Bayard Anderson, 55-year-old member of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress from the state of Illinois since 1961, chairman of the House Republican Conference and member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Nuclear Energy, has a reputation as a moderate Republican. "Although," *NEWSWEEK* magazine writes, "in the beginning of his political career he adhered to the conservative views characteristic of his constituents, he gradually renounced the dogmas of the Grand Old Party." He has branded the production of the mobile MX missiles an "insane enterprise," talks about the 25 million Americans living under the poverty level and favors a balanced budget, but "not at the expense of the poor." In his speeches to the voters, Anderson advocates economy and appeals, as the *NEW YORK TIMES* reported, for discipline and self-sacrifice.

Anderson's views on foreign policy issues also distinguish him from Reagan and Bush. At the time of the televised debates with other Republican candidates before the primaries in Illinois, Anderson said the following about Reagan: "All of his speeches sound as if he is telling us to arm and rearm ourselves. Not a word about any kind of effort to strengthen the peace." Anderson objects to sharp increases in military spending and the restoration of the draft; he is in favor of the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

By declaring himself an independent candidate just before the deadline--23 April--Anderson ensured that his name would be on the ballot in 45 states and the District of Columbia. But does he have any real chance of winning? The two-party system in the United States, which American leftist sociologist W. Dahhoff has aptly called "one of the most clever devices ever dreamed up by the rich to keep them in power," has a firm grip on the voting public. In 1912 Theodore Roosevelt's "Progressive Party" tried unsuccessfully to put its candidate into the White House. In 1948 former Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, who opposed the cold war, suffered a defeat when he challenged President Truman. Twenty years later the same thing happened to George Wallace and his American Independent Party. Senator Eugene McCarthy, who ran as an independent candidate in the presidential election of 1976, was not successful either.

The very presence of independent candidates in elections, however, can, under certain circumstances, affect the outcome of the struggle between the representatives of the two-party political mechanism. Political correspondents noted that, in the primaries in several states, Anderson won an unprecedented number of the votes of independents and of Democrats who were disillusioned with Carter and did not want to vote for Kennedy. As early as the end of March, the *NEW YORK TIMES* wrote: "There is talk of an

Independent movement, a centrist party, a third force representing people who do not want Carter or Reagan. They are mainly rallying round Anderson, who appeals to many Democrats and Independents."

Calling Anderson the "strongest independent candidate in American history," Louis Harris wrote the following in mid-May: "On the national scale, this congressman from Illinois has 29 percent of the vote, as opposed to the 31 percent received by Carter and the 35 percent received by Reagan. In the eight largest northern states--which account for 216 electoral votes, while the number required for victory is 270--Anderson, judging by public opinion polls, will receive a total of 36 percent of the votes in the general elections, while Carter will receive 31 percent and Reagan will receive 29 percent." As the first stage of the campaign showed, however, the organizers of Reagan's campaign are also making a massive effort to win dissatisfied Democrats and Independents over to his side. Both Reagan and his associates realize that, even at a time of increased conservative feelings in the nation, a hard-headed conservative of the Goldwater type has virtually no chance of entering the White House. The crushing defeat suffered by Goldwater in 1964, after his extremism frightened not only the average American but even big business, conclusively demonstrated the potential benefit of vague positions, providing the possibility of attracting various strata of the voting public under the "party umbrella."

Reagan, an experienced demagogue and a capable actor, is striving to refrain from ultraconservative rhetoric. Remembering his unsuccessful campaign in 1976, Reagan does not allow himself to be drawn into detailed discussions of his views on any particular issue, limiting himself to general statements which, precisely by virtue of their vagueness, do not offend anyone. His supporters are trying to create the impression that Reagan's conservatism is displayed more in words than in deeds. In particular, they remind the voters that, when Reagan was governor of California, he often acted contrary to Republican dogma. For example, instead of cutting taxes as he had promised, he raised them, thereby liquidating the budget deficit; instead of reducing state government expenditures, Reagan allowed them to more than double. Under Reagan, the number of persons covered by social welfare programs in California decreased by almost 400,000, but, his supporters hasten to say, the amount of assistance given to the "truly needy" increased. Governor Reagan's "liberal" views on the Equal Rights Amendment and the question of abortion are also being publicized.

Former U.S. President G. Ford occupies a special place in the balance of political power within the Republican Party. In January and February Ford was considered to be the most promising Republican candidate in this year's elections. The former president had already entered the election race de facto by sharply criticizing the Carter Administration for the rise of inflation in the nation and the "dilettantish" conduct of foreign policy affairs. At the end of March, however, Ford publicly refused to run, on the grounds that this might "cause a split" in the party.

During the entire initial stage of the campaign, another important factor was benefitting the Republican Party candidates--the mounting dissatisfaction of the voters with the Democratic Administration's actions in the world arena. "Reagan is being helped most by Carter himself," says D. Yankelovich, head of a New York public opinion research firm. The atmosphere of "jingoism," which was so exaggerated in the winter months, has gradually dissipated. Whereas in February the polls showed that Carter was far ahead of Reagan, receiving 25 percent more of the vote, by the end of March 44 percent of all respondents preferred Reagan as the next president, and only 43 percent chose Carter.

These polls, TIME writes, corroborate the "opinion of the majority of analysts who are calling this year's campaign particularly depressing; Americans are most often voting against candidates than for them." These feelings on the part of the voters, who are becoming increasingly aware of the hopeless "two-party impasse" into which American democracy is herding them, have been pointed out by Secretary-General Gus Hall of the Communist Party of the United States of America in his discussion of the peculiarities of the current election campaign.

8588

CSO: 1803

UNITED STATES INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 60-64

[Article by Ye. V. Mityayeva]

[Text] The sharp exacerbation of the atmosphere in El Salvador and the increase in terrorist and repressive actions against democratic forces are primarily connected with the United States' continuous interference in the internal affairs of this small Central American country. This interference, which is being carried out in a flagrant and overt form, attests to the desire of U.S. ruling circles to prevent the development of a "second Nicaragua" at any cost. Many officials in Washington feel that the Carter Administration was "too late and too indecisive" with its intervention in the Nicaraguan crisis, that it therefore could not prevent the complete victory of the Sandinist National Liberation Front partisans and that "a different course of action" must be taken now in El Salvador. As TIME magazine reported in October 1979, the U.S. Administration has begun a "belated reconsideration of its approach to dictatorships."

It is no coincidence that El Salvador is arousing anxiety in American strategists. Its numerous pressing social and economic problems have heated up the domestic political atmosphere to the boiling point. In this overpopulated mountainous country, the land belongs to an extremely small segment of the population (generally called the "14 families") and almost all of it is taken up by coffee plantations--the main export crop--which is reducing the production of foodstuffs. The people are straining under the burden of poverty, and unemployment has taken on huge dimensions. The military Romero dictatorship, protecting the interests of the bourgeoisie and landowners, conducted mass reprisals against the peasants for a long time and kidnapped and killed representatives of any opposition group--from communists to Catholic priests.

Although the Carter Administration verbally criticized Dictator Romero for violations of human rights, it actually continued to give him economic and military assistance. In summer 1979, after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the United States made feverish attempts to prevent this kind

of thing from happening in other Central American countries. According to U.S. experts, the situation in El Salvador was even more tense than in Nicaragua. Whereas the Sandinistas directed their attacks primarily against the Somoza family, which was hated by all Nicaraguans, in El Salvador the conflict was of a class nature from the very beginning, and Salvadoran leftist forces immediately declared the need to replace the entire socioeconomic system.

To prevent radical reforms in El Salvador, Washington began to demand that Romero take "immediate steps" toward formal democratization. Literally within a few days after the fall of Dictator Somoza, V. Vaky, U.S. assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, was sent to El Salvador, and W. Bowdler, who had served as the special U.S. mediator in Nicaragua, was sent to El Salvador in September for negotiations. Vaky "insisted" that Dictator Romero allow political refugees to return to their native land and move up the date of presidential elections, which had been set for February 1982.

Meanwhile, the Romero Regime continued to cut expenditures on public health, education and housing construction, and increased military appropriations by 21 million dollars. Despite all of its efforts to stifle the opposition, however, its position became more and more shaky. It was soon obvious that General Romero could not hold on to his position of power.

Washington resorted to direct intervention in the affairs of El Salvador without even trying to camouflage any of its actions. American propaganda tried to convince the world public that the pressure being exerted by the Carter Administration was supposedly intended to "prevent bloodshed." In fact, however, Washington was trying to replace the decayed dictatorship with a "moderate" pro-Washington regime, which could quiet public indignation with the aid of limited reforms. Two possible ways of attaining this goal were being considered by the State Department: According to the first plan, the army would cede its authority to a centrist coalition, headed by the Christian Democratic Party (CDP); the second plan proposed a coup d'etat by a "liberal military group." Both plans completely ignored the interests of the overwhelming majority of Salvadorans. The United States' only concern was to keep the country under its influence at any cost and to stifle the revolution before the Salvadoran partisans grew strong enough to win the struggle for power. "The main question is not whether changes will occur," V. Vaky frankly said, "but what kind of changes they will be--violent and radical or peaceful and evolutionary."

On 15 October 1979 the government of General Romero was overthrown. Power in El Salvador was seized by a military-civilian junta, which Washington regarded as a "centrist" force. The Carter Administration denied any involvement in the coup. The NEW YORK TIMES reported, however, that the United States "could identify with forces working in one way or another toward change in El Salvador." This was an admission that the change of government in El Salvador coincided with Washington's interests. The close

ties between the junta and the United States were also attested to by the Carter Administration's immediate declaration of its willingness to "provide considerable assistance." Moreover, the United States was primarily offering help to "simplify the moderate government's task of warding off attacks by leftist extremists": Tear gas and other "non-deadly" substances were sent to El Salvador to quell disorder.

Inspired by the United States, rightist circles took the offensive. Terrorist actions against democratic forces did not stop when the junta took power. On the contrary, they became more brutal. The army fired on peaceful demonstrations and suppressed peasants who demanded the fair redistribution of land. Terrorist groups, such as ORDEN and the White Warrior's Union, as well as armed gangs formed by landowners, joined army troops and police to serve as the striking force of reaction. The Salvadoran oligarchy united to prevent the democratization of national politics and the institution of agrarian reforms.

The fate of hundreds of people who had "disappeared without a trace" under the previous regime remained unknown, and top-level positions in various national security organs were still occupied by the same individuals who had served the dictator.

After remaining isolated from one another for a long time, progressive forces united to fight against reaction. On 9 January 1980 the Communist Party of El Salvador, Popular Liberation Forces and People's Army of Resistance announced the formation of a revolutionary coordinating organization. Within 2 days a coordinating committee was created by the National Revolutionary Movement, the United Popular Front, the Revolutionary Popular Alliance, the National Democratic Union and the February 28 Popular League.

The situation in El Salvador continued to heat up in 1980. The country was engulfed by a wave of overt terror, which the junta did not even try to prevent. Any demonstration by leftist forces, however, immediately aroused a harsh reaction from the junta. Conservative forces, according to many observers, "firmly adhered to the course of civil war." On 22 January the army allied itself with the Christian Democrats to break up a peaceful demonstration. At the beginning of February, army troops and the National Guard assaulted participants in a student demonstration. In March 1980 the junta declared a state of siege in the nation and repealed constitutional guarantees. More than 1,000 patriots died just between January and March 1980. At the end of March Bishop Oscar Romero, a famous fighter for the rights of the oppressed in his country, a man who had denounced the junta and U.S. interference in El Salvador, was killed. The actual instigator of this crime was thought to be Defense Minister Garcia, who occupied a pro-American position. Bishop Romero's funeral turned into a mass protest demonstration against the authorities' terroristic behavior. Despite the peaceful nature of this demonstration, the army fired on the participants. Around 100 people died. In April 1980 the junta engaged in a new wave of repressive action at the capital's university--the center of the opposition

youth movement. Troops were ordered to enter the students' living quarters. Ultra-rightists killed A. Velado, head of the journalists' union, and threatened to take action against Bishop A. Rivero--the most probable candidate to take the late Romero's place as head of the Salvadoran Catholic Church.

In spite of these cases of scandalous brutality and violence, Washington is still giving the regime the most energetic assistance. The United States is still calling the essentially reactionary Salvadoran leadership "moderate" and is trying to call the junta's terroristic behavior a clash between "leftist and rightist extremists." In February the U.S. Government offered El Salvador emergency aid totaling 50 million dollars, 10 million of which was earmarked for the acquisition of military equipment, without asking anything, as observers stressed, in return (for example, the freeing of political prisoners).

The resumption of U.S. military aid to El Salvador was a most significant action. At the beginning of April the United States allocated 5.7 million dollars in military aid to the Salvadoran regime. As representatives of the United Popular Front reported, in subsequent months "Carter offered the junta's armed forces firearms and military equipment worth 18 million dollars. And it was not just rifles and cartridges, but helicopters, tanks and artillery--the means of all-out warfare." Many instructors from the United States arrived in El Salvador--experts on the "art of antipartisan operations." Four strategic bases "for combat against rebels" were established in El Salvador under Pentagon supervision. These bases are also being outfitted with American military equipment. All of these measures to strengthen reaction in El Salvador are obviously inconsistent with Washington's assurances of its desire to support "moderate" forces and promote democratic reform. As the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs declared, the main U.S. concern is to prevent the assumption of power in El Salvador by a government headed by "groups overtly hostile to the United States."

Salvadoran democrats are clearly aware of the potential danger of Washington's actions. A representative of the coordinating body of Salvadoran mass revolutionary organizations stressed that the only possibility of a peaceful settlement "consists in the termination of U.S. aid to the military junta," which has launched an "all-out war." The progressive public in Latin America realizes that the U.S. actions are promoting the seizure of power by rightists in El Salvador, and that the United States is trying to put together a Guatemalan-Honduran-Salvadoran alliance for this purpose.

At the end of February 1980 the State Department made an attempt to deny this. An official representative of the administration announced that Washington would "stop supporting any new regime which had no intention of respecting human rights" and that it would even oppose it vigorously. Actual U.S. policy, however, testifies that this nation is primarily opposed to progressive movements. Numerous examples indicate that Washington will

recognize any regime, even the most reactionary, if it is "friendly" to the United States and can prevent popular uprisings.

Defending the interests of American imperialism, the Carter Administration is intervening in Salvadoran affairs more and more resolutely. There are already 200 marines in El Salvador, and more military personnel arrive each day. American experts are painstakingly training their Salvadoran "colleagues" in the methods of "antitank" combat. In this way, the Pentagon is moving toward what the WASHINGTON POST called its "final goal"--"to set up marine troops in El Salvador and prove that they can win a partisan war." This intention is attested to by the evacuation of the families of American diplomats from El Salvador. The Central American public is disturbed by the transfer of a U.S. Air Force subdivision to Costa Rica--closer to El Salvador. Besides this, Washington also intends to use "hired hands." "Advisers" from the United States and Israel are training 5,000 mercenaries--Cuban refugees and Nicaraguan and Vietnamese counterrevolutionaries--in Guatemala. Israel is prepared to supply the Salvadoran junta with fighter and bomber aircraft. An interventionist corps of army units from several Latin American states is also being formed. At the beginning of May 1980 the Pentagon conducted large-scale maneuvers in the Caribbean basin. According to Salvadoran democratic organizations, military intervention has actually begun, and the American "advisers" have already supervised the suppression of Salvadoran public demonstrations.

This flagrant intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state was called "the most interesting experiment in the world of American politics" by the WASHINGTON POST. However, if this was an attempt by the United States to find new ways of combating what it calls the "Cuban influence" in Latin America, the attempt failed. As a result, Washington will once again be exposed to the Latin American people as an ally of reaction, concerned primarily with the protection of its own imperialist interests.

8588

CSO: 1803

APPLIED SPACE RESEARCH

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 64-71

[Article by A. A. Vasil'yev]

[Text] The latest postponement of the first experimental flight of the Space Shuttle was announced recently. The considerable deviations from the shuttle's schedule and the substantial additional allocations needed, according to NASA administrators, to complete the project have aroused the attention of the American public. The status of the program was the subject of a special discussion in the White House, with the President taking part. Although the propaganda media have much to say about the "unlimited prospects" of American space travel in the future, many believe that the Carter Administration has been unable to offer the country any new goals in space exploration, capable of arousing national interest and warranting nationwide support.

This is the background for the lively debates over the goals of the space program and its objectives for the near and more distant future. There is no shortage of predictions and proposals. Representatives of the scientific and business communities, administration spokesmen and congressmen have become involved in the discussion. Various projects and proposals are being considered--ranging from completely feasible new systems of outer-space communications and observation to the establishment of huge settlements in outer space.

In this situation, marked by insufficiently clear goals and objectives on the one hand and a shortage of information on the other, the question of the actual prospects of the U.S. space program is of interest, particularly the branches of greatest importance to the nation--applied space systems, including communication satellites, satellites for the study of natural resources, outer-space production and power engineering, weather satellites and so forth. It is evident that the chief factors determining the future of American space travel will be the attitude of the administration, Congress and the business community toward these systems, as well as the technical preparedness of industry.

On the other hand, the U.S. Government administration treated the space program as almost an all-out war. The space program began when the work on the space shuttle program had already moved far ahead after the completion of the early work of the Apollo Program with a joint Soviet-American Apollo program and after the demonstration of the considerable practical benefits of various space activities.

From the time of his arrival in the White House, Carter paid special attention to the elements of the space program as communication satellites and the benefits for the study of natural resources and, in the particular, the use of space vehicles whose uses had already been established and whose economic value was indisputable. His administration persistently conducted a policy of associating these space vehicles with the economic interests of the developing countries. As early as May 1977, for example, the President, speaking at a session of the OAS Permanent Council, announced the United States willingness to give other countries information about their natural resources and to use American communication satellites for the transmission of television programs in these countries.

At the same time, Carter used various excuses (a shortage of funds due to the tremendous cost of the space shuttle program, the need for a "balanced strategy" in the area of space exploration, and so forth) to reject any and all new major programs proposed by NASA or the scientific community.

The considerable militarization in the U.S. space program in recent years has also been striking. It has taken the form of larger proportional expenditures on Air Force space programs than on NASA programs (whereas appropriations for military space programs represented 37.3 percent of total space expenditures in 1976, the figure was 47.4 percent in 1979) and a tendency to launch more military than civilian satellites. The latter fact can most strikingly be illustrated by comparing the proportional number of flights planned for the space shuttle in the 1980's in the scheduled Air Force program for 1976 and 1980, whereas the proportional number of flights for military purposes was 10 percent in the 1976 program, it was already almost 50 percent in the 1980 program.

It should be clear, therefore, that the first place in the scale of priorities of the President and his administration has been assigned to programs aimed at political or military advantages for the United States and at assistance to its existing or future private companies. All of the talk about the "national goals" of the future space program and of programs which are "long the nation ahead" has been forgotten.

It has already been noted that several congressmen have sharply criticized the administration's policy in the area of space exploration for its insufficient activity and relatively failure to support major long-range projects, such as projects to supply the earth with energy, large structures and

At the same time, the general exacerbation of economic problems in the nation has renewed the attacks on the space program by some congressmen who wish to enhance their prestige by demonstrating "concern for national needs." Senators E. Hollings (Republican, South Carolina) and D. Riegle (Democrat, Michigan), for example, said in a Senate subcommittee that space expenditures are justified only if they promote national security and solve specific economic problems. Attempts to support any other programs can, in their opinion, only reduce the number of voters supporting the congressional Republican Senator T. Wicker admitted that "we find it difficult to scrape together the money to feed poor children breakfast, but we are spending more and more on the shuttle." It is clear that this position is demagogic in nature. After all, if the senator wished, he could easily find better ways of saving money than cuts in the U.S. space program, which represents only 1 percent of the budget.

A purely utilitarian approach prevails in the attitude of the business community toward the space program, and this has noticeably slowed down the technical improvement of systems. The United States' rivals, primarily Japan, France and the FRG, have taken advantage of this situation to quickly develop their own space programs. The United States has already had to take several steps to impede its rivals. An example of this can be seen in the U.S. refusal to launch the Franco-West German Simfonia satellite until such time as its owners agree to reduce the volume of satellite-aided operations to a minimum. In order to heighten the competitive potential of the products of American corporations, the U.S. Government has had to resume several NASA studies of satellite communication systems.

The attitude of the business community toward satellites for the investigation of natural resources (like the Landsat, NSM and others) can be described as tentative. But this does not mean that they are waiting until the satellites justify their existence. This happened long ago. After the first flight of Landsat in 1972, the tremendous potential of this type of vehicle was revealed and aroused considerable interest in the business community. In 1976 representatives of the 100 largest mining and metallurgical companies founded the Resources Committee to oversee NASA activity. It was on the insistent recommendations of this committee that the Stereosat was designed, with a projected launching date in 1981, and additional optical observation ranges were instituted in the Landsat 3 (1978) and Landsat-4 (1981). It appeared that a consumer had been found, and this consumer's interest in the project was obvious. In response to a direct federal request that the committee take on the responsibility of financing and operating satellites of this kind, however, committee spokesmen declared that this step would be premature.

It was this attitude in the business community toward the continuation of work on the Landsat system that essentially blocked its further development. It is interesting to note that the Landsat system is one of the few space programs which "lost" its future without ever gaining it. According to NASA, this program should be taken over by private businessmen, and it

... and it will not be possible to launch it. The program of this kind have been planned as yet.

One brief survey of the attitude of various U.S. circles toward the national space program primarily points up the clash of interests and the absence of a focal point for an optimal future program. In connection with this, it is doubtful whether the President's decision of 20 November 1979, concerning the transfer of the operation of applied civilian satellite systems to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce, will have the desired effect and aid in coordinating these conflicting interests.

It is in this atmosphere of conflict and far from unselfish tendencies, under the conditions of the almost total absence of reasonable initiatives, including initiatives on the part of the NASA administrators, seriously diluted by spokesmen for the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex, that the debates over the future of American space travel are going on. This calls for the separate consideration of the technical possibilities and actual prospects of the program.

Regardless of what is written about space settlements and gigantic satellites for the transmission of solar energy to the earth, the actual approach to the problem demands consideration of the vehicle question. All projects planned for the near future are based on the space shuttle. Programs for the more distant future envisage either some kind of future single-stage shuttle systems, which will put payloads in orbit at an amazingly low cost (around 5 dollars a kilogram), or say nothing about the problem.

There is no question that the operation of the space shuttle will broaden the capabilities of American space travel, but we must not forget that the shuttle can put a payload ranging from 14.5 to 29.5 tons in orbit at a cost of around 15 million dollars per flight. It is therefore obvious that the launching of huge and heavy systems with the aid of the space shuttle, such as power stations which weigh hundreds of tons, does not even merit discussion. And if plans should be made to create new shuttles, it should be borne in mind that the development and construction of the space shuttle took almost 10 years and cost the nation 7.3 billion dollars. It should also be borne in mind that during the period preceding the adoption of this program, J. Fletcher, who was then the director of NASA, said that its implementation would reduce the cost of putting payloads in orbit to 720 dollars per kilogram, but it later became evident that this figure was not even one-fifth of the actual cost.¹

It is obvious that if new vehicles are developed, the promised low cost of delivery could be considerably understated, and this would threaten the economic profitability of many projects.

¹ "SOLUTSIAI TEHNIKA, FIZIKA, IDEOLOGIYA," No. 7, 1979, p. 89—Editor's note.

Due to its extremely irregular development, moving from periods distinguished by massive programs to periods of virtual standstill, American space technology has acquired some experience in new fields but is losing its old experience. Vivid proof of this can be seen in the present confusion over the scheduled first flight of the space shuttle. One of the main reasons for the postponement was the delay in the development of the main orbital engine. Concentrating all of its efforts on the development of hard-fuel rocket engines, used widely in military missiles, the United States lost much of its experience in the development of fuel-powered engines. At present only two American firms are working in this field, and the main engine for the orbital stage is the only large project in the works.

It is obvious that these vehicle problems will considerably reduce the number of future programs.

Another important factor limiting the development of space programs is the present capacity of the NASA system for processing, storing and disseminating the sharply increased flow of information received from outer space. According to A. Watkins, head of the natural resource research program of the Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the speed of data processing often "holds up the entire project, and this is an absolute catastrophe." It was previously stipulated that the cycle, beginning with the taking of satellite pictures and ending with the presentation of processed information to the consumer, should not exceed 12 days. It actually lasts 4 weeks on the average, and in some cases--up to 6 months. Sometimes information is held up for a year.

The complexity of this problem is pointed out in assessments by American experts, based on an analysis of space programs for the near future, in accordance with which the flow of information will be 12,000-16,000 times as great by the mid-1980's.

The following can be called the most important research fields in American space technology today: satellite communications, outer-space production and outer-space power engineering.

Projects for outer-space settlements, which became popular recently in the United States but which must be regarded as projects for the distant future, are still beyond the range of realistic discussion. The debates over these projects are interesting primarily from the social standpoint and pertain essentially to some kind of vague attempts to create the ideal society in outer space, a society free of the defects organically inherent in America today.

Satellite Communications: The main areas of development in this field are connected with the augmentation of the capacity and relay speed of space systems, which will simplify and reduce the size and cost of the consumers' receiving and transmitting devices. It is in this area that the next dramatic advances in the development of communications devices and systems are

expected, according to NASA Director E. F. Schriever. American experts feel that the next generations of communication satellites could perform a much broader variety of functions through the introduction of several new elements, such as direct communication between consumers throughout the nation with the aid of portable devices, the organization of assault and burglary alarm systems, the navigation of individual means of transport, medical assistance and so forth.

The short-range prospects of satellite communications, however, look less appealing to the United States. Satellite communications represent the first branch of space technology to enter the sphere of extensive commercial use. It is in this area that American companies experience their most dramatic clashes with the interests of firms in the developed capitalist countries, primarily France, the FRC and Japan. These countries are waging a fierce struggle for broader participation in the development and operation of satellites within the Intelsat framework. The U.S. monopoly in the production of satellite-launching vehicles is being threatened by the successful test flights of the European Space Agency's Aryan rocket.

In addition to the competitive struggle, there are problems of a purely technical nature, which are putting the total implementation of sweeping plans in the area of satellite communications in question. Despite the great variety of these problems, they have certain common features that are connected in one way or another with insufficient planning and the inconsistency of the space program. For example, the efforts to improve energy sources for satellites could turn out to be obviously inadequate. According to the heads of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, "It is already obvious that the power engineering of the shuttle, taken from the Apollo project without any changes, will limit the possibilities for its use and the group of operations it will perform. The development of better satellite communications will require much more energy than the few kilowatts which can be derived from today's flight systems." The further development of this type of communications will require the assembly of antennae in outer space and the performance of other operations calling for man to remain in space for long periods of time, in connection with which many experts are noting that the United States is lagging far behind the USSR in the area of space medicine and in provisions for life in space for long periods of time.

Outer-Space Production: Just a few years ago some American experts associated outer-space production with the coming of some kind of economic miracle. It was assumed that this would serve as a way of preserving the economic superiority of America in the future and extending U.S. influence to other countries. At a conference organized by a congressional committee to discuss the future of space travel, the president of one space firm, K. Eric, said "we need to consider a new kind of industrial organization, in which production in space can be combined with production on earth with maximum economic efficiency.... Otherwise, we will encounter problems arising from the continuous reduction of our economic base." During the move from the

planning stage to the implementation of the projects, however, it turned out that forecasts of this kind were premature and ungrounded. The primary objectives of space production were separated from problems requiring resolution in the distant future. Solutions which turned out to be unprofitable were discarded. Here we should recall the 1978 resolution of the National Research Council of the American Academy of Sciences, in which the question of moving several technological processes to outer space is called technically immature. This fact and the suspicions it aroused caused the President to exclude the entire question of space production from the general list of future aims of the space program and to even change the name of this part of the program (previously called "space technology") to "space material studies." According to a subsequent analysis, this "confusion" was a direct result of insufficient forethought in NASA technical policy and premature and irresponsible advertising.

At present, NASA is displaying an almost total reversal in its attitude toward space production, emphasizing the need for several preliminary studies aimed at the more detailed investigation of the influence of outer space (vacuum, weightlessness and solar radiation) on specific types of production. Considerable efforts are also being made to encourage private firms to organize and conduct experiments to prove the potential profitability of operations. One way of attracting private capital is NASA activity in the funding and organization of preliminary experiments. Special attention is given to the economic and legal aspects of this matter: the distribution of expenditures and risks, the right to the information obtained, the potential sales market and the importance of this technology in "ensuring a leading position for the United States."

The manufacture of medicine and new materials for the electronic industry (primarily crystals and semiconductors) has been called the most promising area of space production.

In addition to the factors listed above, which are impeding the development of future programs (the lack of adequate power engineering, the insufficient investigation of problems connected with long-term habitation in outer space and so forth), serious obstacles are also being created by the fierce competition between potential participants.

Outer-Space Power Engineering: As mentioned above, the insufficient attention given to the development of in-flight energy systems is impeding the development of U.S. space travel, according to American experts. Some projects of the 1950's and 1960's were never completed, despite their significant cost. In general, the experience in American space exploration has proved that some of these studies could have been applied in "terrestrial" power engineering, but these problems are not among the quickest to solve. In this sense, the loss of experience accumulated in the process of work on programs for the development of outer-space power installations is a loss that will not be compensated for quickly.

Simultaneously, the question of the construction of power stations of several thousand megawatts, designed to convert solar energy into electric energy and transmit it to the earth in the form of microwave radiation, is now being discussed at various levels of the government hierarchy. There is no question that this decision on the program was influenced by the energy crisis of the 1970's, but there is not the only reason. According to experts, the cost of the preliminary research to determine the expediency of these projects will reach 40-50 billion dollars. It appears that this estimate has affected the preference of large monopolies instead of postponing the discussion of these projects to some date in the more distant future. A fierce struggle has broken out among large aerospace companies over the sums allocated for the first stage of this research. In reference to a bill on the funding of the first stage of research, H. Abourezk, former Democratic Senator from South Dakota, said: "I am afraid that it will lead to the further concentration of economic and political power within the hands of a few gigantic corporations instead of actually promoting the provision of the nation with environmentally beneficial solar energy."

The gigantic space power stations -- as well as, designed by large monopolies (Boeing, Arthur D. Little, General Dynamics and others) are of definite ecological interest, but they have one important drawback. They are not based on previous NASA experience and their implementation will unavoidably increase the cost of projects and reduce their effectiveness. In other words, we are once again confirming the aforementioned lack of planning and continuity in the future of future NASA projects.

When we discuss specific technical difficulties in the establishment of space power stations, we must also bear in addition to the vehicle problem, American experts have pointed out a broad array of problems that must be solved before these stations can be designed. They include problems in the establishment of large structures in outer space with prolonged human activity under the conditions of weightlessness, problems in environmental protection in zones of terrestrial receiving devices, the effect of sizeable doses of microwave radiation on the climate and many others.

The question of the future development of weather satellites is equally vague. The prospects for their further use have hardly been investigated. The experimental weather system now being tested, which has conditionally been called "System-83," has not been tested completely as yet, and its future is uncertain even though, as its name testifies, it is supposed to begin operating in 1985.

When we examine the chief limitations of applied space programs in the United States, we can see some general tendencies. The plans of the administration and the business community in regard to the evolution of U.S. space technology are resulting in its inconsistent and irregular development. An excessively utilitarian approach often prevails, putting primary emphasis on profit rather than on the resolution of fundamental problems.

The inconsistency of programs is impeding the resolution of technical problems. Former NASA administrator G. Muller had good reason to say that "we used to proceed from future objectives when we planned the development of the program. Now the need has arisen to go back and resume the development of technical potential, and then to plan future objectives on that basis."

ASRR

CR0: 1803

THE UNITED STATES AND UNIDO 3

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 71-73

[Article by V. A. Sokolov]

[Text] As one of the central problems of decolonialization, industrialization has been called upon to play an important role in the struggle of the developing countries to eradicate the remaining traces of colonialism and in their fight against neocolonialism and for economic and social progress. While some of the developing countries have had a certain degree of success in augmenting their industrial potential, many of them have been made dependent on the developed countries and on multinational monopolies by the widespread infiltration of foreign capital; the monopolies, acting in their own selfish interests, actually force these countries to accept specific types of industrial development and specialization. On the pretext of "cooperation," "interdependence" and "government aid for development," the industrial West is creating conditions favoring the further penetration of its capital into the economies of the young states, is deforming their industrial development instead of helping them to strengthen their economic independence, and is preventing their development from working toward truly national interests.

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) plays a definitely positive role in the industrialization of the developing countries. The declaration and plan of action adopted at its second general conference in Lima in 1975 stipulate several progressive objectives whose attainment will increase industrial potential somewhat in countries which have escaped the colonial yoke.

The third general conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO 3) was held in New Delhi from 21 January through 9 February 1980 to discuss problems in the industrialization of the developing countries in light of the documents adopted in Lima and to determine the future guidelines and goals of UNIDO activity in the 1980's.

For 3 weeks delegations from 133 countries, 16 UN organizations, 8 specialized agencies, 29 intergovernmental organizations and 5 observers from the

national liberation movements exchanged views on ways of increasing the proportion accounted for by the developing countries in worldwide industrial production. The basis of the discussion was the draft "New Delhi Declaration and Plan of Action," prepared by the "Group of 77."

The course of the discussion at the New Delhi conference quite clearly indicated who was who in this dialog. The balance of power at the conference did not at all fit into the ideas of those who are trying to "equalize" the responsibility of the socialist and capitalist countries for the difficult economic position of the liberated states. The socialist countries once again demonstrated their willingness to develop economic relations with these states on a fair and democratic basis. They supported the basic premises of the New Delhi Declaration, believing that their implementation would strengthen the economic independence of the developing states.

The struggle to reorganize economic relations on a fair and democratic basis and economic and industrial cooperation with the developing countries constitutes an integral part of socialist foreign policy and stems from the very nature of socialist society, the Soviet delegate said in his speech. This is corroborated by the willingness to broaden economic cooperation with the developing countries, share experience accumulated in the sphere of industrialization, and take the needs of these countries into account in the national economic plans of socialist countries.

The opposite approach was displayed by the Western powers, especially the United States. This complicated the work of the conference considerably, and its results disillusioned the representatives of the developing countries. To a significant degree, the outcome was also affected by the international situation that had taken shape through the fault of reactionary and imperialist forces and did not contribute to constructive dialog.

As soon as the conference began, it was already clear that the United States and its allies were prepared to object to the proposals of the developing countries, as set forth in the draft New Delhi Declaration and Plan of Action. The content and general purpose of this document corresponded to the basic premises of the final document of the sixth conference of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries, which was held in Havana in September 1979 and which is known to have aroused particular displeasure in Washington. The United States and England, setting the tone in so-called "Group B," uniting the developed capitalist nations at the conference, tried to influence the position of other Western states. As a result, all of the other Western countries voted against the New Delhi Declaration and Plan of Action on the last day of UNIDO 3. India's PATRIOT newspaper remarked that the votes against the declaration were inspired by Washington for the purpose of undermining India's prestige due to its independent stand on recent events on the subcontinent and its refusal to follow in the wake of U.S. policy.

The 1979 attempts to "depoliticize" the course and outcome of the New Delhi conference were also striking. In particular, one of the arguments against the New Delhi declaration was the allegation that this was a "political document."

The United States, with Canada, France, the FRG and England following its lead, objected to the UN Council on Namibia's participation in the work of the conference, asserting that it did not actually represent a state. This council, however, has been recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate Namibian governing authority until such time as the question of its independence should be settled.

"Group B" also torpedoed the "comprehensive program of assistance to national liberation movements," a draft resolution proposed by Algeria, Zambia and Tanzania.

The head of the American delegation, J. McDonald, presented the U.S. point of view at the conference, depicting the dismal economic prospects in store for the developing countries if they do not establish favorable conditions to attract big capital. These predictions were accompanied by criticism of the oil-producing countries, as if American multinational monopolies had nothing to do with the manipulation of oil prices. He said that "political stability" was the main condition for the attraction of American investments to the developing countries. The purpose of these demands is obvious. This is the traditional imperialist approach of the United States, its habitual practice of supporting regimes hostile to the population.

The U.S. stand on the most expedient ways of industrializing the developing countries, as set forth in McDonald's speech, corresponds in general to the notorious American idea of "industrialization" set forth in the report "American Science and Technology for Development: Contribution to the 1979 UN Conference." The theory that the interests of the developing states coincide completely with American interests lies at the basis of this report, presented at the world conference on science and technology for development in Vienna in 1979. Moreover, the United States intends to allocate only 0.27 percent of its GNP for assistance to the developing countries (for the sake of comparison, let us recall that it allocated 1 percent of the GNP for the Western European countries at the time of the Marshall Plan).

The thesis regarding the "communist threat" is being vigorously utilized by the United States in this area as well in order to intimidate the young states, just as the Western European countries were intimidated in the first postwar years. There was an obvious motive for the proposal of something like a new Marshall Plan, but this time for the developing countries, at the conference. The motive lying behind this proposal is the desire of some circles in the West to use economic assistance to strengthen the position of big capital in the developing countries by creating the necessary infrastructure, financed through funds organized on the Marshall Plan model--a system worked out in the United States for

the postwar recovery of Western Europe and offered on certain political conditions, primarily the condition that communists and other progressive forces are to be prevented from taking part in government.

This approach ignores the proposals of the socialist states and of the particular developing countries which believe it is necessary to conclude international arms limitation agreements and transfer part of the funds now spent on the arms race in the world to peaceful spheres, including industrial development in the young states.

We could not say that the dialog in New Delhi has come to an end. One of the main forums for its continuation will be the special session of the UN General Assembly on the new international economic order in 1980. The United States and its allies are preparing the soil, and international public opinion as well, for their "new initiatives." It is absolutely clear, however, that Washington intends to vigorously oppose the developing countries' legitimate desire for fair practices in international economic relations. One of the main results of the discussion at the UNIDO general conference was the feverish search by ideologists of the large capitalist countries for ways of preserving and consolidating the West's influence in the developing countries.

8588

CSO: 1803

ECONOMY: THE ELECTION YEAR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 74-78

[Article by Yu. I. Bobrakov: "Campaign Declarations and Economic Reality"]

[Text] As the November elections in the United States approach, political battles and squabbles between contenders for the presidency and for the seats of senators and congressmen reach a higher pitch and debates over the economic difficulties confronting the nation become more heated. In this election year, the chief difficulties are the new spurt of inflation, the new increase in unemployment, cuts in production volume, and the economy's gradual slide into another cyclical crisis with all of the ensuing social and political consequences. What is more, it must be borne in mind that these problems are becoming more acute against the background of the burdensome legacy of the 1970's--the exacerbation of energy, raw material and ecological problems, the declining rate of labor productivity, the fall of other indicators of economic effectiveness, and the currency and financial crisis.

The question of "where the economy is going" is constantly raised on the pages of American newspapers and magazines. This is understandable: The tragedy of the "Great Depression" still lives in the memory of the older generation of Americans, and the crisis of 1973-1975, the deepest and most severe crisis since the early 1930's, is fresh in everyone's memory.

In an election year, the Americans naturally view the deteriorating state of the economy in the context of the campaign promises and predictions made by representatives of the current administration. They compare this state to conditions prior to the administration's assumption of power and try to determine the exact economic and social impact of the hundreds of billions of dollars the government regularly collects from the population in the form of taxes and uses to cover its own constantly rising expenditures.

In connection with this, it would be expedient to recall how the present administration began its term in office, and what the nation was promised

by J. Carter, the Democrat who won a hard victory over Republican President G. Ford in the November 1976 election. At that time the U.S. economy was just emerging from the crisis of 1973-1975. Moreover, the process of recovery was particularly difficult and sluggish and was accompanied by the maintenance of a high, actually critical level of unemployment. The Republican Administration's "gradualist" course of economic recovery was extremely vulnerable to criticism from the Democrats, who set forth a program of more vigorous steps to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment in the 1976 campaign.

It was at this time, in October 1976, that Carter declared that the nation's economy could undergo "even harder times" if the voters did not put an end to the "Republicans' poor management of the economy." The conservative nature of Ford's campaign platform on economic issues was one of the principal causes of the general weakness of his political position. When the NEW YORK TIMES assessed the concluding stage of the Republican Administration's term in office, it noted that "public trust in the economic policy of the government, judging by the results of numerous public opinion polls, has fallen to a record low level." Carter, on the other hand, proposed an "activist" program, in which his promises to see to the "internal health" of the nation, stimulate economic growth and reduce unemployment occupied a prominent place, and gained the upper hand over his Republican rival in the election.

The new President tried to avoid the magnanimous type of promises made by his predecessors. In his inauguration speech, Carter said: "Today I am not offering you any kind of new dream. We have learned that 'bigger' does not necessarily mean 'better' and that we cannot answer all questions or solve all problems." This approach gave the public the impression that he viewed problems realistically and would set attainable goals. Carter promised to considerably reduce unemployment, balance the federal budget by fiscal year 1981, conduct welfare "reform" and plan and carry out a program for the development of housing construction and urban "renewal." He also promised to lighten the burden of military spending and make cuts in defense appropriations.

In his first message to Congress in January 1977, the President set forth a program of "economic recovery," calculated for 2 years and intended to solve immediate problems--to improve the unemployment situation and stimulate the economy. He assured the nation that this program would "not lead to any significant rise in the rate of inflation" and that his administration would "never relax its vigil on inflation, which is robbing us all."

In the first stages of Carter's term in office, the U.S. economy continued to experience upward tendencies, in line with the customary post-crisis dynamic of the economic cycle. To a certain degree, this created a favorable "environment" for the administration and gave its representatives euphoric feelings about the state of the economy and the capabilities of the regulating influence of government in this sphere. In this atmosphere

...and, moreover, the President had to admit this indirectly when, in a Los Angeles Times interview of 19 May 1980, he agreed with the correspondent that the strategy chosen to combat inflation presupposes a rise in unemployment.

Despite all previous programs, inflationary processes have become stronger each year in the U.S. economy. For example, the rate of inflation in spring 1980 was three times as high as during the 1976 campaign, when President Ford was criticized for "allowing" prices to rise at a rate three times as high as during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

As for the fourth program, which was announced in March 1980, there has been no shortage of skeptical remarks in the American press about its possible impact. Former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors H. Stein, for example, published an article eloquently entitled "The Failure of Carter's Anti-Inflation Policy" in FORTUNE magazine. He described the program in the following way: "The policy outlined by the government represents a slightly reinforced variation of the one in effect when inflation bloomed and flourished in the last 15 years. The opinion that it will be unproductive is gaining strength. It will not help to change the skeptical born of long years of fluctuation, and it will not change the inflationary mentality, which must change if we wish to put an end to inflation. More resolute attempts at a break with the past are demanded." Naturally, Stein, as an economist once connected with the Republican administration (under R. Nixon and G. Ford), could be taking a biased view of the policy of a Democratic administration, but for the sake of objectivity it must be said that his criticism is directed to an equal degree against the economic policy of the Republicans, under whose administration inflation "flourished" in the first half of the 1970's and has since become chronic and acute.

In the aforementioned LOS ANGELES TIMES interview, Carter said that, according to his calculations, inflation would slow down in the next few months, "even before the Democratic convention." This possibility naturally cannot be excluded. But a slight drop in the rate of inflation can be primarily a result of spontaneous cyclical action and the development of temporary crisis, and this would mean that the price of lower inflation is the economic sacrifice of higher unemployment and a lower standard of living for the people. But are the possible results of the de-escalation of inflation, as indicated by the administration? According to the 1980 May survey, the retail price index will rise 17.75 percent during the fourth quarter of 1980 and the end of the fourth quarter of 1981. The rate of inflation also in other areas have seemed incredibly high. The rate of inflation and the American government now has to pass through this process of de-escalation.

...and, moreover, the President had to admit this indirectly when, in a Los Angeles Times interview of 19 May 1980, he agreed with the correspondent that the strategy chosen to combat inflation presupposes a rise in unemployment.

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DOES hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the
original as the same appears in the records of the Court.

[illegible]

Secretary of the Treasury, J. Edgar Hoover, said at a press conference that Mr. Ford was a "right spender." He made reference to a forecast of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, according to which the economy in 1976 would be approximately 1-1/2 percent in real terms better than it was in the fourth quarter of 1975 and the end of the fourth quarter of 1980.

At the same time, Miller said he came to address the fears of the American public that the new anti-inflation program, adopted in mid-March of this year, might be intended to reduce inflation by curbing economic activity, could mean loss of jobs and increased unemployment. "No," Miller said, "I am not worried about the risks we are taking as we sail through the winter." He called the test of 1976 an "atypical election year".

"You would have thought that the President of the United States would have sought the re-election in a context of a balanced budget, reduced spending and low inflation. But if these objectives were seen to go against

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

...and for a President seeking re-election, ... being actively questioned by many American economists. For example, Dr. J. Kellner, chief economist of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust financial institution, told a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent, "no matter what kind of foundation it is, we cannot deny its existence. There is the impression (but it will be quite severe--more severe than the administration and the majority of Americans expect)." Renowned economist A. Greenspan stressed in his assessment of the economic situation and the tendencies for its further development: "President Carter's opinion that the recession will be short-lived and moderate has not been borne out." And prominent expert R. Wessinger, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers (under Eisenhower), even feels that this recession will be more severe than in 1970-1975.

There are many reasons for these predictions; we will list a few of them:

Industrial production decline has lasted for months and is becoming increasingly distinct. In April 1980, for example, production volume dropped again--by almost 1.9 percent in comparison to March. This was the biggest drop since August 1979. Particularly sharp cuts have been made in the automotive industry, in related branches and in housing construction. The 9 May 1980 issue of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE noted: "The automotive industry has been experiencing its own personal recession for almost a year. Now that the other branches of the economy have joined it, this industry and all related branches have plunged into a depression." The demand for motor vehicles, according to the newspaper, has dropped to the level of the "dismal years of 1974 and 1975," which no one could have imagined until just recently, and economists are giving up their already pessimistic forecasts in this extremely important industry in favor of even more pessimistic ones.

Capital investments in construction, according to official data, were 1.8 percent lower in March than in February--the most dramatic month-to-month decline in the last 16 years:

According to official data, the volume of new residential construction dropped 1.5 percent in March, 1980--the most dramatic monthly decrease in the last 16 years.

Unemployment. Unemployment rose and kept rising in April when production rate continued to fall. The level of unemployment is much higher in some countries than in the U.S. (Germany). In Detroit, for example, the unemployment rate rose to 15.2 percent, which is equivalent to 21 percent of the total labor force employed. In New York construction, the unemployment indicator is 100 percent (100 jobs lost per 100 jobs).

...and the unemployment rate is rising the anticipated rise in unemployment. This is a very serious situation. A further reduction in production will lead to a further increase in unemployment. In March and April 1980, the volume of production fell 1.1 percent in March and 1.2 percent in April.

THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 79-88

[Second installment of translation by A. A. Arzumanov of chapters from the book "The Washington Pay-Off; A Lobbyist's Own Story of Corruption in Government" by Robert N. Winter-Berger, New York, 1972, Lyle Stuart, Inc.]

[Not translated by IPRS]

CSO: 1803

AMERICAN-CANADIAN RIVALRY IN DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN RESOURCES

Moscow SSMA: PRONOMIA, POLITIKA, GEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 99-98

(Article by V. P. Pisarenko and P. B. Kravtsov)

[Text] In the 1970's the increasing industrial use of the world ocean turned into an important sphere of international economic and political relations, connected with the exploration of coastal waters and regions far offshore. The differing interests and actual capabilities of littoral states in the development of marine engineering have had a serious effect on their approach to the regulation of bilateral relations and the drafting of an all-encompassing convention at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

In relations between the United States and Canada in the sphere of world ocean development are evolving against the background of a fierce inter-imperialist struggle for control over ocean expanses and resources. Considering the need to strengthen the capitalist system's position at a time of radical reorganization of the political and legal status of the world ocean, however, ruling circles in these countries have had to search for compromise solutions for the more pressing problems in the delineation of coastal regions and the regulation of marine engineering projects.

Over the last 10 years Canadian-American relations in the area of fishing, the development of the offshore oil and gas resources of the continental shelf and deep sea mineral resources, and the delineation of border according to the law of the sea.

In the American and Canadian fishing industries rely primarily on the resources of the continental shelf of the North American continent, which are being developed by the two countries. The fishing industry occupies a considerable proportion of the GNP in both countries: 11.0% in the United States and 9.3 percent in Canada.¹ In terms of the total catch of fish and shellfish the United States and 1.3 million tons in Canada in 1978-1979 countries held fourth and seventeenth place in the world respectively. The fishing industry in both countries is still

developing irregularly, primarily due to domestic economic factors. The ineffectiveness of the American and Canadian fishing industries is the result of the poor organization of marine biological resource development, a higher level of proportional expenditures on fishing in comparison to other countries, weak vertical integration between the fishing trade and the processing and sales of fish, insufficient knowledge about the resource base, the underdevelopment of shipbuilding for the fishing trade, the inefficient structure of the fishing fleet, and so forth. In contrast to the United States, which covers around half of its need for fish products (including inedibles) with imports, Canada exports 80 percent (in cost terms) of the products of its fish industry, occupying second place in the world in this field. Besides this, in Canada the population of coastal regions is much more dependent on the fish industry for employment and income. As a result, when priorities were set in Canadian maritime policy, the protection of the interests of this industry became one of the chief goals of the national world ocean development policy, while in the United States fishing was assigned a secondary role in comparison to other ways of using the ocean.

When we assess the present status and future prospects of Canadian-American relations in the area of fishing, we should consider the fact that they are based on long and close cooperation. A fishing agreement to regulate halibut fishing on the west coast of the North American continent was concluded by the two countries in 1923 (at present, the 1953 text is in effect). An international commission on halibut fishing in the Pacific Ocean was formed on the basis of this agreement and was empowered to set halibut quotas for American and Canadian fishermen. The commission has its own scientific research base and has worked on a broad variety of research projects in this field. In the last decade the status of halibut reserves on the west coast of the United States and Canada deteriorated sharply: The total catch of this fish decreased from approximately 30,000 tons (the annual average from 1956 through 1961) to 8,400 tons in 1977.³ After Canada and the United States established a 200-mile fishing zone, the United States decided to gradually stop Canadian halibut fishing in its zone. Canada regards this as a serious infringement of its interests, since halibut reserves in the American zone (in the past and the present) are approximately three times as great as Canadian reserves, and Canadian fishermen have traditionally caught a much more of this fish near U.S. shores than American fishermen have caught near Canadian shores. Nonetheless, both countries have expressed a desire to continue cooperating within the international commission framework, regarding it as a essential condition for the efficient use of the North West Coast halibut population, this non-migrating fish.

Canada, under the leadership of the regulation of salmon fishing on the west coast of the continent, is a strong supporter of the 1960 Convention on the protection of salmon fisheries in the North Pacific International Pacific Salmon Fishing Commission (IPSC). The Commission was created on the basis of the 1960 Convention. Its functions include the regulation of salmon fishing and spawning grounds in the Fraser River. The agreement extends to the entire system of rivers situated

However, the regional New England fishing council unilaterally increased cod and haddock quotas for American fishermen. The United States also took similar steps to redistribute the Pacific coast salmon catch in its own favor. In response, Canada limited American shrimp fishing near Vancouver Island in the Pacific Ocean.

Realizing that the existing agreement was ineffective, the United States and Canada began a new round of negotiations. Another provisional fishing agreement was concluded in April 1978. The latest changes in the balance of catches in favor of the United States were recorded in this agreement, and an additional region in American waters was opened to Canadian fishermen. Even this agreement, however, did not solve all existing problems, primarily those connected with the disputes over the delimitation of border sections of the 200-mile fishing zone. The system worked out at the last session of negotiations for the settlement of disputes also turned out to be ineffective. A new Canadian-American fishing agreement is now being discussed by the U.S. Congress. According to reports in the press, Washington is certain that this agreement will be ratified quite soon.

The development of the oil and gas resources of the continental shelf is the main area of marine research and engineering in the United States and Canada. The two countries' approaches to this matter, however, differ perceptibly. The United States, which has the greatest scientific and technical potential for offshore drilling among the capitalist countries, is trying to slow down the development of its own offshore oil and gas resources and is encouraging expansion by American oil monopolies in broader operations near the coastal regions of other countries. Under the conditions of the fierce competitive struggle for access to nonrenewable sources of raw material, state-monopoly capital in the United States regards the slower development of offshore deposits as a means of conserving American oil and gas reserves. The possibility of the quicker (if necessary) development of these deposits is assessed not only from the standpoint of the acquisition of an additional source of raw materials, but also as an effective weapon in the economic struggle with exporters and consumers in other capitalist countries. Besides this, the oil and gas reserves of the American continental shelf are regarded in the United States as some kind of strategic reserve to be used only if foreign shipments should cease.

The realization of the potential of additional oil production zones and fields, according to American oil experts, urged this country to speed up exploration and development of coastal waters is to be one way of reducing Canada's dependence on imported oil. Since most of the offshore oil deposits are located in bleak and desolate areas, and since the oil companies, in order to meet their consumption, their exploration programs require expenditures reaching into billions of dollars, the oil companies will use the latest offshore drilling equipment and technology. These companies will also make extensive use of the scientific and technical resources of their own companies, but they have also increasingly turned to important foreign countries to broaden and strengthen

the questions of national capital and the state in the exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the continental shelf and the far North, which are under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

Judging by estimates of the potential oil and gas resources of the Canadian continental shelf, their exploitation could contribute considerably to covering the nation's demand for these types of energy raw materials. It should be borne in mind that estimates of the oil and gas potential of the Canadian shelf are only approximate due to insufficient geological and geophysical studies and test drilling. The estimates of potential oil and gas resources published by the Canadian Geological Survey in 1977 seem to be the most representative. According to these data, total offshore and continental-offshore (partly on the shelf and partly on the mainland) oil and gas deposits, which account for 35-50 percent of Canada's aggregate potential reserves, amount to 1.6 billion tons of oil with 90-percent detection probability and 2.26 billion tons of oil with a 50-percent probability; the respective figures for gas are 2.15 trillion cubic meters and 3.9 trillion cubic meters.⁶ The most promising regions are the Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie River delta, the Arctic Islands and the shelf of Labrador and Newfoundland.

Oil and gas occupy an important place in Canadian-American relations. Until recently Canada was the United States' main supplier of oil, and American multinational oil monopolies, which held key positions in the Canadian oil industry, derived colossal profits from the exploitation of Canadian oil and gas resources and their sale in the American market. Now that the Canadian Government has decided to gradually curtail exports of oil to the United States, the American monopolies are trying to find new ways of making superprofits on the exploitation of Canadian oil and gas resources. In particular, they expect to retain their dominant position in the Canadian oil industry on the strength of their technological leadership in the area of offshore drilling. Besides this, U.S. monopolies are trying to take advantage of Canada's scientific, technical and financial dependence in this field to pressure the Canadian Government to abandon its plan of granting privileges to national capital in the development of marine oil and gas resources.


Canadian-American conflicts over oil and gas resources now extend to the sphere of Canadian energy policymaking. A fierce struggle is going on between Canadian branches of American oil monopolies and the government of Canada over such important aspects of energy policy as the regulation of oil and gas prices in the domestic market, as well as in the area of tax policy and real estate legislation, where the proportional distribution of profits from the exploitation of oil and gas resources between the federal treasury and the oil monopolies is being settled. The rise in proportional capital expenditures resulting from the move to offshore drilling is being used by the oil industry as one of the chief excuses for raising oil and gas prices in the domestic market and retaining the privileged conditions of foreign capital's access to Canadian offshore oil and gas resources (in comparison to other regions with similar natural conditions--Alaska and the North Sea).

the exploitation of other coastal territory. The exploitation of mineral resources located at the bottom of the ocean is directly related to the process of delineating the marine boundaries of states. The United States and Canada have disputed marine borders near Georges Bank (on the New England coast), in the Beaufort Sea and in the Dixon Entrance (West Coast). The most serious disagreements have been waged over the shelf near Georges Bank. The method of determining the border is the subject of these disagreements. Canada feels that the border in this region should be drawn along an equidistant line, in accordance with the Geneva convention of 1958 on the continental shelf. The United States has agreed to the Canadian proposal only in part and believes that this method of delineation should be used only to the point where it intersects with the middle of the Northeast Channel—an underwater canyon separating Georges Bank from the shelf of Nova Scotia (see Map No 1). According to the United States, the border should then run along the bottom of the canyon, since it is more than 200 meters deep and Georges Bank is a natural extension of U.S. territory. The arguments put forth by the United States have cited the provision on "special circumstances" in the 1958 convention on the continental shelf and the decision of the World Court on the delineation of the shelf between the U.K., Denmark and Holland, which states that the settlement of such disputes should be guided by consideration for the "integrity of mineral deposits, the bathymetry of the shelf and the proportions of the disputed territory adjacent to each side."⁵

The American method of determining the border would mean that Georges Bank is completely within the United States. The delineation of borders in this region is an extremely important matter. According to the preliminary data of all prospecting operations, sizeable deposits of oil and gas could be located in the depths of Georges Bank. Besides this, the region is an important fishing zone. The fishermen of New England obtain 75 percent of their entire catch here, and the Canadian catch of just scallops in the region was valued at 35 million dollars in 1977—that is, more than 10 percent of the value of Canada's annual fishing product in the Atlantic.⁶

The two countries adhere to absolutely conflicting views in regard to the delineation of the shelf in the Beaufort Sea region—one of the most promising oil and gas regions along the Arctic coastline of North America. Canada feels that the border should be an extension of the land border between Alaska and the Yukon Territory—the 141st meridian (see Map No 2). The United States is adhering to the principle of the equidistant line, since Chukotka is about 2000 kilometers of sea with an area of around 780 square kilometers.⁷


In the matter of the shelf in the Dixon Entrance, Canada favors the extension of the border which, according to a 1958 decision defining the border between Great Britain and British Columbia (1900), was drawn along a straight line between Prince of Wales Island in the east and Cape Muzon in the west. The United States insists on this on the grounds that this court decision applies only to the land boundary and proposes that delimitation be governed by the principles of the 1958 Geneva Convention.



Map 1. Atlantic Coast

Deep-Sea Mineral Resources: Deep-sea solid minerals--manganese concretions--are considered to be one of the most important world ocean resources.¹⁰ Today the concretions are mainly valuable for their nickel content, as well as their content of cobalt, manganese and copper, the ocean deposits of which, even according to minimum estimates, surpass continental reserves. According to the latest data, for example, nickel deposits in just one part of the Pacific, located between 7° and 15° North latitude and 120° and 150° West longitude (an area of 3 million square kilometers), are considered to be the richest deposits, estimated at 20 million tons, or 30 percent of all reserves of this metal in the continental deposits of the developed capitalist and developing countries.¹¹

The possible effects of the future exploitation of deep-sea resources on the world metal market were investigated by a group of UN experts. According to these studies, the production of metal from these concretions will contribute significantly to the satisfaction of the world demand for cobalt, nickel and manganese. The appearance of these metals in the world market is expected to change the existing structure of the market, which will take the form of a relative decrease in continental production and a drop in world prices. According to forecasts, the cobalt and nickel markets will be affected most by the exploitation of these concretions.



Map 2. Arctic Coast

Several leading capitalist states, particularly the United States, are taking energetic action to exploit this source of strategic raw materials, regarding it as a means of, on the one hand, reducing their dependence on imports of these metal and, on the other, exerting pressure on continental suppliers to reduce the prices of imported raw materials.

Besides this, it is being pointed out in the United States that the exploitation of these deep-sea minerals could completely eliminate the need for imports of copper, nickel and cobalt by 1990, and reduce imports of manganese to the level of one-fourth of the national demand.¹² The United States is also associating the prospect of covering its own need for these metals with the possibility of improving its balance of payments.¹³

The most salient feature of Canada's approach to the matter of deep-sea mineral resources is that, in contrast to the United States and other developed capitalist countries, it already has abundant supplies of nickel, copper and cobalt and is also the world's largest exporter of these metals.¹⁴ As an exporter, Canada is wary of future competition on the part of the exploiters of these concretions and wants to protect its metallurgical

industry, which is based on intensive research. The effect of the broad-scale working of deep-sea minerals on world prices is also a matter of great importance in Canada. At the same time, the more active involvement of Canadian monopolies in the exploitation of these concentrations is dictated by the desire to remain in the competitive struggle for the new source of raw materials in the event that the working of seabed deposits should turn out to be more profitable than continental mining.

The effect of the working of these concentrations on the nickel industry is a matter of extreme significance in Canada. Although Canada is still the world's largest producer of nickel, it is quickly losing its monopoly in this field. Its share of nickel production in the capitalist and developing countries dropped from 94 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1976.¹⁵

According to foreign experts, the working of deep-sea mineral deposits would also have a negative effect on the Canadian metallurgical industry as a result of a sharp drop in world cobalt prices. It is important to bear in mind, however, that cobalt does not play an important role in Canada's exports.

At the same time, participation by Canadian monopolies in the exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources could compensate to some degree for the decline of domestic nickel and cobalt production and process the Canadian economy with a new source of manganese, the demand for which is covered completely by imports.

The sharply differing economic interests of the United States and Canada in this area were reflected in the views expressed by the two countries in regard to international legal regulations governing the development of seabed mineral resources at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The United States advocated the regulation of concentration exploitation by means of a registration system (and later, a licensing system), envisaging virtually free access to these deposits. The United States was counting on the competitive superiority of U.S. companies to the firms of other capitalist nations, which would guarantee them a monopoly in this field. The lengthy and complex negotiations at the UN conference and the propagandistic thesis that U.S. security was supposedly being threatened as a result of American dependence on imports of strategic raw materials from the developing countries motivated the United States to pass unilateral legislation to regulate the activities of American monopolies in this area.

The facts, however, indicate that the United States has no serious reason to fear the disruption of shipments of the metals contained in these concentrations. Around 80 percent of all American imports of nickel (the most valuable component of the concentrations) comes from Canada, and not from the developing countries. The problem of acquiring manganese, which is relatively cheap, does not play any decisive role in U.S. decisions regarding the expediency of exploiting seabed resources. The United States' dependence on imports of cobalt, with 80 percent of the U.S. demand covered

by Zaire, does not represent any particular threat, as the United States has considerable reserves of this metal, and its production (cobalt is derived as a by-product of copper-nickel ore processing) could be based on internal resources, the use of which is now considered to be unprofitable. Besides this, after Zaire, the second largest producer of cobalt in the capitalist world is Canada, which is capable of covering much of the U.S. demand for this metal.¹⁶

Canada's policy at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was aimed at a search for compromise in the matter of international legal regulation of the exploitation of seabed minerals. Realizing that any disruption of agreements reached on this matter at the conference would cause the developed capitalist countries to begin the broad-scale and uncontrolled exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources (which would be least in the economic interests of Canada), Canadian representatives advocated a so-called "parallel system," which would extend the right to work these concretions to a special international organization and to individual states or their companies, acting under international control and in accordance with conditions stipulated in a convention.

The stand taken by Canada at the UN conference in regard to international regulation of the use of deep-sea raw materials was criticized by the United States. Canada was accused of trying to keep world nickel prices at an excessively high level by establishing international control over the scales of concretion exploitation. Canada responded with the statement that the United States "intends to cover its own need for nickel at any cost, regardless of whose interests this will primarily affect."¹⁷

The debates between the United States and Canada over this issue at the conference and on the bilateral level were heated and lengthy. Finally, in spring 1978, the two countries were able to reach a compromise: At the sixth session of the conference the two countries submitted a joint proposal containing methods for calculating the maximum level of the production of metals from the concretions.¹⁸

The sharp U.S.-Canadian disagreements in the area of international legal regulation of the exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources are not an impediment to the joint participation of their companies in consortiums working on the technology for the extraction and processing of the concretions. The American Sedco firm is a member (with 25 percent of the stock) of the Ocean Management Incorporation consortium, organized at the initiative of the Canadian International Nickel company, and Canada's Noranda Mines is taking part in the operations of the Kennecott Joint Ventures consortium (10 percent of the stock), organized and headed by the American Kennecott Copper company (50 percent of the stock).¹⁹

On the whole, although some disputes have been settled in Canadian-American relations in the area of world ocean development, a number of complex economic and political problems are still unsolved. This is due to radical

differences in the two countries' approaches to this matter. In contrast to the expansionist marine policy of the United States, aimed at the accelerated use of marine resources and expansion on the global scale, the Canadian approach emphasizes the preservation of sovereignty over the expanses and resources of coastal regions and the strengthening of national capital's position in their utilization. There is reason to believe that in the future, as the energy crisis in the capitalist world grows in severity, ecological problems become more complex and new possibilities for the industrial development of Arctic regions multiply, the regulation of American-Canadian economic and political problems in this sphere will acquire increasing significance in the relations of the two states.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Fisheries of the United States, 1978," Wash., 1979, p 303; "Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries," ENVIRONMENT CANADA, May 1976, p 12.
2. CANADIAN SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING, 7 April 1979, p 11.
3. P. Copes, "The Impact of Extended Jurisdiction on Canadian Pacific Coast Fisheries," Burnaby, 1979, p 12.
4. R. Logan, "Canada, the United States, and the Law of the Sea Conference," Ottawa, 1974, p 11.
5. Ibid., p 60.
6. "Oil and Natural Gas Resources of Canada, 1976," Ottawa, 1977, p 8.
7. R. Logan, Op. cit., p 155.
8. OCEANUS, Summer 1977, No 3, p 31.
9. R. Logan, Op. cit., p 60.
10. See SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1975, pp 110-113--Editor's note.
11. CIM BULLETIN, January 1979, p 118.
12. In 1975 the United States imported 98 percent of all the cobalt used in the nation, 90 percent of the nickel, 10 percent of the copper and all of the manganese. The cost of importing these metals was estimated that year at 1 billion dollars, of which 670 million went for the purchase of nickel (MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, 1 January 1977, p 29; "Congress and the Oceans: Marine Affairs in the 94th Congress," Wash., 1976, p 131).

13. The deficit in the U.S. balance of trade in these four metals already amounted to 1 billion dollars at the beginning of the 1970's and, judging by available estimates, the United States will have to spend 2 billion dollars on imports of these metals in 1985 if the mining of the concretions has not begun by that time ("Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 93d Congress," Wash., 1974, p 796).
14. In 1974 Canadian nickel deposits were estimated at 14 percent of all deposits in the capitalist world, while the figures for cobalt and copper were 13 percent and 7 percent. Canada holds first place in the capitalist world in the production and export of nickel, second place for cobalt and third for copper. Canadian exports of nickel, cobalt and copper were estimated at 1 billion dollars at the end of the 1970's (CANADIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, Ottawa, December 1979).
15. CANADIAN MINING AND METALLURGICAL BULLETIN, No 78, 1977, p 74.
16. MINING CONGRESS JOURNAL, January 1977, p 29.
17. THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 3 March 1976.
18. CIM BULLETIN, January 1979, pp 121-122.
19. Ibid., p 119.

8588

CSO: 1803

BOOK REVIEWS

American-European Relations

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 99-102

[Review by V. F. Polyakov of the books "Europe Between the Superpowers. The Enduring Balance" by A. W. Deport, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1979, XV + 256 pages; "Atlantic Community in Crisis. A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship," edited by Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., New York, Pergamon Press, 1979, VIII + 386 pages; "America and Western Europe. Problems and Prospects" edited by K. Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Lexington (Mass.), Lexington Books, 1977, 447 pages; "Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen aufgaben" by K. Kaiser and K. Markus, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1979, XV + 447 pages]

[Text] The books being reviewed are of interest not only because of the similarity of their subject matter--they all deal with the relations between the United States and Western Europe--but also, and primarily, because they contain contrasting descriptions of the political struggle being waged on both sides of the Atlantic over questions connected with Europe's present and future role in world politics.

In his study of American-Western European relations in the past (since 1945), Deport, who was once a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and now works for the State Department, concludes that centripetal tendencies, arising from common class interests, prevail over centrifugal tendencies in these relations.

It is true that he has to admit that matters in the economic sphere of Atlantic relations are not going as smoothly as the United States might wish. The frequent conflicts between the United States and the Common Market countries over questions of trade, finance and raw materials have caused Americans to become disillusioned with the policy of supporting the processes of Western European integration (p 228). Washington's attempts to use NATO as a model for the creation of an "Atlantic community," in which economic differences could be diminished, have been unsuccessful. In

his opinion, even the advantages of the policy of including Japan in the Atlantic system still appear extremely dubious (p 214).

Deport cannot ignore the fierce struggle between "Europeanism" and "Atlanticism," which has characterized the political relations of the NATO allies throughout the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's--the allies' differences of opinion over questions of East-West detente, military expenditures, France's refusal to accept U.S. hegemony and France's withdrawal from the NATO military structure. In his opinion, however, "Atlanticism" in U.S.-Western European relations is such a long-range tendency that all of the past economic, political and military problems have been temporary and have not been as disturbing as they have sometimes been depicted by fault-finding American analysts. Deport feels that the stability of today's Atlantic ties is a result of the existing system of U.S. and Western European cooperation in the sphere of security, which is in their common long-range interest. This is the reason for Deport's optimistic conclusion that, "in spite of doubts and inconveniences," the allies have no alternative to the NATO bloc... Each year the general conviction that the alliance must remain in effect grows stronger" (p 196). Deport's main thesis is that NATO proved effective in the cold war era and it has retained the same kind of tangible value even in the era of detente.

This eulogization of the mission of NATO and the United States as steps to "guarantee the security" of Western Europe seems rather gauche even to the author. He has to qualify his statement by stressing that the cold war did cost a great deal and did hurt America. The price paid by the United States included "not only the human lives sacrificed in two wars" (Korea and Vietnam) and huge expenditures of resources for military needs, but also "the deterioration of the intellectual and moral climate within the nation" (p XII). Here, however, Deport adds that the American public and politicians must realize that the "burden of responsibility" borne by the United States in the world "has deep historical roots."

When Deport speaks in favor of the continuation of the United States' leading role in Western Europe, he unwittingly admits that this will only be possible if the NATO alliance is maintained. "As long as Western Europe wastes its energy trying to balance out Soviet power, which it cannot do on its own, the Western European countries will endeavor to preserve the alliance with the United States" (pp 243-244). From this, Deport draws his main conclusion: The preservation of NATO and Washington's influence in Europe will necessitate the resistance of detente processes, which could eventually deprive the U.S. mission of "defending" its allies of all justification. Deport does not dare to set forth this deduction in these exact words, but his line of reasoning and his basic recommendations can be summarized as the following: The reinforcement of NATO is an absolute priority in U.S. relations with Western Europe.

Whereas Deport depicts the relations between the United States and Western Europe in rosy hues, the authors of "The Atlantic Community in Crisis," a group of researchers from the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, headed

by Institute Director R. Pfaltzgraff and Associate Director W. Hahn, paint a different picture.

In their opinion, although the NATO bloc has just celebrated its 30th birthday, there is every reason to believe that it is entering a "crucial" period of life and that the "denouement" in allied relations could come by the mid-1980's.

The authors substantiate their conclusion with the argument that the military balance of power in Europe is allegedly shifting in favor of the USSR and that this military superiority could be used as "leverage" against the Atlantic allies. As a result, the United States would have to give up its NATO obligations and the Western European countries would be "defenseless" (pp 58-65). It is not difficult to understand that this alarmist thesis is addressed to the particular Western European nations that object to the American plan of increasing NATO military expenditures and do not want the Pentagon's "Eurostrategic" weapons deployed on their territory. The specious excuse of worries about Western "security" is essentially being used to rationalize the continuation and intensification of Western Europe's military and, consequently, political dependence on the United States.

It is not surprising that the practical recommendations of R. Pfaltzgraff, W. Hahn and their colleagues represent nothing more than a search for ways of strengthening U.S. military ties with Western Europe. Among these, preference is given to the deployment of the American medium-range Pershing-2 missiles in Europe and the modernization of conventional NATO forces. As a way of overcoming increasingly acute clashes with Western Europe over military matters, the authors insistently recommend a return to the idea of creating a broad "Atlantic community," which is supposed to guarantee the political consolidation of the Western countries.

In their discussion of questions connected with the standardization of the army equipment of NATO countries, the authors justify Washington's desire to keep the lion's share of military orders on the grounds that the United States has the "technological superiority" on which the fighting capability and, consequently, the "security" of the NATO members depend (pp 173-177). Therefore, political solidarity is essential both to the United States and to the Western European countries, but the economic dividends from the arms race should go primarily to the United States. These are the mercenary plans of the American guardians of Western European "security" and advocates of violent confrontation.

Despite the assertion of imminent upheavals in U.S. relations with Western Europe, the recipes of R. Pfaltzgraff, W. Hahn and their colleagues differ little from Deport's recommendations. They essentially say that the United States should continue to play the dominant role in Western European affairs, and that Western Europe should gratefully accept this "selfless" mission.

A different approach to the future development of relations between the United States and Western Europe is taken by the majority of the Western European researchers who collaborated on the other two works: "America and Western Europe" and "Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Aufgaben." On the whole, they agree with the general conclusion that unconditional reliance on the United States and the traditional policy of "Atlanticism" are not in the long-range interest of an economically strong Western Europe. In their opinion, the continuation of military ties with the United States within the NATO framework is still one of the objectives of the Western European countries, but this does not mean that its attainment will guarantee the effective safeguarding of the actual security interests of Western Europe now and in the future.

The Western European analysts point out the fact that the very concept of security has been changing as a result of the declining significance of the factor of military strength. They stress that the NATO bloc, as the embodiment of "Atlanticism," cannot give a satisfactory response to the various challenges thrown down to Western Europe by today's world. The world economic crisis, oil and raw material problems, social change, and relations with the developing and socialist states--these and other matters are putting the need for a more independent Western European course in world politics on the agenda.

The editor of these books, Professor K. Kaiser, the chairman of a German society for foreign policy studies (FRG), logically substantiates the prevailing thesis of the Western Europeans that only a correct assessment of long-range security interests can serve as a basis for realistic Western European policy. Although he recognizes the positive aspects of American-Western European cooperation in the military sphere, he also stresses that "the deciding role in security matters is played by the policy of detente, as it weakens the very source of danger" (p 426). Naturally, Professor Kaiser realizes that detente, arms control and the policy of cooperating with "traditional adversaries" will complicate the augmentation of NATO military potential, which is the concern of arms race supporters. But he firmly believes that "there is no alternative to the policy of detente." "It is easy to see," Kaiser warns, "that the continuation of the essentially uncontrollable race for arms can lead to a catastrophe sooner or later." In his opinion, the socialist states are becoming the "new partners" of the West in the resolution of European security problems.

In response to the critics of detente, who maintain that it has not brought about any cardinal results in East-West relations, Kaiser stresses: "Considering the deep roots of the East-West conflict, imbedded in the political and economic structures of the two systems, it is simply unrealistic to expect quick results." It is individual positive achievements that will combine to make up future relations on the European continent (p 426).

Kaiser notes that Western Europe's "economic security" no longer depends on an American-Western European alliance, but on relations with countries outside these bounds, particularly the suppliers of oil and other raw

materials. In his opinion, political solidarity with Washington in the resolution of today's global problems "is no longer enough" to safeguard European interests: "The Western European countries and North America can only expect to solve future problems if they conduct a flexible policy in the area of security, both in regard to new issues and in regard to new partners" (p 428).

The views of K. Kaiser and other Western European researchers clearly reflect the desire of ruling circles in several European countries to rid themselves of the suffocating embraces of "Atlanticism," which is less and less in their long-range interest. The realization that only the policy of detente and mutually beneficial cooperation between East and West can increase Western Europe's independent role in world politics points up the vicious nature of U.S. long-range calculations, connected with attempts to perpetuate its dominant position in relations with Western Europe and with a policy aimed at continued confrontation with the socialist countries.

Plans for Strategic Forces

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 102-103

[Review by V. M. Arsov of the book "SALT II and the Costs of Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces," Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, Washington, 1979, XII + 34 pages]

[Text] This short but extremely informative brochure presents only the main results of a study conducted by the national security and international relations division of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations and Budget committees. In the view of CBO Director A. Rivlin, this study pertains to the exceedingly important question of the effect of SALT II on the development of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces (p III). The analysis of the strategic situation that might take shape by the beginning of the 1990's in a "world without SALT," as well as the attempt to determine the cost of a U.S. refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty, are equally important.

The very title of the work points up a characteristic error in present-day U.S. thinking. Is it possible to use the word "modernization" to signify what would essentially be the radical re-equipping of all three components of U.S. strategic forces with the fundamentally new MX ICBM system, Trident submarine-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles? The Carter Administration's plans for a new spurt in the race for strategic arms in search of superiority are also revealed by the research findings. On the basis of only the information received by the Congress before fall 1979 in regard to the administration's plans, the CBO concludes that real U.S. budget appropriations for strategic forces in 1984 will be 80 percent higher than in 1980. "This dramatic rise in expenditures on strategic forces reflects a broad-scale program of capital investments in new weapon systems," the CBO analysis admits (p 3).

The essence of this program is set forth in concrete facts and figures. Even if the SALT II Treaty should go into effect, the following would occur, according to the budget office: "Although there is some uncertainty regarding the budget of U.S. strategic forces within the framework of the SALT II agreement, one thing is absolutely clear: The modernization programs now being conducted will certainly require expenditures on strategic forces in the next few years that will be much higher than in the last decade" (p 12). In 1980 prices, total U.S. appropriations for strategic forces should rise from 10-12 billion dollars a year in the 1970's to 19.1 billion in fiscal year 1984 (p 4). Appropriations for research and development projects included in the 5-year plan for 1980-1984 will increase approximately 2.4-fold, purchases of strategic weapons will increase 1.7-fold, the cost of building facilities and installations will rise 10-fold, and capital investments in strategic forces as a whole will increase 2.2-fold (p 4). If, however, the seven largest U.S. strategic programs are taken into account, as they are in the CBO analysis--the MX system, the Trident submarine, the ballistic missiles on Trident-1 and Trident-2 submarines, air-based cruise missiles, aircraft carrying cruise missiles, and the modification of the B-52 bomber--annual capital investments in these systems should rise from 4.3 billion dollars in fiscal year 1980 to 13 billion in 1984--that is, they should triple (p 5).

According to these plans, the United States should arrive at the initial stage of the MX system's combat readiness in 1986, should annually build one Trident submarine, and two in 1984, should re-arm 12 Poseidon submarines with Trident-1 missiles, should achieve the initial combat readiness of the more powerful Trident-2 missiles by 1990, should equip 173 B-52 bombers with cruise missiles by the mid-1980's (12 missiles per plane), and should re-equip Boeing-747 and DC-10 planes by 1987, each with up to 72 cruise missiles. But these plans were made in fall 1979--that is, before 12 December, when President Carter announced his new 5-year intensive arms race plan, according to which the annual increase in U.S. military appropriations will rise from 3 percent to 5 percent in real terms. For this reason, the earlier completion of these programs can now be expected.

Nonetheless, the CBO analysis almost regretfully states that "the intensive funding of the majority of programs will not have any significant effect on U.S. potential in the next few years" (p 9). "At best," it would only move up the combat readiness date of the MX by 1 year and of the Trident-2 by 2 or 3 years, and slightly expedite the building of Trident submarines--up in two a year from 1982 on. Consequently, even earlier U.S. plans specified virtually the maximum rate of augmentation in the main strategic programs, and within the SALT II framework at that.

The CBO, however, sees new possibilities for intensive capital investments in U.S. strategic potential. These primarily include the re-equipping of many Poseidons with Trident-1 missiles, the accelerated arming of B-52 bombers with cruise missiles or even the resumption of B-1 production, as

well as the deployment of more than 200 MX ICBM's--that is, more than originally planned. Moreover, the last of these possibilities is considered to be one of the "least expensive." The CBO must admit, however, that "in view of the potential capability of MX missiles to strike Soviet missile sites, a higher level of deployment could be regarded in the USSR as a particularly threatening choice" (p 11).

In the event, on the other hand, that the American leadership should refuse to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the budget office envisages three fundamentally different courses of development for U.S. strategic forces. If emphasis is placed on the concept of "essential parity," it would be preferable for the United States to increase the number of its means of delivery and nuclear warheads. If the emphasis is on a specific degree of viability of strategic forces, the United States could, for example, considerably expand the construction of shelters for the MX system. It could also choose a radically new strategy and then create a strategic structure to fit, one which would differ in essence from the present one, the CBO study states.

As for the first two choices, the calculations of the CBO, based partially on a U.S. Air Force model of the cost effectiveness of the MX system, indicate that the "optimal" number of MX missiles in the absence of the SALT II Treaty could reach 450, while the total cost of the system could amount to 100 billion dollars, as opposed to 45 billion if the treaty should go into effect. This, according to CBO estimates, would be connected with the "need, arising from several indefinite factors in the absence of SALT II," to increase the number of MX missile silos to 15,000-24,000, as opposed to the approximately 6,000 that will be required if the treaty should be ratified (p 26). The rise in U.S. expenditures on strategic aviation could also be "quite significant" over the long range if the limitations envisaged in the SALT II Treaty should be rejected (p 31).

A radical change in U.S. strategy, as the analysis points out, could even lead to the deployment of a mobile antimissile defense system, prohibited by the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of U.S. and Soviet missile defense systems. "Although this approach has tremendous theoretical appeal as a means of defending MX basing systems," the analysis states, "the necessary mobility and the probable number of requisite launching sites will compel the United States to either abrogate or renegotiate the unlimited ABM treaty, which would be a potentially destabilizing move" (p 28). The study notes that the best time for making this decision will depend on the estimated cost of its implementation. Current estimates of the cost of this kind of ABM system, however, are "quite dubious," the report stresses (p 28). Nonetheless, despite the destabilizing nature of such decisions, they are now being discussed by American officials.

China's Role in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 104-105

[Review by A. A. Nagornyy of the book "Playing the China Card: Implications for United States-Soviet-Chinese Relations," Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, VII + 27 pages]

[Text] In the 8 years since the Shanghai communique was signed in February 1972, Washington's China policy has been debated more and more loudly in the nation. The most critical question, which has recently aroused the interest of American political circles, concerns the use of the "China card." The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations requested the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress to conduct an investigation into the matter. The study was then completed by renowned political scientist R. Sutter. In his study, the author made use of books and articles published in the press, as well as the data of a confidential survey of government employees and experts on China.

The study summarizes the views of U.S. scientific and political circles on various aspects of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations. The author endeavored to present all of the different current views on this matter without going into an analysis of their accuracy. The report consists of two distinct sections, dealing with the past and the present.

In contrast to many American experts who addressed this topic in the past, the author quite accurately and objectively associates the changing mood of American scientific and political circles with Beijing's increasingly anti-Soviet behavior. Sutter notes that Beijing's augmentation of its ideological disagreements with the Soviet Union has been accompanied by increasing support in the United States for the relaxation of Washington's rigid anti-China line. In contrast to many other bourgeois political scientists, the author puts the blame for the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations squarely on the shoulders of the Maoist leadership (p 5).

The author is also correct in his assessment of the significance of "Chinese anti-Sovietism," which became more intense when the American foreign policy line was being modified in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The author includes the armed conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border in 1969 among the most important international events of this time. It was precisely then that Washington began to conduct a softer foreign policy line toward China. This was also furthered by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. These events took place when U.S. global positions were relatively weak.

The author recalls that it was precisely under these conditions that the "Nixon Doctrine" went into effect--a doctrine aimed at the preservation of a strategic balance of power in Asia that would be favorable for the United States, even at the cost of utilizing the Soviet-Chinese conflict for this purpose.

Nixon's trip and the initiation of direct contact between the United States and the PRC broadened the discussion of problems in U.S. policy toward the USSR and China. In particular, Sutter notes, differences of opinion in regard to Soviet-Chinese relations became even more distinct. An entire series of congressional hearings, where two currents clashed, took place at this time. The supporters of the first felt that the United States should resist the temptation to gamble on Soviet-Chinese conflicts. Moreover, some American experts on China believed that the United States should assist in improving Soviet-Chinese relations. Another group of experts and politicians advocated the active support of China as a counterbalance to the USSR. They unequivocally advocated the exertion of pressure on the Soviet Union for the purpose of changing its foreign policy with the military and technical assistance of the PRC (p 9).

The section of the report which sets forth the current views of American experts on China, however, is naturally of greater interest. Here the author discusses the principal American theory pertaining to the normalization of American-Chinese relations and the new stage of the Washington-Beijing rapprochement.

It must be said that the author was less successful in this part of the work. Objectively speaking, the varied and often contradictory spectrum of remarks by American political scientists, as presented in the work, makes it extremely difficult to discern any clearly conflicting approaches which could be used as a basis for the investigation of fundamental differences of opinion.

In essence, the author limits himself to a mere description of the various approaches to this problem, without trying to present any kind of in-depth analysis. This testifies that Sutter has no general criterion for analyzing points of view. For example, when he distinguishes between the various current trends in U.S. foreign policy thinking on the prospects of rapprochement with the PRC, he stresses that one of them emphasizes that the factor of rapprochement with China will have no real effect on the USSR, while the other criticizes the policy of gambling on Soviet-Chinese conflicts on the grounds that the consequences of this policy are impossible to predict with strict accuracy. There is no discerning analysis of the so-called "manipulative" approach, which is most widespread at present. The experts in this group are advocating quicker and broader rapprochement with Beijing. At the same time, some of them actively support unlimited (including military) cooperation with China, while others restrict this cooperation to only non-military forms (p 24).

The author's failure to name the American scientists and politicians who adhere to various beliefs does not clarify the matter either. It is as if the opinions, remarks and views are suspended in mid-air: They are not related to the domestic balance of political power in the United States or to foreign political events. As a result, the evolution of the principal approaches is unclear.

Finally, the long-range consequences of Washington's rapprochement with Beijing are analyzed poorly and far from objectively in this report, just as in the majority of recent American works. The indissoluble connection between this rapprochement and the escalation of the arms race, however, is already evident. In itself, normalization did not bring about stronger militaristic tendencies in the Pacific, but the nature of this rapprochement is increasing the fear of China's neighbors that Beijing itself is not reluctant to use the "American card" for the purpose of a new spurt of expansionism. The author also underestimates the need for Soviet-U.S.-Chinese cooperation in arms race control. In particular, the problem of SALT II and SALT III is only posed at the very end of the work. Sutter and the other American authors whose works served as a basis for the report regard the possibility of the non-ratification of the SALT II Treaty and the breakdown of further strategic arms limitation talks as a matter of little importance. This approach reflects the shortsightedness that has been characteristic of American foreign policy in recent years.

Multinationals and Production Internationalization

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 105-106

[Review by L. V. Maksimova of the book "Rol' sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh monopolii v protsesse internatsionalizatsii kapitala i proizvodstva" (The Role of Today's Multinational Monopolies in the Internationalization of Capital and Production) by G. G. Chibrikov, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1979, 176 pages]

[Text] Using an analysis of new American and international statistics as a basis, the author examines the dialectical relationship between two important contemporary processes: the internationalization of production and capital and the increasing influence of today's multinational monopolies (particularly the American ones) in world economics.

The author presents an original and interesting interpretation of today's multinational monopolies, particularly the American model, and of the contradictory results of their activity.

The author postulates that the new type of international monopoly is the basic form in which the process of the internationalization of production and capital is manifested. He criticizes the approach to multinationals according to the origin of the capital and the geographic diversification

of operations. The author substantiates the definition of the multinationality of a company according to the degree of participation in the economic partition of the world, the interconnection of capital and other factors. Participation in the economic partition of the world is associated not only with the seizure of markets, but also with the direct monopolization of factors of production, the ability to influence a particular part of the world production of a specific commodity.

In his analysis of the organizational structure of today's multinational, G. G. Chibrikov concludes that international business, by virtue of its centralized financial and operational regulation, acquires definite independence of economic processes in individual countries and in world economics in general. This applies to such phenomena as the circulation of capital within the framework of international concerns, which goes beyond the bounds of "surplus capital" (p 34), intraorganizational pricing, which covers the circulation of goods and services between parent firms and their affiliates (p 79), and the dynamic of reproduction within multinational monopolies (p 131).

The author discusses the inefficacy of the attempted national regulation of American multinationals. He concludes that the internationalization of capital and production "puts the question of regulating international economic relations from a single global center on the agenda" (p 137). Development in this direction, however, could lead to the outbreak of new conflicts, primarily between the United States, the Western European countries and Japan.

Computer-Aided Political Research

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
p 106

[Review by A. K. Andreyev of the book "Kolichestvennyye metody v amerikanskoy politologii" (Quantitative Methods in American Political Science) by S. V. Melikhov, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 203 pages]

[Text] In recent years, the methods of mathematical logic and computers have been employed on a broad scale in the social sciences in our country. In the West, however, quantitative methods of analysis have become a kind of procedural attribute of many works aspiring to academic "solidity" and "strict accuracy." In particular, this was quite apparent in the speeches and reports of several foreign participants (especially the Americans) at the 11th Congress of the International Political Science Association, held in Moscow in August 1979.

Therefore, the subject matter chosen by the author of this monograph is quite topical.

One of the most important theoretical and practical questions posed in S. V. Melikhov's study is the following: "How does the use of 'precise'

quantitative methods by American researchers lead them to erroneous sociopolitical conclusions?" (p 8). The author's attempt to determine the conditions for the effective use of quantitative analysis in the study of international relations is also of interest.

Using a representative group of serious research projects and monographs as a basis, the author analyzes the use of quantitative methods in American political science. His criticism of the findings of bourgeois researchers is masterful. For example, he presents a correct, in our opinion, general evaluation of the findings of the massive "National Dimensions" project, conducted in the United States with the aid of quantitative methods. Melikhov points out the "mechanical and unsystematic character" lying at the basis of this project.

After a detailed examination of the reasons for the false, subjective and ideologically biased conclusions of American political scientists of the "quantitative" school, Melikhov correctly remarks that American researchers who use quantitative methods in their work back then up with the false "non-quantitative" sociopolitical theories and beliefs of bourgeois political science. This gives the author an opportunity to illustrate the continuity of "traditional" and "modernistic" currents in American political science and their common class essence and purpose.

In a critical analysis of the works of bourgeois political scientists, the author strives, using Marxist-Leninist premises as a basis, to give credit to the positive aspects of foreign experience in the use of quantitative methods in the social sciences.

Fairly complex questions connected with mathematical techniques are elucidated by the author accurately, and in a style accessible to social scientists working in applied fields.

RSXN

CSO: 1803

TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE ARMS FIELD

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 107-116

[Article by V. V. Potashov]

[Text] By signing the 1972 SALT I and 1979 SALT II agreements, the U.S. leadership clearly and unequivocally admitted the parity of general equivalence of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and acknowledged that military and political relations between the two countries could only be based on the principle of equality and equivalent security. But this admission was not easily given. It took decades of tireless struggle by the USSR for peace and international security. As early as the 1960's the American leadership was openly proclaiming the U.S. goal of achieving "strategic superiority" to the USSR, and arms limitation talks were regarded as a means of reinforcing "superior strength."

The situation has changed dramatically, and Washington officials must now take this into account. In the military establishment and some U.S. political circles, however, ideas of military superiority have not died, but have merely undergone a transformation into a search for "technological" or scientific and technical superiority. These ideas lie at the basis of the official handbook of the research and experimental design department of the U.S. Department of Defense: "The all-round goal of our technological program is the achievement and preservation of national technological superiority in strategic areas of military technology.... The technological program will provide a basis for this kind of military technological superiority."¹ Some military and political circles in the United States still regard the SALT agreements merely as admissions of temporary parity in arms, and military research and engineering as a technological guarantee of "strategic superiority" in the future. The position of U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown on this matter is the following: "We must not only maintain the speed of our technological development, but also accelerate it.... This is of vital importance for the preservation of the decisive technological advantages that guarantee the necessary superiority in specific military capabilities."²

What programs of military research and development does the American leadership consider to be of "strategic importance" and how should these programs be evaluated in light of SALT? The urgency and importance of examining the U.S. Department of Defense research and development programs aimed at superiority precisely from the standpoint of the arms limitation talks are obvious, since these programs contradict the principle, officially acknowledged by the United States and the USSR, of equality and equivalent security and the objective of arms race curtailment.

It should be noted here that the American Congress has also displayed some concern in recent years over the incompatibility of many U.S. military programs with the administration's announced goal of "arms control." Since 1977, in accordance with a legislative act, the President, representing the administration, annually submits a report to Congress on the effect of military programs planned for the coming fiscal year on arms control--"arms control impact statements." In the report for fiscal year 1979, the administration had to present an analysis of 142 U.S. military programs which would, according to congressional criteria, have an impact on arms control. Another 158 programs falling under these criteria were not investigated. Even the American Administration had to admit that many research and development programs of the U.S. Defense Department could have a "potentially negative" impact on the process of arms limitation.

Under the Carter Administration, annual appropriations for military research and development rose from 9.5 billion dollars in 1976 to 13.5 billion in 1980--that is, more than 40 percent; and an increase to 16.5 billion dollars, or another 22 percent, is planned for 1981.

The ratio of research and development expenditures to the cost of purchases of all types of weapons has also been around 40 percent in recent years. It should be noted, however, that the situation is different in the area of strategic arms and systems, where research and development absorb around 55 percent of all funds. Moreover, expenditures on research and development in connection with "strategic defensive" programs and command, monitoring and communications systems in 1979 even surpassed the cost of purchases by 30-50 percent.

The sharpest increase in military expenditures, particularly in the area of strategic arms, can be seen in the new 5-year plan of the Defense Department, announced by President Carter on 12 December 1979. A statement by H. Brown in reference to this plan essentially declares the U.S. intention to win the race for strategic superiority by sharply augmenting military appropriations in the 1980's. Suffice it to say that, even in constant prices, these appropriations will be 25.7 percent higher in 1985, or almost 40 billion dollars higher, than in 1980; while in current prices, according to American estimates, they will almost double during this period.

The details of the new 5-year arms race plan have not been made public as yet, but the chief developmental tendencies of strategic programs can be

judged by Congressional Budget Office materials published in September 1979. Annual U.S. expenditures on strategic forces in 1980-1984 will almost double, for example, capital investments in their "modernization" will more than double, and direct appropriations for research and development will be 2.4 times as great in constant 1980 prices. Expenditures on the development and production of the seven main strategic offensive armament systems, such as the MX, Trident and cruise missiles and their carrier-bombers, will triple.³ In view of the fact that the Pentagon's 5-year plan was announced after the publication of these congressional papers, adjustments can be expected to speed up these programs.

The breakdown of expenditures in terms of branches of the military points up the fact that research and development in the Air Force have experienced the sharpest increase in the last 2 years--from 4.2 billion dollars in 1978 to 5 billion in 1980, or almost 20 percent, and an equally interesting increase in the funds of specific divisions of the U.S. Defense Department, such as the Advanced Research Projects, Intelligence, Mapping and other agencies--a total increase of 44 percent, from 780 million dollars to 1.12 billion. This points up the areas of particularly intensive military research.

Out of the several hundred U.S. military programs, however, we can single out three major efforts in the area of research and development, which have been particularly promoted under the present American Administration. Above all, these include the development of new types of so-called pinpoint accuracy weapons. The second project is the development of new reconnaissance and communications systems, which could lead to the active militarization of outer space. Emphasis here is placed on the development of satellites for the collection of data and the management, control and transmission of information to armed forces. General R. Henry, head of the Air Force space and missile systems division, believes, for example, that "it is precisely the area of data processing and transmission that presents the most comprehensive possibilities for research and development in the future."⁴ Finally, the third of the Pentagon's present efforts, which is supposed to promote the development of the rest, is the more active involvement of American civilian science and industry in military research and development.

We will now take a closer look at the particular U.S. military programs with the most negative impact on arms limitation talks by intensifying the qualitative improvement of weapons.

Pinpoint Accuracy Weapons

The material base for the development of this type of weapon in the United States was the technical progress that had been made in several fields, both in the civilian and in the military spheres, combining to establish the prerequisites for the birth of a new generation of precision-guided strategic and tactical weapons. The development of microprocessors with

high-speed data processing was instrumental in the design of the new military equipment: "As they are miniscule in size, extremely cheap, lightweight and require little power, we can move most of our complex systems from earth and aircraft to rockets and space vehicles so that large computer complexes will no longer have to be used for the management of these vehicles,"⁵ said General A. Sley, chief of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command. The placement of radar tracking devices and minicomputers on board flying vehicles allows for the design of such "smart" self-guided systems as, for example, MARV'ed nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles, strategic cruise missiles and ABM missile-interceptors.

The United States has already spent 2 billion dollars on the advanced ballistic re-entry system program (ABRES), with annual expenditures of around 100 million dollars in recent years. The new self-steering multiple warheads are being developed for possible use on the present generation of American strategic missiles and on the projected MX ICBM and Trident 2 SLBM systems. The MARV warheads will be capable of maneuvering in the last stage of their trajectory because they will be fitted with gages to determine relative position and speed and to detect control systems. According to American experts, this will reduce the circular error to dimensions much smaller than the size of the nuclear blast crater--that is, to achieve the maximum precision of warheads.⁶

The Carter Administration's report on arms control contains the following admission: "If warheads with pinpoint accuracy are deployed in sufficient quantities, they will pose a threat to most Soviet retaliatory forces and could be interpreted by the USSR as a sign of a U.S. intention to develop full first-strike ICBM potential." It would be difficult to disagree with this statement, but an odd conclusion is drawn in the report: "As a result, the modern ABRES program, including warheads with pinpoint accuracy, will not have enough of a deterring impact on arms control."⁷ But various types of MARV'ed warheads are already being tested in flight in the United States.

The program for the development of air-launched cruise missiles is now in the last stage of completion, and the missile is being tested with the B-52 bomber as its carrier. More than 1 billion dollars was spent on the program prior to 1980, and its total cost has been estimated at around 4.5 billion dollars, excluding the expenditures of the Department of Energy on nuclear warheads.

Besides this, an air-based strategic missile is being developed in the United States. Experimental tests are planned for 1981. Its ram jet engine distinguishes it from the present cruise missiles and will allow for the development of supersonic speed and the use of the missile against both ground targets and important air targets, such as early-warning aircraft.

The work on cruise missiles is sharply augmenting the role and significance of the fleet of U.S. strategic bombers, which will be capable of

carrying from 20 to 72 such missiles and launching them without entering a zone of heavy ABM systems. Furthermore, variations of modernized wide-body civilian jet airplanes, such as the Boeing 747, DC-10, C-5 transport plane and other planes, are being developed for arming with more than 20 missiles. This should bring the total number of nuclear warheads in U.S. strategic aviation forces up to 2,400-4,300 by the mid-1980's.⁸

Medium-range nuclear missiles--so-called programs for the development of the new Pershing-2 ballistic missile and land- and sea-launched cruise missiles are intended essentially to augment nuclear forces in the European theater of military operations. The latter two systems differ little in design from the air-launched cruise missile, but expenditures on them are covered by different budget items and will total over 900 million dollars in 1980, with the total cost of the systems estimated at no less than 4-5 billion dollars. The research and development stage of these programs is coming to an end, and the missiles are already being tested.

All of these systems have new self-steering devices which give them the highest accuracy and make them suitable for the destruction of such ground targets, located in the depths of the territory of a "probable adversary," as medium-range missile launchers, naval and air force bases, command and communications centers, nuclear weapon storage facilities, ABM installations, army headquarters and reinforcements, bridges and so forth. If these systems, which have a range of around 2,500 kilometers, are deployed in the FRG, England and other NATO countries, they will be capable of reaching extremely important targets on the territory of the USSR and the European socialist countries.

Whereas the programs examined above represent the main efforts to develop means of destroying ground targets, means of destroying air and space targets are also being developed intensively as part of the American precision armament programs. Given the present military and strategic state of affairs, American experts often regard the objectives of the latter systems as secondary to the objectives of the first--that is, missile defense, air defense and space defense systems are regarded as means of ensuring the delivery of U.S. nuclear strikes. The means safeguarding strategic offensive forces also include command, control, communication and reconnaissance systems, antisubmarine defense, and other forces.

First of all, we will discuss American research and development in the area of missile defense systems. As we know, the Soviet-U.S. treaty of 1972 on the limitation of ABM systems permits only research in this area and prohibits tests and the deployment of these systems or their sea-, air-, space- and land-based mobile components. It also prohibits the development of new ABM systems, based on "other physical principles," such as, for example, weapons powered by directed energy of the laser type. The United States had spent 2.2 billion dollars, however, on research and development in the implementation of "revolutionary" ABM ideas by 1980, with annual expenditures approaching 230 million dollars. This is far

from the total sum, since part of these expenditures were covered by other programs--for example, the program for the development of radar weapons as part of ABM technology, the appropriations for the Kwajalein missile testing grounds, and so forth.

The official goals of the American ABM program were set forth by H. Brown: "The main goals of the program are the guarantee of our technological overtaking of the USSR and the development of new equipment to reduce the cost and complexity of missile defense systems." The fundamental technical designs in this program are based on new means of precision navigation and destruction; some of them are already being tested, and tests of the others are being planned: "We will continue to put the main emphasis on the demonstration of the tracking and guiding ability of the new equipment and the guaranteed interception of warheads with accuracy sufficient to destroy them with non-nuclear means."⁹

According to General S. Myer, chief of the American ABM program, based on the completion of preliminary engineering and this year's program revisions, work is now being performed on a layered defense system to serve as the new leading ABM concept, replacing the concept of site defense. The essence of this new ABM concept consists in the creation of two "layers," or two "filters," of missile defense: an upper, extra-atmospheric layer, extending far into the depth of the trajectory of an approaching ballistic missile, and a lower "filter," consisting of the more traditional components of land-based missile defense systems, which intercept warheads close to the target.

A program of experiments in homing in the upper layer is planned for the testing of interception equipment in 1981. An optical observation gage will be used on the interceptor, capable of detecting a target from far away, identifying it with the aid of an in-flight computer and guiding the interceptor so precisely that the target can be destroyed by non-nuclear means. A contract has already been signed with the Lockheed firm for this program, involving a cost of 108.4 million dollars. Most of the equipment for the program has already been tested and has proved to be extremely reliable, of excellent quality and of sound value.

The main effort in the field of directed-energy weapons is being focused on laser devices, which have been actively developed in the United States for around 15 years as part of the "high-energy laser" program in a number of subprograms of the Air Force, Navy, Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. On the whole, around 1.27 billion dollars was spent on the program by 1980, covered by Pentagon budget items, and at least another billion is expected to be spent in 1980-1984. Besides this, huge allocations for laser research and development are being spent by several private companies and universities, and part of the cost is covered by the Energy Department budget. The rapid growth of the program--allocations actually doubled in the last 6 years--and the official data on it testify that the program has now reached the stage of advanced research and development,

individual subsystems are already being tested and the manufacture of experimental laser weapons has been planned for the early 1980's.

The potential significance of this weapon has been compared by U.S. Secretary of the Air Force J. Martin to the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II. One military-industrial complex spokesman connected with the development of high-power lasers describes their significance in the following way: "We must realize that the ability to concentrate such narrow rays of energy traveling at the speed of light so that its density far surpasses the density of the energy of a nuclear bomb explosion represents an achievement in the arms sphere with no less destructive potential than the release of the gigantic but uncontrollable energy of nuclear bombs."¹⁰

The U.S. Defense Department defines high-power lasers as lasers with an average yield of over 20 kilowatts, or single pulse energy exceeding 30 kilojoules. The Pentagon is testing laser devices with a yield of several hundred kilowatts, and by the mid-1980's it plans to reduce the size and weight of these devices to dimensions permitting their placement on board aircraft and space vehicles. These devices could be used as pinpoint accuracy weapons from aboard orbital stations to destroy various space targets.

Many American scientific, technical and military journals of recent years have mentioned the possibility of creating an entire network of reinforced "combat stations" orbiting around the earth with the aid of the space shuttle. These would be used for the destruction of space targets with high-power lasers, primarily the ballistic missiles of an adversary soon after their launching. Although the energy reserves that will have to be put in orbit for use in an ABM system are sizeable, they could be carried by the shuttle. The necessary number of "combat laser stations" in polar orbits around the earth has even been calculated: 21 stations with lasers with a range of 5,000 kilometers, and only 9 stations if the range is 10,000 kilometers. "When lasers are deployed in space in such a way that each spot on our planet will constantly be within the firing zone of a laser combat system, we can quite justifiably expect real fundamental changes."¹¹ These changes are associated with the expectation that directed-energy equipment could restore the balance between strategic defensive and offensive forces. In other words, "future achievements in ABM equipment could allow for a move from the present situation of nuclear deterrence of the United States and USSR with offensive forces playing a dominant role to a situation with defensive forces dominant."¹²

The latest achievements in this field were tested in an "airborne laser laboratory"--a special Boeing KC-135 airplane--with lasers shooting down helicopters and even antitank missiles on firing ranges in Alabama and California, and now the Air Force is working on a plan for the development of a powerful land-based laser device in 1983, which will be tested for the destruction of targets in space.

In the last 2 years another type of directed-energy weapon has also been worked on intensively in the United States--radar weapons based on rays of charged or neutral particles: ions, electrons, protons or neutrons, which are accelerated to a high energy level with special accelerators. Appropriations for research and development in this area actually tripled in 2 years, and now the Pentagon has a 5-year plan for the expenditure of at least another 315 million dollars for this purpose. In addition, around one-third of the cost is to be covered by the Department of Energy budget and part of the research and development will be financed by private companies and universities. The actual development of radar ABM systems is part of the program entitled "Advanced ABM Equipment: Radar Weapons."

The three main goals of these development projects have already been frankly admitted in the United States: the deployment of antimissile radars on earth for the broad projectorlike envelopment of the skies and for the destruction of approaching missiles; the placement of weapons on satellites for the destruction of missiles soon after their launching and for the demolition of enemy satellites. Radar weapons will be used on board ships to destroy attacking aircraft and missiles at presently inaccessible speeds.

Special mention should be made of the discussion of American research and development programs in the area of space defense, which is directly related, as was demonstrated, to research and development on antimissile defense and radar weapons. Besides this, the intensive development of space defense systems--actually means of destroying space targets--is supposed to accomplish other tasks connected with the active militarization of space by the United States and the development of new reconnaissance and communication systems, which will be discussed below.

Therefore, American means of space defense can be categorized, on the one hand, as weapons of pinpoint accuracy and, on the other, as means ensuring the offensive capability and survivability of new offensive space systems now being created in the United States.

American research and development in the area of space defense have been accelerated to the maximum in recent years. Suffice it to say that appropriations only for cosmic means of destruction--"antisatellite weapons"--will increase almost 10-fold within 4 years: from 12 million dollars in 1977 to 109 million in 1981. The section of the Pentagon budget pertaining to space defense also includes appropriations for programs dealing with the survivability of satellite systems, cosmic surveillance equipment and cosmic tracking. Therefore, according to official data, total appropriations for the U.S. space defense program will amount to around 800 million dollars by 1981. This figure, however, does not include the huge U.S. expenditures on research and development programs in the areas of missile defense, high-power lasers and other projects directly related to the development of cosmic weapons.

The development of missile defense systems and high-power lasers into cosmic offensive weapons is reflected in the two main U.S. space defense projects.

The first project, "Miniature Systems," is based on the use of a precision self-steering missile-interceptor with a non-nuclear charge, worked out by the Army as part of its missile defense program and later turned over to the Air Force for deployment in the head of space defense missile carriers. Modified SREM missiles, now mounted on American bombers, are supposed to serve as these carriers. They will put interceptors into space from F-15 fighter planes, which will guarantee maximum initial altitude and speed. Plans have already been made to test this system in 1980. Its total cost will be around 200 million dollars, the cost of one missile-interceptor will be approximately 1 million dollars, and expenditures on a research and development contract with the Vought Corporation will total 38.7 million dollars. Another type of missile carrier will be a modernized Minuteman-3 ICBM, which will most likely be capable of launching several interceptors at once, considering their negligible weight--around 16 kg--and size--approximately 30 x 33 cm.¹³

Another space defense project--"Advanced Systems"--is based on the use of powerful space- and land-based lasers for the destruction of space targets. The work on this project is nearing the stage of engineering development, and appropriations designated for the use of high-power lasers as anti-satellite weapons were five times as high in 1979 as in 1977, even though these lasers are mainly being developed under other Pentagon programs. The plans to develop space-based high-power lasers have been announced several times by President Carter and Defense Department spokesmen, but the program as a whole is classified information. According to the estimates of American experts, the testing of these lasers in outer space could begin as early as 1982, among the first military payloads of the shuttle. It has also been proposed that the shuttle itself be safeguarded by a space defense system, including high-power lasers.

An analysis of U.S. research and development posing a military and political threat would be far from complete without an examination of a second trend, connected with the active militarization of outer space.

Cosmic Means of Command, Reconnaissance and Communications

The dramatic intensification of space programs under the present American Administration has been a direct result of President Carter's declared "new space policy," which is supposed to guarantee "permanent leadership by the United States in space."¹⁴ The particular significance of this "new policy" for the U.S. Department of Defense, especially the Air Force, is reflected in the simple fact that the expenditures on just military cosmic research and development have risen 2.5-fold--from 687 million dollars in 1977 to 1.7 billion in 1980--and even quicker growth is planned for the future.

According to a presidential directive (PDM-37), the U.S. secretary of defense is responsible for the program to coordinate all civilian space systems for participation in "military operations in times of emergency," by analogy with the "civil air force reserve" program. According to this directive, civilian satellites of military value are to be specially modified, and military equipment can even be deployed on them. A special service is now being created in the U.S. Armed Forces as part of the Air Force--the "Space Command," which is supposed to coordinate all Air Force, Navy and Army activity connected with military space operations and with the use of the space shuttle.

All of this attests to the fundamental reorganization of U.S. policy in regard to the use of outer space, aimed primarily at the militarization of the new cosmic potential derived by the United States from the operation of the space shuttle.

American experts have said: "Perhaps the most powerful potential weapon in the U.S. arsenal will be a gigantic shuttle.... The space shuttle will let a multitude of genies out of the bottle."¹⁵ It is true that the creation of this system will change U.S. military space capabilities more in the qualitative than in the quantitative sense. Suffice it to say that potential military payloads put in orbit will increase from approximately 20 tons in 1975 to 600 tons a year in the mid-1980's. A single shuttle can carry a payload measuring 4.6 x 18.3 meters and weighing up to 29.5 tons in its hold, and before the end of the 1980's the Pentagon plans to use the shuttle to carry its payloads more than 100 times, which will amount to a load of around 3,000 tons put in orbit close to the earth.

The Defense Department has invested approximately 1 billion dollars in this program, but the total cost of just the research and development is around 8.5 billion dollars, and the figure rises to more than 13.5 billion if all expenditures on the system are included.¹⁶ Despite its small share of the expenses in comparison to NASA, the Pentagon plans to use around one-third of all the programmed flights. According to the chief editor of AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, "the Department of Defense has openly called NASA's shuttle an 'important and integral part of our future military space activity' and the Defense Department will be its priority user."¹⁷ Once again, we have graphic proof of the most active involvement of U.S. civilian industry in the sphere of military activity, which has been particularly pronounced under the present administration.

The Pentagon leadership's frank statements about the military value of space systems are also new. It has already been noted that these systems are being described more and more unequivocally by the American military and political leadership as means of safeguarding offensive capabilities. Air Force Secretary H. Mark has drawn the following conclusion: "Whether we view this from a pessimistic or optimistic standpoint, it is clear that space activity will play an important role in our strategic strength."¹⁸

In addition to playing a leading role as means of supporting the offensive potential of armed forces, U.S. space systems will also be used in direct aggressive operations in space. General T. Stafford, assistant chief of Air Force staff, one of the astronauts who flew to the moon, has openly suggested the following possibility: "Under certain conditions, outer space could be used as an attractive stage for a show of strength." And he goes on to "justify" this: "A conflict in space will not violate national boundaries or kill people, but it could serve to demonstrate our resoluteness quite clearly for a relatively modest price."¹⁹

We will now examine the main U.S. space research and development programs, but first we should note that virtually all military satellites will be put in orbit with the aid of the space shuttle from 1983 on.

The Navstar global position system consists of 24 satellites weighing 450 kilograms each and measuring 1.5 x 5.3 meters, which will be put in orbit at an altitude of around 20,000 kilometers by 1985 and will form a kind of network around the earth. By constantly transmitting coded signals, this system will give an unlimited number of special receivers (plans already call for 27,000) information about coordinates and speed in three dimensions with accuracy surpassing 10 meters and a few centimeters per second respectively. The receivers will be small in size and can be mounted on missiles, aircraft and ships and can even be carried in infantry packs. All branches of the U.S. and NATO armed forces and some civilian ships and airplanes will be equipped with them.

In all, the U.S. Defense Department spent more than 700 million dollars on the Navstar program by 1980, with the total cost of the program estimated at around 4 billion dollars. The cost of the portable signal receivers will range from 10,000 to 50,000 dollars, and it will weigh between 4.5 and 9 kilograms.

The purpose of the Navstar program was set forth by W. Perry, director of the Pentagon's research and development agency: "The accessibility of precise position data is quite obviously important in the disposition of our new and highly accurate weapons. The more effective collection and generalization of observation and reconnaissance data from many sources is probably not as evident.... This is why the GPS program is important not only for weapon delivery systems, but is also a key element of the combined potential of reconnaissance and communications."²⁰

Receivers of Navstar signals have already been developed for placement on ballistic and cruise missiles, which will give them tracking accuracy of around 10 meters.²¹ Experiments to increase the accuracy of ballistic missiles with the aid of the six Navstar "technological" satellites that have already been launched are already being conducted as part of the Minuteman, Poseidon, Trident-1 and Trident-2 programs. "Just the placement of the GPS receiver on a missile submarine, and not even on its SLBM, can reduce navigation error (to 15 meters) and increase the accuracy of

Poseidon and Trident SLBM's by an estimated 30 percent and 50 percent respectively. Much greater accuracy would be guaranteed as a result of the effective placement of GPS receivers on the SLBM's themselves."22 The use of the GPS for the guidance of advanced types of MARV'ed warheads is already being planned.

Although the equipment of GPS satellites is "extremely insensitive to jamming" and "quite viable," the United States will not rely exclusively on GPS-guided strategic nuclear systems, but plans to use back-up inertial guidance systems, mapped homing, etc.

The intensive development of satellite systems of photo and radar reconnaissance apparently fits in with the Pentagon idea of "counterforce strategic warfare," as they can aid in the determination of target coordinates for new systems of pinpoint accuracy weapons and in the preliminary topographic mapping of locations for self-steering systems--cruise missiles, the Pershing-2, MARV'ed warheads and others. Although the research and development programs involving these satellite systems are confidential, their intensification can be judged by the sharp increase in appropriations for the U.S. Defense Department agency in which these programs are being carried out. Under the Carter Administration, the research and development expenditures of the National Security Agency and the Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Defense Department have risen 79 percent--from 188.6 million dollars in 1976 to 337.3 million in 1980, and if expenditures on the purchase and operation of equipment are included--from 853.6 million to 1.2 billion. The total research and development expenditures of the Defense Communications and Defense Mapping agencies of the Defense Department increased almost 60 percent in the same period.

But the most rapid increase in expenditures has been seen in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which specializes primarily in space programs--a rise from 214 million to 462 million dollars in 4 years (1976-1980). It is in this agency that new, highly sensitive "mosaic gages," which can detect targets in space at a distance of up to 40,000 kilometers and accurately calculate their trajectory, are being worked out as part of the missile tracking equipment program. The program's first satellites are supposed to be launched in 1981. Another approach to the tracking of objects in space is represented by the "High-Altitude Optics" (HALO) program, in which the DARPA is making extensive use of the achievements of civilian microelectronics. An experimental satellite, the "Mini-HALO," capable of detecting and tracking many objects in space at once with the aid of a special telescope, spectral filters, detector antennae, in-flight computers and so forth, is to be launched in 1984. As part of the "Teal Ruby" program, it is possible that tests will begin in 1981 on a satellite which, with the aid of thousands of detector infrared gage elements and an in-flight computer, will detect and track strategic missiles and bombers in flight. As part of the "Synthetic Aperture Radar" project, the DARPA has also worked out a system consisting of several satellites, the "Clipper Bow," equipped with powerful radar devices for

tracking ships in the ocean and other objects. Plans call for the launching of these satellites in 1984.

It should be added that the United States now has a reconnaissance satellite network to detect launchings and observe and track ballistic missiles, created as part of the "Defense Support Program." The cost of developing this "most sensitive reconnaissance system," consisting of 12 satellites weighing 1.2 tons each and measuring approximately 2.8 x 6.7 meters, equipped with an infrared telescope, has been estimated at 2.2 billion dollars by 1982. The abovementioned programs for the creation of new reconnaissance satellite systems should heighten their operational-tactical characteristics and make them less vulnerable. Because they are much more complex in design, the new systems will be considerably more expensive.

All satellite reconnaissance systems have one offensive aspect, which has been pointed out by American expert R. Olridge: "The tracking of all objects in space and the provision of data for aiming at enemy satellites presupposes the ability to destroy these objects."²³ And the means of destroying these objects, as was pointed out above, are now being actively developed in the United States. It is this that constitutes the military danger of these satellite systems.

New satellite command, control and communication systems are also being developed for the potential to wage prolonged "limited strategic warfare." Their main features are increased viability, noise resistance and handling capacity. The third generation of military communication satellites should be deployed in 1980. The research and development costs of this project have been estimated at 261 million dollars, and the purchase of 12 satellites will cost 868 million dollars. According to plans, six satellites weighing 730 kilograms each will be simultaneously put in a geostatic orbit with a projected service life of 10 years.

The Fleetcom and Afloatcom system are intended for the reliable command and control of all nuclear forces of the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Two of the four Fleetcom satellites, weighing 843 kilograms each and measuring 6.6 x 13.2 meters, have already been put in geostatic orbits, and have up to 21 SHF channels with a handling capacity--10 channels for the Navy, 12 for the Air Force (as part of the Afloatcom system, also deployed on other satellites), and 1 channel in reserve for the supreme command.

In addition to these systems, a multipurpose and ultra-secret "satellite information system" is now in the last stages of completion. It will consist of six satellites, which will also command U.S. nuclear forces. The research and development have already cost 196 million dollars, and more than 500 million dollars will be allocated for purchases by 1982.

But a decision has already been made to develop a new and better strategic satellite communications system in the 1980's. The satellites will be put in orbit around the earth at an altitude of approximately 200,000 kilometers--"the highest steady orbit on this side of the moon"--and will have

extensive maneuvering capability, which is supposed to guarantee their "total invulnerability."

So that strategic weapon systems can be precisely guided to their targets at any time and in any kind of weather, and so that the combat readiness of operational-tactical forces can be ensured, the U.S. Defense Department is sharply expanding its own system of weather satellites. Appropriations of 704 million dollars by 1982, for 51 satellites weighing 480 kilograms each and measuring 1.2 x 3.9 meters, are planned in the military weather satellite program. Four of these satellites have already been put in orbit close to the earth at an altitude of 830 kilometers. This clearly shows how much importance the Pentagon places on the heightened combat readiness of armed forces in its plans for the future.

There is no special need to prove that the third of the U.S. military establishment's main efforts in the area of research and development--the active involvement of civilian industry and the nation's scientific potential in the sphere of militaristic activity--is completely consistent with the Carter Administration's goal of achieving military and technical superiority to the USSR.

The most general conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that tendencies toward emphasis on the "position of strength," similar to tendencies of the early 1960's but with slight differences, are once again apparent in U.S. military and political strategy. Whereas the United States openly declared the goal of "strategic superiority" and "arms race regulation" during the Kennedy-McNamara era, the Carter Administration has stressed the need for "technological" or qualitative superiority and "arms control." Echoes of the past are also clearly heard in the U.S. refusal to take real steps toward disarmament on the basis of equality and equivalent security and in its attempts to guarantee the military superiority of the NATO bloc. These are dangerous lapses into the cold war era, but present realities testify that the situation in the world has definitely changed. Those who have lost contact with reality and are designing new means of mass destruction should be reminded of this.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The FY 1979 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition," 1 February 1978, pp VIII-1, VIII-4.
2. "Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1980," H. Brown, Secretary of Defense, 25 January 1979, p 253.
3. "SALT II and the Costs of Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces," Staff Working Paper, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, Wash., September 1979, pp 4, 5.

4. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, August 1979, p 54.
5. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 29 January 1979, p 112.
6. ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, June 1979, p 36; AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, June 1979, p 47.
7. "FY 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements," Statements Submitted to the Congress by the President Pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Wash., 1978, pp 56, 58.
8. "FY 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements," Wash., 1979, pp 30-31.
9. "Department of Defense Annual Report FY 1980," p 127.
10. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 16 October 1978, p 48.
11. Ibid., pp 48-49.
12. "Evaluation of FY 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements: Towards More Informed Congressional Participation in National Security Policy-making," Report Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Wash., 3 January 1979, p 101.
13. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 3 September 1979, p 57; 17 July 1978, p 14.
14. Ibid., 16 October 1978, pp 24-26.
15. NEWSWEEK, 6 December 1978, p 36.
16. "Space Shuttle 1978 Status Report," Wash., 1978, p 1; "Space Shuttle Program Cost, Performance, and Schedule Review," U.S. House of Representatives, Wash., August 1979, p 48.
17. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, August 1979, p 58.
18. Ibid., p 43.
19. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 3 September 1979, p 57.
20. "The FY 1979 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition," pp VII-22.
21. "FY 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements," p 120.
22. "FY 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements," p 112.
23. THE NATION, 23 March 1978, p 334.

UNITED STATES: ENERGY PROBLEMS

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 117-125

[Report of session of Scientific Council of the Economic, Political and Ideological Problems of the United States, USSR Academy of Sciences, held at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences to analyze U.S. energy problems]

[Text] The council session was opened by its chairman, Deputy Director G. Ye. Skorov of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISKAN), who noted that the United States had experienced two energy crises in the 1970's (in 1973-1974 and in 1979). They are sometimes regarded as two phases of a single energy crisis. It seems, however, that this opinion is groundless. A crisis is not something that is permanent. Crises come and go. This is true of the energy crisis and of other structural crises. The energy problem is quite another matter--that is, the problem of finding new sources of energy, of guaranteed energy supplies, of energy consumption and so forth. The United States will have to deal with these problems even in the future.

If we look at the two energy crises of the 1970's, we can see that, in spite of their quite significant differences, the main reason for both was not a physical shortage of resources, but changes in energy supply conditions. In the first case, there was a sharp rise in prices and a brief interruption in the supply process when the Arab countries used oil as a political weapon (by imposing an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and Holland). This was a temporary factor, but it had an effect, causing a leap in prices that was called an oil price revolution. In the second case, the change in energy supply conditions was connected with events in Iran, with reduced oil production in this country and with the stabilization of production levels in other OPEC countries.

These two energy crises demonstrated the shaky balance between resources and consumption and between production and consumption in the capitalist world. A reduction of 1 or 2 percent in the resources in this balance is enough to create panic in the market, which leads to a sharp rise in

demand, and this gives rise to an equally sharp rise in prices and the birth of a crisis situation.

Despite the more than quintuple nominal increase in oil prices (in 1974-1979), the actual price rise in the open market in Rotterdam was almost twice as high. And whereas the world price of OPEC oil shipments is now 30 dollars a barrel, the figure was close to 40 dollars in Rotterdam in the spring of 1980.

If we take a sober look at what was happening in the 1960's, however, it could seem that there was no real oil shortage of any importance in the West at that time. In the 1970's the situation in this area became much more complex. The situation will apparently change once again in the 1980's. It could change under the influence of two factors, one connected with consumption and the other with production. Consumption is still rising. At a conference of the heads of state and government of the United States and six other major capitalist countries in June 1979, a decision was made to freeze oil imports at the 1978 level for the six other nations and at the 1979 level for the United States. Naturally, no one can now predict whether this decision will be implemented or not. But this is the first serious decision of this kind on the matter. The 20 states belonging to the International Energy Agency decided to set oil consumption ceilings for 1980. This was also the first decision of its kind since the time when the agency was established in 1974. If these plans are carried out, the West might be able to prevent the extreme exacerbation of the oil situation. But this is only one side of the coin.

The other side concerns oil shipments and production. In summer 1979 Libya announced that it was considering the reduction of oil production for 2 years. At that time, the bourgeois press called this a bluff and an attempt to blackmail the West. But the possibility of considerable cuts in oil production and temporary restrictions on oil deliveries, as the events in Iran have shown, cannot be excluded. If the disparity between the growth of consumption and the growth of production or the present production level should increase, there could be a much more severe energy crisis than the present one.

Current developments in the United States, where more than a third of all the oil produced in the capitalist world is consumed, are of particular interest in this connection. The first of the matters of particular interest to us today pertains to the content and nature of the energy crisis in the United States. What are its contributing factors and causes? Is it true that it is connected with an absolute shortage of resources? Or does the problem lie in the peculiar structure of the energy balance or the specific organization of oil consumption, or does the policy of the monopolies lie at the basis of the crisis, with some of their difficulties playing a definite part? These are questions which require analysis and investigation. The second matter, which has still not been thoroughly analyzed and, unfortunately, does not fit into the program of today's

meeting, in the effect of the energy crisis on the state of the U.S. economy--yesterday, today and in the near future. The third matter is the question of how the American economy will escape the current problems in the energy sphere.

These matters are of interest to us in the Soviet Union as well. The global nature of the energy problem and the similarity of some of the technical and economic objectives in the energy sphere in the United States and the USSR are motivating us to study and carefully weigh all of the positive aspects of the American experience--naturally, with total regard for the fundamental differences between the Soviet and American socioeconomic systems.

I. N. Karpov stressed in his report that the energy crisis in the capitalist world is primarily a structural crisis, arising from the capitalist energy industry's excessive reliance on oil, which represents only 6 percent of the total nonrenewable energy resources on the planet. Oil became the main source of energy not only by virtue of its superior technical and economic properties, but also as a result of the policy of oil monopolies, which was aimed at the artificial reduction of the price of oil--in comparison to coal (based on heating potential)--for the purpose of taking over the market. This policy was accompanied by ever-increasing shipments of cheap oil from the developing countries, the accelerated rise of energy requirements in the production sphere and substantial changes in the structure of the world capitalist energy balance in favor of oil and natural gas (from 16 percent in 1920 to 77 percent in 1978).¹

The mass import of cheap oil became an important factor of scientific and technical progress in the developed capitalist countries. At the same time, it gave rise to wasteful practices and impeded the development of their own fuel and energy base and of alternative energy sources. Between 1950 and 1978, for example, U.S. consumption of oil and petroleum products almost tripled, while oil production increased only 1.5-fold. The shortage was made up by imports, which increased almost 10-fold. The increased imports of cheap oil from the developing countries were regarded in the United States as a grand action intended not only to produce considerable economic gains, but also to protect U.S. strategic interests by preserving America's own energy resources. This was the common policy of monopolistic capital and the state.

The energy crisis is also a crisis in imperialism's relationship with the developing countries. Even at the time of the first rise in world oil prices, the oil producing countries stressed the need to eradicate the "traditional" system of the exploitation of their people by the oil monopolies and to establish prices based on the cost of deriving energy from alternative sources. Calculations show that between 1960 and 1973, when all of the OPEC countries earned 95 billion dollars in the form of oil revenues, the United States and other imperialist states earned 600-700 billion dollars in net profit. Moreover, the actual expenditures of energy in, for example, the U.S. processing industry between 1950 and 1970

decreased at an average of 1.7 percent a year. This was made possible by the situation in which control by the oil cartel over all stages of oil production and refining gave foreign trade in oil the nature of intra-organizational deliveries within the framework of multinational oil monopolies. This made it possible to set and maintain low monopoly prices on imported oil. At the same time, due to inflation, in 1972 for example, the developing countries acquired 50 percent less machine-building products than in 1958 for the revenues from the same quantity of oil.

The fuel and energy balance in the United States took on a particularly abnormal nature. In 1978, for example, more than three-quarters of the consumption of all energy systems was accounted for by oil and gas (47.1 percent for oil and 29.8 percent for natural gas), while coal represented 20.7 percent and hydraulic and nuclear energy represented only 2.4 percent.

The excessively high level of energy consumption and its abnormal, lop-sided reliance on foreign oil were the main reasons for the present energy difficulties of the United States. According to the calculations of American economists, for example, known oil reserves in the United States are constantly decreasing--from 4.4 billion tons in 1975 to 3.8 billion in 1978. The rise in the number of new wells after the lifting of oil price controls has still not reversed the tendency toward a progressive decrease in known oil reserves.

Natural gas holds a prominent place in the nation's energy balance, with its output reaching 557 billion cubic meters in 1978. Its proportion in the energy balance, however, is expected to drop from 29.8 percent in 1978 to 19 percent in 1985. Forecasts of this kind are based on the decrease in known natural gas reserves recorded over several years (from 6.7 trillion cubic meters in 1975 to 5.8 trillion in 1978). The rise in the price of gas (in 1979) and the continuous reinforcement of incentives for monopolies to prospect for gas in the United States, as well as the possibility of arranging for deliveries of natural gas from Mexico and the Canadian north, which could take place in the 1980's, are not likely to significantly increase the proportion accounted for by natural gas in the energy balance. According to American estimates, gas imports will increase from 26.8 billion cubic meters in 1978 to 67.9 billion in 1982.

Coal deposits in the nation have been estimated at 3 trillion tons, enough for 300-400 years. Carter's new energy program envisages the doubling of coal output by 1985--up to 1.1 billion tons. According to the forecasts of the U.S. Department of Energy, however, the level will rise to only 900-965 million tons by that time. Moreover, many American experts believe that this part of the program will encounter great difficulties even if the prices of competing types of fuel remain fairly high.²

According to American experts, the synthetic fuel production volume will not exceed 2 percent of total energy consumption in 1985.

The prospects of nuclear energy in the United States are probably the least certain due to sharp conflicts in national public opinion regarding the expediency of its intensive development. For example, whereas the assumption in 1974 was that the total capacity of nuclear power plants would be around 2 billion kilowatts by the year 2000, the 1977 prediction was a much more modest indicator--380 million. Nonetheless, given the rapid growth of energy consumption in the United States, the depletion of hydraulic energy potential of many regions, the rise in the price of imported oil and natural gas and the existence of considerable uranium deposits, it is quite possible that nuclear energy will be developing more rapidly. The proportion accounted for by nuclear power plants in total energy production, for example, will rise from 11 percent in 1978 to approximately 20 percent in 1985.

American forecasts assign a prominent place to solar, wind, tide, biomass and geothermal energy and several other renewable energy resources. According to the forecasts of the President's Council on Environmental Quality, these will cover around 25 percent of all U.S. energy needs by the beginning of the 21st century, and up to 50 percent by 2020.

In spite of all this, no major effort has been made to reorganize power engineering in the United States. If the inflationary rise in prices is taken into account, there has essentially been no increase in annual appropriations for the development of the basic energy branches, and the proportion accounted for by the entire energy complex in total capital investments in the economy has even decreased--from 17.1 percent in 1974 to 13 percent in 1978. All of this proves once again that long-term regulation of the energy balance by the state cannot be effective in the absence of a state sector and in the presence of monopoly domination in U.S. power engineering.

Nonetheless, the urgency of this problem is forcing ruling circles to continue the search for solutions. State energy strategy now emphasizes more effective fuel conservation measures. In recent years, per capita energy consumption in the United States has been double the FRG figure and triple the figure in Japan, while the per capita GNP in the United States is already virtually the same as the FRG and Japanese figures.

Despite all the difficulties involved in the reorganization of power engineering, the process of adapting the U.S. economy to the new energy situation has already begun. In 1978-1979, for example, the average annual rate of increase in the GNP was 4.4 percent, but energy consumption increased by only 1.9 percent. During these 2 years, the Americans acquired energy conservation equipment and devices costing 4.3 billion dollars and applied to the government for the necessary credit. Work was begun on the technological reorganization of several machine-building branches, the development of new types of energy conservation equipment and devices and the mastery of new technology for the production of synthetic fuel. Technological reorganization is primarily evident in the automotive industry.

It appears that the energy difficulties of the United States and the measures to overcome them will have equally important political, socio-economic and military-strategic consequences. This increases the need for the constant in-depth analysis of their nature and their effects on contemporary capitalist economies and politics.

Yu. I. Rigin said that one of the consequences of the energy crisis of 1973-1974 was that conservation and the efficient use of fuel and energy resources actually became one of the primary objectives of the American Administration's economic policy. The line of energy conservation was first recorded in legislative form in December 1975, in the special Energy Policy and Energy Conservation Act, and was reaffirmed in the October 1978 National Energy Act. Even American experts admit that the problem of energy conservation in the United States is much more pressing than in any other industrially developed country.

The major guidelines of current U.S. policy in this area are the following: the more effective use of energy in transportation; the gradual conversion of electric power plants and enterprises from liquid fuel to coal and other alternative energy sources; the better insulation of residential, trade and administrative buildings.

The administration is particularly concerned about the increasing scales of fuel consumption in transportation, particularly by motor vehicles, which have become excessive in the United States. Around 40-50 percent of all the oil consumed in the nation is used to produce gasoline. Liquid fuel expenditures for the needs of motor transport are almost equivalent to total oil and petroleum product imports in recent years.

According to the administration, the best way of reducing gasoline consumption lies in the conversion of the automotive industry to the production of economy cars. Energy effectiveness standards for motor vehicles, beginning with the 1978 models, were stipulated in the abovementioned 1975 law. Mileage requirements for 1980 have been set at 11.8 liters per 100 kilometers, as opposed to the 17 liters (on the average) in the mid-1970's. A standard of 8.6 liters has already been set for the 1985 models. For the first time in U.S. history, the law specifies the labeling of new car models with their expected mileage figures. The total petroleum savings from these measures should amount, according to the administration's estimates, to at least 50 million tons a year by the end of the 1980's.

Besides this, in 1978 Congress passed President Carter's proposal of a tax deduction for purchasers of cars with economy engines and the establishment of a high excise tax on the sale of multicylinder vehicles with excessive gas consumption.

According to American estimates, if the present tendency continues, the energy effectiveness of motor transport will almost double by the year 2000. This should reduce gasoline consumption in the nation by around

30 percent in comparison to the present level (380 million tons a year) even if the total number of automobiles should increase to 140 million by that time, as opposed to 110 million in 1978.

The administration hopes to provide incentives for the gradual conversion of motor transport to new types of fuel, particularly gasohol--a mixture consisting of 90 percent gasoline and 10 percent alcohol derived from agricultural raw materials. It has been decided, in particular, to exempt this fuel from federal gas tax (around 1 cent per liter) until the end of 1984. The assumption is that this kind of government subsidizing will allow gasohol to compete with nonethyalted types of gasoline. There are already around 1,000 gas stations in the United States which offer car drivers gasohol. The Carter Administration has proposed the construction of 100 more plants for the production of alcohol in the nation, intended exclusively for gasohol production, so that their total output will reach 1.14 billion liters by 1982 and double this volume by 1985 (in the more distant future, according to the calculations of the Department of Energy, the United States will be able to cover up to 40 percent of the entire demand for gasoline with gasohol if necessary). This means that even if the present level of fuel consumption should stay the same, the United States will be able to reduce its need for oil for gasoline production by at least 50 million tons annually by the mid-1980's.

Designs of passenger cars powered by diesel fuel and accumulator batteries are arousing more interest. According to the plans of General Motors, for example, almost 13 percent of all of this firm's vehicles will be equipped with diesel engines by 1985 (5 percent in 1979). The mileage of these vehicles is approximately 25 percent better than that of automobiles with conventional gas engines.

Great significance is being attached to the projected conversion of electric power plants and enterprises from liquid fuel to coal and other alternative energy sources. The new federal energy program, which is now being discussed in Congress, envisages a 50-percent decrease in the liquid fuel consumption of electric power plants and industrial enterprises in the 1980's. These enterprises will gradually convert to other types of fuel, primarily coal and, in part, to nuclear and solar energy. The federal government is expected to give them a total of 5 billion dollars in loans and subsidies for this purpose.

Besides this, according to the energy act of 1978, the burning of petroleum products and natural gas in new power plants and industrial boilers will be prohibited. Exceptions will be made in those cases when the use of coal could violate existing environmental purity standards. Companies investing capital in coal-operated boilers will be granted an additional tax deduction (over and above existing ones) in the amount of 10 percent of their investment in fixed capital. Conversely, companies burning petroleum products and natural gas in boilers will lose certain benefits.

The administration also sees considerable opportunities for energy conservation in the public utility sector. According to official American data, 40 percent of all the energy now consumed in the United States is used in the heating, cooling and maintenance of buildings, and 30-50 percent of these energy expenditures are unnecessary. The new federal program essentially supplements the conservation measures envisaged for this sector in the 1978 law. The main guidelines of this kind of conservation are the following: the better insulation of residential, trade and administrative buildings; the limited use of liquid fuel for residential heating; the maintenance of a strictly regulated temperature level in residences and administrative buildings; the labeling of household appliances with energy effectiveness ratings. By the end of the 1980's, heat and energy conservation measures are expected to extend to 90 percent of all residences in the nation.

The total impact of all the energy conservation measures proposed by the administration should amount, according to official estimates, to at least 100 million tons a year, calculated in oil units, by the end of the 1980's. In cost terms, even based on the current price of oil in the world capitalist market (30 dollars a barrel, on the average), this savings would amount to almost 22 billion dollars a year.

An investigation of the U.S. Administration's energy program and the measures for its implementation would be of definite practical value to Soviet economic organizations. Energy conservation is the quickest and cheapest way of solving the present energy problem. Capital expenditures on energy conservation, no matter how large, are recouped in a relatively short time. It must be borne in mind, however, that the course of energy conservation presupposes perceptible changes in the economic structure, particularly changes connected with the development of such new branches as the production of various types of energy-saving devices.

N. I. Kistanov noted the increased attention the U.S. Government and energy companies are paying to coal as a promising energy source. Its reserves are huge but its use is limited.

In order to overcome this inconsistency, the U.S. Government has drawn up, and submitted to Congress, a program for the creation of industries for the production of synthetic fuel from coal, oil-bearing shales and biomass, at a total cost of 88 billion dollars. In accordance with the program approved by the Congress, only around 20 billion dollars will be spent on the development of this production in 1980-1985 (including 2.2 billion in the 1979/80 fiscal year). The rest of the funds will be spent in 1986-1995. Congress has set the goal of producing 75 million tons a year of synthetic fuel (calculated in oil units) by 1995, instead of the 125 million by 1990 proposed by the administration.

The idea of producing synthetic fuel from coal is not a new one in the United States. Even before World War II there were several dozen plants

here which manufactured gas from coal for use in the housing sector. But these enterprises were unable to survive the competition when oil production grew, and they went bankrupt. In those years, plants in several European countries were producing synthetic oil, but they were highly unprofitable and were closed down after the war when cheap oil was abundant in the world market.

At present, the industrial production of synthetic oil from coal is being carried out only at one plant in South Africa. Its output is 273,000 tons a year. In 1974 South Africa began to build two large plants (in Secunda) under the supervision of the American Fluor firm.

The United States still does not have a single plant for the industrial production of synthetic oil and gas from coal and oil-bearing shales. There are 25 experimental plants and installations where some of the technological processes of this production are being perfected.

The federal government is now working on several research programs aimed at maximizing the spheres for the use of coal both in its natural form and in the form of liquid and gaseous fuel. In fiscal year 1978, 580 million dollars from the federal budget was appropriated for these projects. In fiscal years 1979 and 1980, expenditures were supposed to be around 688 million and 789 million respectively. Among the eight current research and development programs, the major ones in 1979 were the following: coal gasification--175 million dollars, coal liquefaction--206 million, and the direct combustion of coal--50 million dollars. All of the research on synthetic fuel production is being conducted by the federal government jointly with large oil companies, taking on three-quarters of all the expense of building experimental plants and demonstration facilities and conducting experiments.

Several of the prerequisites for the establishment of considerable control over the coal industry and the production of synthetic fuel from coal by the oil monopolies are present. In particular, they have research organizations which are investigating promising sources of energy (coal, oil-bearing shales and bituminous gravel). They have the best material and financial facilities for organizing the production of synthetic oil and gas from coal. According to the data of the Federal Trade Commission, the 8 largest oil companies owned around 19 percent of all known coal reserves by 1974, and the 20 largest oil and gas companies owned around 38 percent. The same 8 companies accounted for around 35 percent of all of the coal mined, and the 20 accounted for more than 48 percent.

The United States has huge reserves of oil-bearing shales. According to estimates, they contain around 75 billion tons of oil. This is equivalent to all known world oil reserves. If oil shales of lower quality are included in the total, the quantity of oil they contain can then be estimated at 270 billion tons--a figure 50 times as great as known crude oil reserves in the United States.

Several large companies in the oil and gas industry are now perfecting new technology for the derivation of oil from shale on land leased from the federal government. Their total expenditures on this work in 1979-1983 will amount to 3.9 billion dollars.

There are difficulties in establishing the production of oil from coal and shale. They are both economic and technological in nature. Another serious problem is the need to search out tremendous financial resources. According to the energy program, in 1995 the output of synthetic fuel, in liquid measurement, should amount to 75 million tons. According to expert estimates, this will necessitate the construction of 30 plants with an output of 2.5 million tons of oil each, and the cost of each plant should come to around 2-3 billion dollars. On the whole, the establishment of branch of industry will require around 300 billion dollars.

The operating costs of synthetic fuel production in the United States are now estimated at 100-200 dollars a ton. Naturally, these American estimates are only approximate figures because the United States has no experience in building enterprises of this kind.

The first enterprises of this type will not be opened until the second half of the 1980's. Even these 30 plants, however, will not solve the problem of the oil shortage. According to the Exxon company, it will take 300 plants with an output of 2.5 million tons of synthetic oil a year each to cover the shortage at the beginning of the 21st century, and this will take 30 years.

At the same time, the shortage of liquid fuel and the rising price of this fuel have motivated U.S. oil companies to increase their capital investments in the oil and gas industry in the last 2 or 3 years, and this will lead to the growth of production and capacities in the oil industry. The fact that the level of oil imports in the United States has remained high, despite the rapid and sharp rise in world prices, must also be taken into account. This signifies that the world price still does not fully reflect the actual social and consumer value of (nonrenewable) oil resources. It is quite possible that the United States will continue to increase its imports in the 1980's.

In this connection, M. M. Sokolov asked whether the terms "monopoly" and "low monopoly prices" on oil were not contradictory. After all, monopolies were always associated in our minds with high monopoly prices in the past.

To answer this question, we must give primary consideration to the fact that the oil monopolies began their vigorous takeover of the world capitalist fuel market in the postwar period and could only do this with the aid of low world prices. Since oil was plentiful in the market and the cost of its production was relatively low, they were able to gradually push coal, as oil's leading competitor, out of the market.

Whereas world oil prices prior to World War II were connected to some degree with prices in the U.S. domestic market, in the postwar period this connection disappeared and world prices were set in accordance with the Western European level. It was at this time that world oil prices could be described as low monopoly prices. After pushing coal out of the market, the oil monopolies covered their "losses" resulting from these low prices by raising their profit margin. For this reason, there is no contradiction here.

The developing countries were quite justified in maintaining that world oil prices were too low and had to be raised. At first, the criterion or point of departure for the rise in these prices was the correlation of domestic oil and coal prices in the United States. The price of coal here was approximately one-third as high as the price of oil (in conventional units). Prior to 1973, for example, oil was being sold at 23 dollars a ton on the U.S. market, while coal for heat and electric power plants was being sold at 7-8 dollars a ton. We know what followed: World oil prices rose approximately 10-fold in the 1970's.

V. A. Nazarov asked if these were high or low monopoly prices. In the past, before the price increase, we said that world crude oil prices were high monopoly prices. There was reason to call them this. Between 1961 and 1970--that is, just before the rapid rise in oil prices--the price of "f.o.b. Ras Tanura" crude oil was always 1.80 dollars per barrel, with average production costs of under 20 cents a barrel in the Middle East. This means that the price was approximately 9 times as high as the production cost. It is quite obvious that this huge difference guaranteed profits considerably above the norm even before the rise in prices.

Why are we now saying that the prices set by the OPEC countries are low monopoly prices? What arguments corroborate this? The fact that the price of oil was lower than the price of coal at any given time proves nothing. This merely testifies that the cost of producing oil fell much lower than the cost of producing coal. But each ton of oil can produce a much higher profit than a ton of coal. It is only on this basis, that oil production in the Middle East guarantees profits exceeding the norm, that I cannot agree, V. A. Nazarov said, that the world price of oil is now a high monopoly price. I simply want this matter to be given careful consideration. In particular, L. N. Karpov's hypothesis (in my opinion, this is still only a hypothesis) that low monopoly prices can be discussed if we exclude such categories as rent differentials, deserves attention. As we know, the cost of crude minerals includes production costs, average profit and the rent differential in the mining industry. It is possible that the super-profits in the oil industry of the Middle East represent rent, and not monopoly profits arising from the monopoly position of the OPEC group in the world capitalist market.

N. A. Sakharov discussed some of the political aspects of the problem and the interrelations between the administration and the oil monopolies when national energy policy was being worked out.

criticism of the oil monopolies occupied an important place in Carter's campaign in 1976. He continued this criticism in later public statements when he was already president. He said, for example: "We will not let the oil companies hold up production until the price of gasoline goes up." "We demand that the oil companies cooperate with us. If they will not cooperate voluntarily, we will unhesitatingly use the powers invested in me as Vice to order the oil companies to satisfy the basic energy needs of our nation."

Statements of this kind could create the impression of a sharp conflict between the Carter Administration and the oil business. But this was only the semblance of a conflict. For example, the Carter Administration lifted oil and gas price controls. This was precisely what the oil business had wanted for 20 years but had been opposed by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. Later, at the end of 1979, the government appropriated 20 billion dollars over the next 5 years for the production of synthetic fuel as an alternative energy source. This was what the largest oil companies had been striving for quite vigorously for 15 years. In 1973, for example, S. Rockefeller used his position as vice-president to propose the federal subsidization of synthetic fuel development projects.

Carter's energy program puts considerable emphasis on alternative energy sources, primarily coal, solar energy and oil-bearing shales. When we assess this fact, however, we must bear in mind that this entire industry is monopolized to a great degree by the oil companies. For example, Exxon, Mobil Oil, Gulf Oil and other companies control many uranium deposits, the production of photocells for the conversion of sunlight into electric power, etc.

Therefore, a substantial part of Carter's energy program is directly in the interest of the oil monopolies, which are turning more and more into energy monopolies, and his verbal attacks on big capital represent only a screen for the close cooperation between the government and the oil business. Naturally, this does not mean that the program is totally in the interest of the oil monopolies. The government has to consider the interests of other monopolistic groups as well. This is attested to, in particular, by the announced course of energy conservation, and the Carter Administration's bill establishing a tax on the windfall profits of oil corporations, passed by Congress in the middle of April 1980.

Several participants in the discussion noted the sweeping, essentially global nature of many aspects of the energy problem. The discussion pointed up, in particular, the need for reorganization--to some degree--of the economic structure in the United States and in many other states, with a view to the entire problem. The last few years have irrefutably confirmed the importance of the quickest possible development of new alternative energy sources and significant changes in the structure of the world fuel and energy balance, in which oil and natural gas still prevail. The great significance of energy conservation measures has also

been confirmed as a way of guaranteeing the normal functioning of all branches of the contemporary economy, and from the standpoint of future economic development. The discussion also revealed the expediency and importance of the further comprehensive investigation of energy problems and their economic, technical and political aspects, internal and international.

FOOTNOTES

1. Several questions connected with the factors engendering and contributing to the energy crisis in the capitalist world are discussed in detail in V. I. Pavlyuchenko's article in issue No 6 for 1977--Editor's note.
2. An article on the problems and prospects of the American coal industry will be printed in a forthcoming issue of the magazine--Editor's note.
3. This topic is discussed in detail in the article "Developmental Trends in the U.S. Automotive Industry" in issue No 11 for 1979--Editor's note.

8588

CSO: 1803

CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 80
pp 126-127

[Not translated by JPRS]

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA - ekonomika, politika, ideologiya",
1980

CSO: 1803

- END -

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

10/7/80

